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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURE OF IMPORTANCE PERCEPTIONS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The perceived importance of work factors by employees 
is one of the most commonly referred to and potentially useful 
constructs in behavioral research. Importance is an integral 
part of the writing and research on job satisfaction, atti­
tudes of employees, motivation and performance prediction. 
Unfortunately, it is one of the most loosely defined concepts 
in both theoretical and empirical terms. Yet, without a clear 
definition of importance perceptions, one has difficulty 
making any coherent statement about them, their relationship 
to other concepts and their role in explaining behavior in 
organizations.
The aim of the present study is to show the centrality 
of importance in both the theoretical and empirical work of 
many prominent behavioral scientists, and to define conceptu­
ally and then empirically, the factors which contribute to the 
formulation of importance perceptions. In this way the study 
should allow future researchers to make more meaningful use of 
the importance construct. Our understanding of motivation, 
job satisfaction and other employee attitudes and their rela­
tionships to performance will be enhanced, and our knowledge 
of how to affect employee behavior will be improved.
Importance is central to the literature concerned with 
employee performance and attitudes, and this centrality pro­
vides considerable incentive for careful examination of what 
it means when someone indicates that something is important. 
Individual performance is frequently presented in the litera­
ture as being a function of choices concerning the direction, 
amplitude and persistence of effort exerted and these effort 
choices are in turn presented as being functions of the per­
ceived importance of rewards gained through performance. 
Therefore a more thorough understanding of the nature of 
importance perceptions may be helpful in explaining or influ­
encing effort choices and individual performance.
Associated with performance and motivation research is 
the large body of literature treating the individual's affec­
tive response to his work. The reliance of this literature on 
importance as an explanatory construct suggests that a more 
thorough understanding of employee attitudes may also result 
from an investigation of the nature of importance perceptions.
A review of several bodies of literature indicates that 
while a great deal of reliance has been placed upon individual 
importance perceptions in performance and attitude theory and 
research, the importance concept is not yet adequately 
developed. Very little research has focused upon the nature 
of importance itself, though a variety of conceptualizations 
may be inferred from its usage. Three basic approaches to 
defining and operationalizing importance are identified.
These are 1) a demand-based approach, 2) a need-based approach 
and 3) a value(s)-based approach. The demand-based approach 
essentially defines importance perceptions as they are 
reflected in choices or preferences between factors and makes 
no attempt to conceptualize the components which go into the 
making of those choices. Need-based approaches define impor­
tance in terms of an individual's current need-states. A 
review of the theoretical and empirical evidence for the need- 
based approaches to importance perceptions yields inconsistent 
and contradictory findings indicating the inadequacy of need 
states alone to explain importance. The values literature is 
encumbered by a wide variety of definitions of "value(s)".
Those writing from a values perspective introduced the instru­
mentation construct in order to develop a rational conceptual­
ization of importance. The value(s)-based approaches, how­
ever, fail to conceptualize the meaning of "value", thus 
leaving unanswered the question of the nature of importance 
perceptions. In sum, the absence of research literature which 
theoretically and empirically defines importance has led to a 
variety of usages which all exhibit one or more inadequacies.
The purpose of this study is to examine the usefulness 
of a cognitive structure conceptualization of importance per­
ceptions. In this study a model of importance perceptions based 
upon theories of cognitive structure is proposed. The model
developed suggests that importance is a function of 1) the 
content of the factor to be evaluated, 2) the cognitive cen­
trality of the factor and outcome(s) with which the factor is 
associated, 3) the degree of dependence of the associated out- 
come(s) upon the factor, 4) the degree to which the factor is 
critical to the attainment or maintenance of the outcome 
state and 5) the temporary salience or cognitive prominence 
of the factor or associated outcomes.
The present study theoretically and operationally 
defines each of these variables and then empirically tests the 
usefulness of such a cognitive approach to importance percep­
tions .
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE EMPLOYING THE IMPORTANCE CONSTRUCT
Before reviewing and evaluating the specific approaches 
to the importance construct as they currently appear in the 
literature, it will be useful to set importance in its general 
theoretical context. Importance appears most frequently as an 
explanatory construct in theory and research treating employee 
performance, motivation and attitudes.
Performance, Motivation and Importance Perceptions
The role attributed to importance perceptions in 
employee performance and motivation provides considerable 
incentive for a study of the importance construct. Perceived 
importance of behaviorally-determined outcomes is virtually 
unanimously held to be a critical factor in the understanding 
of human performance and motivation. As an example, one of 
the more integrative performance models suggests performance 





5. choice to exert effort
6. choice as to level of effort
7. choice as to persistence of effort
(Campbell and Pritchard, 1976). These variables are thought 
to account for differences in the level of performance between 
individuals performing the same tasks. Within individual per­
formance variability is thought to depend largely upon indi­
vidual choices about the direction, amplitude, and persistence 
of effort. Motivation may be defined as that which affects 
those effort choices. Importance is a major component in 
these behavioral choices.
A large part of the research aimed at providing knowl­
edge that will help us to understand and improve organization 
performance is built upon theories which attempt to explain 
the variance in performance between individuals of basically 
the same aptitude, abilities, skills and knowledge. This 
literature provides several possible answers to the question 
"Under what conditions might one expect differences in effort 
choices and thus performance between and within individual 
employees?" Without exception these answers involve some use 
of one form or another of the importance construct as it 
influences individual behavioral choices.
Process theories. Process theories of performance 
(e.g. Adams, 1963; Festinger, 1957; Graen, 1969; Hull, 1952; 
Lewin, 1951; Porter and Lawler, 1968; Tolman, 1932; Vroom, 
1964) seek to describe how performance occurs without focusing 
on the nature of the variables affecting performance. 
Importance perceptions play a critical role in these theories. 
Process theorists suggest that effort choices are primarily
determined by the product of 1) the perceived probability that 
a given level of performance will lead to some outcome, 2) the 
probability that a given level of effort will lead to the 
requisite performance and 3) the perceived value of the out­
come associated with the effort and performance. The greater 
the value of the outcome, ceteris parabis, the greater the 
effort. According to Locke (1969, 1976), the value of an out­
come as perceived by the employee has two components - the 
amount of pleasure or other worth to be obtained and the 
importance of that attainment (italics mine). It is suggested 
that something in the work situation which is seen as having 
an impact upon some valued outcome will be regarded as impor­
ta.it. Effective motivators should be those objects or condi­
tions which hold forth the probability of the attainment of 
desired outcomes.
While process theories of performance and motivation 
give some indication as to the place of importance perceptions 
in influencing human effort and performance, they are less 
helpful with regard to the nature and development of impor­
tance perceptions. Most process theories seem to assume some 
basic set of needs, drives or values upon which importance 
evaluations are built.
Content theories. Another set of theories, frequently 
referred to as "content" theories (Campbell and Pritchard, 
1976; Locke, 1976) attempt to conceptually define the compo­
nents of performance, including importance perceptions or some
equivalent, by describing the nature and hierarchy of the 
basic needs, drives, or values assumed by the process theories 
(Alderfer, 1969, 1972; Maslow, 1954; Murray, 1938). The per­
ceived importance of a specific factor is seen as dependent 
upon either the relative hierarchical ranking of the associat­
ed need or the relative deficiency of the need. Factors con­
tributing to the fulfillment of more basic needs are presumed 
to be more important than those associated with less basic 
needs. Also, the greater the deficiency of the need, the 
greater the perceived importance of factors related to that 
need. Conversely, according to this view, when a need is 
relatively satisfied, the factors associated with that need 
should become less important (Lawler, 1971; Maslow, 1954; 
Smith, Kendall, and Hulin, 1969).
Reinforcement theories. Another set of theories 
referred to as "reinforcement theories" (e.g. Skinner, 1948, 
1971) develop similar explanations for importance perceptions 
b u t , unlike content theorists, view needs, drives, tensions 
and other non-observable internal states as unnecessary and 
misleading. According to reinforcement theorists, the per­
ceived importance of a factor will depend primarily upon the 
positive or negative affective evaluations brought about by 
exposure to the factor stimuli. If exposure to a set of fac­
tor stimuli results in a positive (rewarding) experience, then 
that factor should increase in importance. If exposure to the 
factor results in a strongly negative experience, the factor
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may likewise increase in importance (it becomes important to 
avoid it). On the other hand, if the exposure to the factor 
stimuli does little in the way of producing positive or nega­
tive affect, then it is less likely to be perceived as 
important.
In sum, in process, content, and reinforcement 
theories of performance and motivation we do find agreement 
that the perceived importance of a factor helps to determine 
choices concerning the level and persistence of effort.
There seems to be little consensus, however, as to the nature 
and development of importance perceptions, with nothing said 
as to their stability or degree of predictability.
Employee Attitudes and Importance Perceptions
Associated with performance and motivation theory and 
research is a large body of literature treating the individ­
ual's affective response to his work. The reliance of this 
literature on importance as an explanatory construct, the very 
size of this body of literature, and the potential relation­
ship between importance and the formation and dynamic of 
individual affective responses to work provide additional 
incentive for gaining a better understanding of the nature of 
importance perceptions.
Employee attitudes toward the work they do and the 
environment in which the work is done has been one of the most 
studied areas of contemporary industrial and organizational 
research (Locke, 1976). Job satisfaction studies have clearly
dominated this investigation of worker attitudes. While 
satisfaction is variously defined and measured, it receives 
this considerable attention either because it is thought to be 
related to maximizing performance, minimizing costs attribut­
able to human behavior or because employee satisfaction is 
seen as desirable in and of itself. Regardless of which 
rationale is adopted, importance perceptions play a funda­
mental role in the theory and measurement of job satisfaction.
Most theoretical and empirical work on job satisfaction 
has focused on job situation factors such as the nature of the 
work task; relationships between supervisors, subordinates and 
co-workers; growth and development opportunities; compensation 
and other rewards; and the effectiveness and equity of organi­
zation policies, procedures and practices. The work satisfac­
tion literature gives strong evidence that differences in the 
objective work situation are likely to produce differences or 
changes in the satisfaction responses of employees (Barnowe, 
Mangione and Quinn, 1972; Lawler, 1971; Likert, 1961; Pelz, 
1951; Rosen, 1969; Vroom, 1964). Real changes in pay or bene­
fits, for example, may be expected to produce changes in the 
level of employee satisfaction (Smith, Roberts and Hulin, 1976) 
At the same time, however, the degree of satisfaction with a 
particular pay increase may vary considerably among employees 
(Hinrichs, 1969). This is because differences in satisfaction 
responses between individuals may be expected when there are 
individual differences in personality or perceptual framework
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of the employees (Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, and Welck, 1970; 
Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson and Capwell, 1957; Hulin, 1971; 
Hulin and Blood, 1968; Turner and Lawrence, 1965). Thus the 
same objective situation may elicit different responses from 
different individuals. It has been found, for example, that 
differences in "need for achievement" may account for differ­
ences in responses to promotion opportunities or job enrich­
ment efforts (Hackman, Pearce and Wolfe, 1978; Saleh and 
Grygier, 1969).
Individual differences in perceived factor importance 
is one of the most referred to variables in the literature 
used to explain differences in between- and within-individual 
affective responses to various work factors (Blood, 1969; 
Friedlander, 1965; Saleh and Grygier, 1969). While the impor­
tance of work factors has been frequently employed to explain 
differences in satisfaction between and within individuals, 
considerably less has been done to determine whether changes 
in within-individual factor satisfaction could be attributable 
to changes in importance perceptions.
Indeed, one of the characteristics of job satisfaction 
which has been frustrating to researcher and practitioner 
alike has been the tendency for levels of satisfaction within 
individuals to change without apparent antecedent changes in 
the objective situational factors (Smith, et al., 1976). That 
which receives a response of satisfied at one time may elicit 
a dissatisfied response at another time (Alderfer and Guzzo,
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1979; Cherrington, Condie, and England, 1979; Smith, et al., 
1976). The potential for importance dynamics to help explain 
satisfaction dynamics has remained relatively unexplored pri­
marily due to the limits of our understanding of the nature of 
importance perceptions and their relationship to affect.
While most behavioral scientists accept the definition 
of job satisfaction as a pleasurable or positive emotional 
state resulting from the appraisal of one's job or job experi­
ences , there is as yet little agreement as to the sources of 
the emotional state or affect. Perhaps more widely held among 
satisfaction theorists is the idea that commonly measured 
self-reports of satisfaction are composed in part of an evalu­
ation of the discrepancy between what is and what ought to be 
(Dawis and Weitzel, 1975; Katzell, 1964; Likert, 1961; Locke, 
1969; Pelz and Andrews, 1966; Rosen and Rosen, 1955; Smith, 
Kendall and Hulin, 1969). To the degree that satisfaction is 
an appraisal by the individual of what is,as compared to what 
ought to be, any changes in the standards by which the 
individual evaluates the factor may result in changes in the 
level of satisfaction. Locke (1969, 1976) argues that accu­
rate estimates of the degree of job satisfaction reflect both 
perceived discrepancies and the importance of the factor. 
Changes in the perceived importance of a particular factor 
should then be reflected in reported satisfaction (Blood, 
1969). If, for example, an employee perceives that he is 
receiving less pay than he ought to receive and amount of pay
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is very important to him, he is likely to be more dissatisfied 
than he would be if he placed less importance on amount of pay 
(Friedlander, 1965; Saleh and Grygier, 1969). Thus, self- 
reported satisfaction may differ as a function of between- 
individual or witbin-individual differences in the importance 
of the factor in question.
A number of researchers have suggested that being able 
to identify, measure and predict differences and changes in 
what is important to employees would be valuable in helping to 
determine whether such changes or differences are related to 
changes or differences in satisfation or performance (Blood, 
1969). To what extent do individual perceptions of what is 
important change? If importance perceptions do change, what
are the bases for such changes? Finally, how do changes or
differences in importance perceptions relate to satisfaction? 
It may be, as Blood (1969) assumes, that importance affects 
satisfaction. Or, it may be that positive or negative 
experiences resulting from exposure to factor stimuli affect 
the importance attached to that factor, more in keeping with
the reinforcement theories. In either case, additional in­
sight into the nature of importance perceptions should prove 
useful for gaining a better understanding of employee satis­
faction with work factors.
In sum, importance has been widely employed as an 
explanatory construct throughout the behavioral literature 
concerned with employee performance, motivation and satisfac­
13
tion. Therefore, a reliable conceptualization of the nature 
and development of importance perceptions would seem to be 
fundamental to broadening our understanding of these research 
areas. Nonetheless, though an adequate understanding of the 
crucial dimensions of importance and the cognitive contexts in 
which they occur seems necessary, a review of the literature 
reveals that there has been very little specific focus on the 
importance construct itself and there is as yet little agree­
ment concerning a framework which might account for the adop­
tion and expression of importance evaluations among employees 
(Jury, 1977).
Any attempt to advance our knowledge of the role, ante­
cedents and effects of importance perceptions on employee 
performance and attitudes should begin with a clear definition 
of what is meant by importance. Unfortunately, the importance 
construct as used in the research literature has nearly as 
many implied conceptualizations as there are studies which use 
the term. Each study is accompanied by one or more and some­
times quite diverse operationalizations. In this section we 
will review and evaluate the existing conceptualizations of 
importance in the literature and then attempt to formulate a 
useful, integrative conceptual framework for the importance 
construct.
Early Importance Studies
Even a partial review of the literature treating impor­
tance directly or indirectly, as a major focus or related side
14
issue, yields an amazing variety of explicit or implied inter­
pretations of what individuals mean when they say something is 
important. Early studies by Chant (1932), Wyatt and Langdon 
(1937), and Blum and Russ (1942) apparently were inspired by 
conflicts of opinion between management and union leaders as 
to what workers desired most in and from their work. Work 
factors nominated by the various disagreeing parties were sub­
mitted to the working electorate for a vote on which among the 
factors offered were most desired, preferred or perceived as 
most important. The basic approach was "given a free choice 
between two or more things, which would you select?" Thus, in 
these early studies, importance was often inferred from a 
ranking of factors according to which one would rather have.
Other early studies (e.g. Berdie, 1940) did not attempt to 
infer perceived importance from preference but rather asked 
informants to rank a selected group of factors according to 
their importance. In general, most early studies were similar 
in that they sought to determine which of a number of work 
factors would be ranked above others, all things considered.
A variety of operationalizations were employed, as were sever­
al possibly different conceptualizations. Table 1 illustrates 
some of the findings of these early studies. The quite strik­
ing differences in rankings obtained from the miscellaneous 
and department store workers, studied by Chant and Blum and Russ, 
and Wyatt and Langdon's women factory workers and Berdie's
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male graduates prompted Jurgensen (1947) to Investigate the 
effects of demographic characteristics on rankings of factor 
importance. Jurgensen reported significant differences in 
importance rankings for men and women on all of 10 scales 
including security, advancement, type of work, company, co­
workers, supervisor, hours, working conditions and benefits, 
with the only exception being that both men and women ranked 
pay equally. While Jurgensen did not report significance 
levels, he did examine the factor importance rankings across 
age, education and occupation and concluded that education had 
the strongest effects. As did Berdie (1940), Jurgensen used a 
forced ranking technique explaining that, since all the 
factors were likely to be quite important, a rating scale 
would not allow a clear-cut ordering of the factors.
Jurgensen also provides an example of early conceptu­
alizations of importance which appear frequently throughout 
the literature thereafter. While equating importance rankings 
with "job preferences", as did his predecessors, he clearly 
links the selection of factors and interpretation of results 
to job satisfaction. Indeed, Jurgensen's intent in the study 
was reported as "obtaining data on the relative importance, 
among job applicants, of various factors which are frequently 
mentioned as having an important bearing on job satisfaction," 
(Jurgensen, 1947, p. 555 - italics mine). It may be safe to 
conclude that this and previously mentioned early studies were 
not primarily concerned with determining whether or to what
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degree certain factors were important to workers, but rather 
with the relative ranking of factors selected because of their 
importance. Nor, apparently, were they overly concerned with 
developing a precise theoretical framework for what employees 
meant when they said something was important to them. It is 
not surprising, therefore, to find some variety in the concep­
tualizations of the importance construct in this early re­
search. In none of the early studies reviewed was importance 
conceptually defined - no attention is given to theoretically 
or empirically explaining or discovering what was meant by 
"important" or "unimportant", under what conditions something 
is considered important, nor to determining the stability of 
importance responses. In a summary of several large-scale 
studies. Stagner (1950) indicated a need to give more heed to 
this lack of clarity and consistency in conceptualization and 
operationalization. He points out, for example, that asking 
subjects directly about importance of work factors may produce 
quite different results from indirect questions about desires 
or preferences and thus to compare the two sets of results as 
if the measures were equivalent may be misleading. An 
employee may prefer a pay raise to greater job security simply 
because his position is relatively secure and yet, when asked 
"How important is job security?" may rate it as extremely 
high, perhaps much higher than an increase in pay.
In their review of approximately thirty-five studies 
which in some way employ importance, Herzberg, et al. (1957)
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provide further insight into the early conceptualizations of 
employee perceived importance of work factors. Studies cited 
by Herzberg, et al., exhibit a common characteristic mentioned 
above in reference to the study by Jurgensen (1947). That is, 
importance of job factors is not explored in an unrestricted, 
all things considered format, but are investigations of job 
factor rankings in the order of importance to job satisfaction 
(Herzberg, et al., 1957, p. 43). This represents a potential­
ly important distinction between studies employing importance, 
which Herzberg, et al., seemed to have overlooked. For within 
these authors' review of the early literature there are clear 
differences in the rankings given by employees to factors 
evaluated according to their importance to job satisfaction 
and the same or equivalent factors evaluated simply according 
to "how important" they were with no restrictions.
In their review and interpretation of previous impor­
tance studies, Herzberg, et al., contribute their own ideas as 
to how importance ought to be conceptualized when, in their 
attempt to explain the wide variety of empirical findings, they 
suggest that fluctuating situational factors and "need" changes 
make it "very difficult to predict how important these job 
factors are to any particular individual unless one knows the 
things the individual needs and wants most at the moment" (p. 50) 
Apparently, then, for Herzberg, et al., what the employee 
wants reflects his current needs and what he wants is what is 
important to him. This view of importance essentially equates
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need fulfillment with satisfaction, pleasure, and personal 
reward (p. 50). The employee is seen as satisfied with the 
job to the extent that, in general, all needs which are to be 
met by the job are fulfilled. If a particular need is not 
met, the employee becomes dissatisfied with the job factors 
which he sees as relating to that need and those factors 
become more important. Thus, Herzberg, et al., apparently 
conceive of importance in terms of demand (p. 67) or intensity 
of desire or wanting for whatever need fulfillment (satisfac­
tion) a particular job factor is thought to provide.
While terms such as need, desire, want, preference, and 
demand appear frequently in the Herzberg, et al., chapter on 
importance and are quite obviously intended to be synonymous 
with perceived importance, a number of other concepts are 
occasionally substituted for importance. Perhaps most strik­
ing, because of the way in which it is used is the association 
of importance and values. In the Herzberg, et al., usage, 
values are introduced as meaning the individual's hierarchy of 
importance of work factors. The higher the importance rank­
ing, the higher the value attached to the factor. Work factor 
importance rankings are defined in usage as being a replica­
tion of work values. This raises an interesting question con­
cerning the conceptualization of importance which we shall see 
has yet to be resolved in the literature. It is clear that 
Herzberg, et al., view importance as a nearly exact equivalent 
of both needs and values, and yet state that "an individual
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cannot always satisfy his needs and still maintain the values 
he believes are his". This presents an awkward problem for 
the conceptualization of importance. If a person perceives a 
factor as important because he has a need for it or for what 
it provides, but fulfilling that need violates a value, the 
same object or condition which would be important because it 
is needed may be seen as unimportant because of the influence 
of values. It would seem that neither needs nor values alone 
can define importance and yet we have no conceptual prescrip­
tion for how much need offsets how much value, or vice versa.
A review of more recent usages of the importance construct 
strongly suggests that this and similar other conceptual 
inadequacies have not been resolved.
An Overview of Current Approaches to Importance
A selected review of more recent literature within which 
the importance construct is found reveals a surprisingly 
diverse set of concepts either equated with or strongly associ­
ated with perceived importance of work factors. A partial 
listing of those concepts is given here to demonstrate that 
diversity.
1. Demand, wants, desires, preferences (Jurgensen,
1947; Mobley & Locke, 1970; Taylor & Thompson,
1976).
2. Needs (Alderfer & Guzzo, 1979; Herzberg, et al., 
1957).
3. Need deficiency (Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969)
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4. Need strength (Aldag & Brief, 1975; Friedlander, 
1965; Froehlich & Wolins, 1960; Morse, 1953; Ross & 
Zander, 1957; Schaffer, 1953).
5. Need fulfillment or affect (Blood, 1971; Kraut & 
Ronen, 1975).
6. Value or worth. (Vroom, 1964; Vroom & Pahl, 1971; 
Reinharth & Wahba, 1975).
7. Moral values, value systems, ideals, meaningful­
ness. (Blood, 1969; Cherrington, et al., 1979; 
England, 1971; Lied & Pritchard, 1976; Pennings, 
1970).
It should be noted that a large proportion of the studies 
reviewed made no attempt whatsoever to develop a conceptual 
framework for importance. Even less has been done to provide 
empirical validation for whatever meaning for importance is 
assumed or implied. As Jury (1977) points out, there are very 
nearly as many seemingly distinct uses of importance as there 
are studies employing the term. Most often, in the literature 
which may be referred to as industrial and organizational 
psychological research, one is required to attempt to discern 
the specific interpretation of the meaning of importance by 
examining a cacophony of proposed "synonyms" and operationali­
zations each of which is beset by similar conceptual opaque­
ness. Frequently two or more quite different meanings of 
importance are stated or implied at the same time. In addi­
tion, there are those who insist that importance perceptions
21
are best is defined by that which their particular instrument 
measures with or without theoretical foundation.
While the need for more detailed information about 
importance perceptions can (and must) be met by improvements 
and refinements in methodology and instrumentation, no matter 
how refined the techniques, they do not provide direct infor­
mation about the meaning of the results and do not permit 
automatic predictions concerning related behavior. The inves­
tigator still must make inferences from the data. For this 
the researcher interested in importance perceptions requires a 
theoretical framework which accounts for the adoption and 
expression of importance on the part of individuals.
In the research literature employing the importance 
construct, little attention is given to the purposeful devel­
opment of such a framework. In this section an attempt will 
be made to present and evaluate the more prevalent connota­
tions of importance appearing in the literature.
Prevalent Current Connotations of Importance
In order to provide some organization for the review of 
importance conceptualizations which follows, I have classified 
studies according to how they seem to use importance, making 
divisions along lines of theoretical or operational differ­
ences. In Table 2 I provide a partial listing of the studies 
surveyed and a brief summary of their corresponding importance 
connotations, operationalizations and key variables which
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seem to have affected importance perceptions. Conceptualiza­
tions of importance, more often implied than stated, may be
divided roughly into three categories. These include 1) those
studies which interpret importance in terms of demands, wants 
or desires; 2) those which present importance perceptions as a
direct reflection of innate, universal, human needs; and 3)
those which present importance as developing from and an 
expression of personal value(s).
Demand-based Approaches
Herzberg, et al., (1957) give evidence that most early 
studies of employee attitudes toward their work were concerned 
with what workers want, desire or demand in and from their 
jobs. The first conceptualization of importance that appears 
in Table 3 is referred to as "Demand-based". While few if any 
studies specifically develop a theoretical framework for 
importance, these provide sufficient example of those which by 
statement or implication equate importance with demand.
According to this view, demand reflects importance, and 
the strength of the demand or desire (Alderfer and Guzzo,
1979) indicates the degree of importance. Thus, those things 
demanded most by employees are the most important and those 
things which are most important to people will be characteriz­
ed by higher levels of demand. This is analogous to an 
economic approach to perceived importance. In economic 
theory, demand for the individual is based upon tastes or pre­
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ferences, desires or wants (e.g. Mansfield, 1975). If we 
offer the individual any two market baskets, he will be able 
to indicate which he would rather have, or that he is indif­
ferent and would prefer neither over the other. If he chooses 
A over B it is understood that A is "more important" than B to 
that individual. When the researcher asks the employee to 
indicate his preference for one job factor over another, he is 
relying upon this kind of reasoning and infers relative impor­
tance from choices. For example, when the subject consistent­
ly selects a "market basket" which is characterized by items 
associated with job security over another "basket" character­
ized by items associated with favorable pay conditions, it is 
assumed that security is more important than pay. The more 
often security is selected over other "baskets", the greater 
the strength of the demand or desire for security, and the 
greater the presumed importance.
To what extent is demand, desire, want or preference 
strength equivalent to what the employee means when he says 
something is important? When the employee indicates that he 
would rather have job security as defined in a questionnaire 
than pay increases, is he saying that security is more impor­
tant?
An examination of the required assumptions of this con­
ceptualization of importance reveals several problems. First, 
the conclusion that one factor or condition in general is more 
important than another because of desire or preference choices
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is difficult to support. It is far too sweeping to say that 
the employee prefers security to pay from the evidence pre­
sented in the illustration above because we cannot conclude 
that all levels or degrees of security would always be pre­
ferred to all levels of pay. It is entirely possible that a 
level of pay which is higher than that which is offered (or 
assumed by the employee) would be preferred to some relatively 
lower level of security. This is well-recognized in economic 
theory and is the basis for the development of indifference 
curves. Demand does not define which factor is more impor­
tant, but rather indicates how much of one factor would be 
preferred over a given level of another. Such being the case, 
we are left with the proposition that demand or preferences 
may shift from one factor to another quite readily, depending 
upon the quantity or quality of each factor. According to 
this view, importance would shift with it. Thus, we are not 
able to draw conclusions such as "security is more important 
than pay" from this approach. We are limited to "this partic­
ular amount and quality of security is preferred to this par­
ticular amount and quality of pay". A further indeterminancy 
of the demand-based definition is the temporal limits of this 
interpretation. Does a preference of one factor over another 
mean that one is generally more important than the other?
This is far from certain. There is evidence to suggest that 
temporary situational factors may significantly alter prefer­
ences while having little effect on importance ratings
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(Hinrichs, 1969; Herzberg, et al., 1957).
Perhaps a more fundamental limitation of the approach 
equating demand with importance, so far as this discussion is 
concerned, is that demand, desire or preference rankings 
alone do not tell us much about the nature of importance.
What determines whether one factor is preferred to another?
We know little more about the nature and adoption of impor­
tance perceptions than if these concepts had not been intro­
duced precisely because the demand-based approaches do not 
provide a thorough, precise conceptualization of demand.
Need-based Approaches 
Numerous studies have appeared over the last two 
decades which have explicitly or (more typically, implicitly) 
presented importance as a reflection of the individual's need. 
A partial listing of studies employing a need-based connota­
tion of importance is given in Table 2. As Jury(1977) points 
out, in the majority of cases where little more than a brief 
reference to need theory is provided as a conceptual frame­
work, very little additional insight is available as to the 
nature and development of importance perceptions.
Theorists use the term "need" to connote the objective 
presence of a deficiency or excess which, if not altered, 
would impair the health or well-being, physical or psychologi­
cal, of the individual (Hall, 1961; Locke, 1969, 1976). 
Expressed desires, wants or demands are understood to be 
observed phenomena related to underlying need states. Desires
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may be clustered into need classes which may then be thought 
of as the fundamental life-goals of the individual. Those who 
interpret importance in terms of needs rely upon the theoreti­
cal work of Murray (1938) and Maslow (1954)(and perhaps to 
some degree the more recent presentation of their ideas by 
Alderfer, 1972), each of whom proposed a set of human needs 
which is intended to represent the motive forces behind 
virtually all human behavior. While there are differences 
between these three theories, the similarities are striking 
(see Table 3). Unfortunately, these similarities extend 
beyond similar clustering of needs into classes to their 
common inadequacies in providing a sound conceptual framework 
for importance perceptions. All need-based interpretations of 
importance exhibit the fundamental weakness of being built 
upon a foundation which Locke (1976) describes as having the 
following characteristics:
1. Inadequate evidence, logical or empirical, that 
needs as presented even exist.
2. Unintelligibility of many of the need concepts.
3. Inconsistency and confusion of conceptual defini­
tions .
4. Inadequate, if any, definition of the concept of 
need.
In addition to these theoretical weaknesses of the need-based 
explanations of importance, inconsistent, frequently contra­
dictory empirical findings further erode confidence in this
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approach to understanding importance. In the following sec­
tion, the theoretical and empirical implications of the need- 
based approaches are examined with regard to their contribution 
to understanding the nature and development of importance 
perceptions.
Murray, Maslow and Alderfer
Needs became firmly rooted in contemporary attitude and 
motivation theory due to the conceptual efforts of Murray 
(1938). He hypothesized approximately twenty specific inter­
nal states, the attainment or maintenance of which governs 
human behavior. The satisfaction of these various needs is 
the driving force in desires, wants, demands and preferences. 
That which one needs is that which one desires, wants, demands 
and, as compared to something which one does not need, pre­
fers. Presumably, then, the strength of the desire (i.e., 
importance) is the strength of the need. Of course the ques­
tion must be asked, "which is perceived as more important 
between two separate needs?". If there is no qualitative 
difference between needs, then it might be suspected that the 
stronger of the two needs would be the more important. Impor­
tance studies which seem to advocate this conceptualization 
are indicated in Table 3 as "Need Strength" concepts.
While Murray does not distinguish qualitatively between 
needs, Maslow (1954) does. He proposes that there are five 
basic needs which may be arranged in a hierarchy of "prepo­
tency" . Needs at a particular, more basic, level of the hier-
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archy must be largely fulfilled before needs at the next 
higher level give rise to prepotent demand. This is not to 
say that two levels of needs cannot be operative simultaneous­
ly, but rather that the more basic takes precedence. If there 
are qualitative differences in needs, as suggested by Maslow, 
then we must know exactly what is meant by "largely fulfilled" 
in order to know which need takes precedence. In addition, 
since Maslow acknowledges the possibility of individual dif­
ferences in the basic need hierarchy, we must also know the 
ordering of need prepotency for the individual (Locke, 1976). 
We may suppose, however, that more basic needs which are sub­
stantially unfulfilled will generate stronger demand than 
relatively fulfilled needs at a higher level, and thus be per­
ceived as more important. Alderfer (1972), and Schneider & 
Alderfer (1973) offer an alternative to the Maslow formulation 
of needs by suggesting three categories; existence, related­
ness and growth. Correlations between this ERG formulation 
and the Maslow need hierarchy have produced mixed results 
(Schneider & Alderfer, 1973). Alderfer offers several propo­
sitions which are intended to explain the relationship between 
need-states and desires in his framework (Alderfer, 1972; 
Locke, 1976). These include:
1. The less a need is satisfied, the more it is 
desired.
2. The less Relatedness and Growth needs are satis­
fied, the more Existence needs are desired.
29
3. The more a need is satisfied, the greater the 
desire for higher order (i.e., more abstract) 
needs.
Therefore, it would appear that there are two separate 
instances in which a lower order (e.g.. Existence) need would 
be strongly desired (important). The first would be when it 
is not satisfied. In the second instance, the lower order 
need may be quite satisfied but frustration in fulfilling 
higher order needs causes the person to seek to satisfy those 
needs with lower order substitutes (Locke, 1976). Higher 
order needs, on the other hand, will only be strongly desired 
when lower order needs are satisfied and the higher order 
need itself is not satisfied. This formulation allows two 
logical conclusions. First, if needs on all levels are 
satiable, then the person with substantial satisfaction of all 
these needs will not strongly desire any of them and thus none 
of the needs will be important to that individual. On the 
other hand, if needs are essentially insatiable, then we are 
left with the conclusion that all needs will be strongly 
desired and important. In this case the greater strength of 
desire must go to the lower order needs since they are desired 
both when unsatisfied and when higher order needs are unsatis­
fied. Finally, if only the higher order needs are insatiable, 
it remains that the lower order needs will have prepotency. 
Thus, either no needs are perceived as important, all needs 
are important, or only lower-order needs are important. It is
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clear that ERG need theory offers little in the way of concep­
tual breakthroughs (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976).
It should be noted that not all "needs" are assumed to 
be innate. McClelland (1951) and his associates have proposed 
the existence of certain learned predispositions which are 
referred to as needs for achievement, affiliation, failure 
avoidance and power. These "needs", according to McClelland, 
may vary in strength and thus it seems plausible that they may 
be understood to contribute to perceptions of importance in 
much the same way as the innate needs of Murray, Maslow, and 
Alderfer (Campbell & Pritchard, 1976). However, since the 
work of McClelland is more closely associated with another 
conceptualization of importance (i.e., Value(s)-based), I will 
acknowledge the use of the term "need" here and return to 
these acquired predispositions later.
Evaluation of Need-based Approaches
Locke (1976) argues forcefully that the logical and 
empirical support for need theories is far from adequate. 
First, there is little if any evidence that self-esteem or 
self-actualization needs even exist. It is far too easy to 
explain observable behavior in terms of non-observable and 
thoroughly plastic "needs" (Blacker & Williams, 1971). If 
needs lead to importance but these needs prove to be phantoms, 
then importance based upon needs is unsubstantiated. Further­
more, the testimony of empirical work in this area as to the
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relationship between need states and importance perceptions, 
is not entirely supportive of the needs-importance linkage.
Morse (1953) and Ross and Zander (1957) equate impor­
tance with "strength of need". In the Ross and Zander study, 
the authors investigated whether the degree of satisfaction of 
certain personal needs supplied by a person's place of employ­
ment had a significant direct relationship to turnover. 
Recognition, autonomy, task significance, fair evaluation and 
knowing important people in the organization were the need 
areas considered. Part of the study was designed to determine 
whether the satisfaction of these needs was important to the 
members. In effect, importance was defined as the degree of 
dissatisfaction required to cause a person to leave the 
company. If satisfaction with a particular need was impor­
tant, then those members who were not satisfied would relin­
quish membership. This, of course, represents an indirect 
method of determining importance via observing behavior and 
satisfaction attitudes. Amount of dissatisfaction was comput­
ed by subtracting the amount of satisfaction from the 
"strength" of the indicated need (Importance). While this 
procedure is, in itself, somewhat unusual, our concern here is 
with the conceptualization of importance. Ross and Zander 
measured importance indirectly through behavior and attitude 
as described above, yet, at the same time measured "need 
strength" by the direct question, "How important is it to you
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that Thus, in their study, importance is both "need
strength" (the degree to which something is needed) measured 
directly, and whether dissatisfaction (unmet need) led to 
certain behaviors - an indirect measurement. Unfortunately 
Ross and Zander do not compare the results of these two opera­
tionalizations. It is of interest that Ross and Zander employ 
importance as the standard from which the level of satisfac­
tion is subtracted to determine the true level of dissatisfac­
tion which is likely to determine behavior. Theoretically 
this implies that the degree of dissatisfaction, given a par­
ticular level of satisfaction, is directly related to the 
level of importance (or need strength) and that importance, 
the standard, and satisfaction, the perception, are indepen­
dent of one another. This relationship may be expressed as 
DISSATISFACTION = IMPORTANCE - SATISFACTION 
where satisfaction is the extent to which the need is met and 
importance is conceived of as the need requirement, "how much 
there should be". An importance score of 10, for example, 
combined with a satisfation level of 6, results in a dissatis­
faction level of 4. There would be no dissatisfaction if the 
extent to which the need is perceived as met equals or exceeds 
the need requirements.
The Ross and Zander (1957) and similar conceptualiza­
tions of importance as "need strength" (Morse, 1953; Scaffer, 
1953) are particularly interesting when compared with the 
Porter studies on perceived need satisfaction and importance
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(Porter, 1961, 1962, 1963). For while both employ conceptual­
izations of need strength to define employee dissatisfaction 
with various work factors, and both view factor importance as 
a reflection of need strength, their ideas of what constitutes 
strength of need seem to be quite different.
In his series of studies. Porter examined differences 
in need satisfaction and importance for security, social, 
self-esteem, autonomy and self-actualizaton needs across dif­
ferent managerial levels and company sizes. While a concep­
tual framework for importance is never explicitly developed, 
the idea of need "prepotency" (strength) as suggested by 
Maslow was employed in these evaluations of employee atti­
tudes. In much the same way as the formulation by Ross and 
Zander, Porter defines need deficiencies (dissatisfaction) as 
the difference between the perceived amount of present 
fulfillment and perceptions of what should be available: 
DISSATISFACTION = Should be - Perceived to be.
Both Ross and Zander and Porter see importance as the strength 
of the need for whatever object or condition is being evaluat­
ed. However, the former equates this with the need require­
ment, "how much there should be", while Porter clearly does 
not see importance this way. Importance in the Porter studies 
is measured directly by asking subjects to indicate how 
important the item is on a seven point scale, entirely apart 
from "how much should there be?". Porter (1962, 1963) keeps 
measures and interpretations of importance quite separate from
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those of "how much should there be?" and reports findings con­
cerning each separately. While Porter does not tell us exact­
ly what the nature of need strength is, it is clear that it is 
not the same as that envisioned by those who follow the pat­
tern of Ross and Zander. To define importance as "strength of 
need" cannot be sufficient if need strength is, in turn, 
inadequately defined. On the strength of a comparison of the 
findings concerning need deficiencies and perceived importance 
in the Porter studies (1962, 1963), managers appear to be 
making very different kinds of evaluations when they say some­
thing is important (i.e., "this is very important to me") and 
when they say there is a large need requirement (i.e., there 
should be large amounts of the item in question).
There are clear implications that perceived importance 
is somehow a function of need states, yet nowhere in the 
literature surveyed is there anything approaching a clear 
statement of what people mean when they say something is 
important to them.
Since it is not possible to directly evaluate the 
various need-based conceptual frameworks of importance, we 
must attempt instead an evaluation of the usefulness of need 
states as an explanation of importance by examining the 
empirical evidence. Such an attempt requires some caution 
since it must be recognized at the outset that if the underly­
ing theoretical frameworks (which are not revealed) are dif­
ferent, the interpretation of the empirical evidence may be 
inconsistent.
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Factor importance as a function of need satisfaction» 
Lawler (1971) provides a starting point for evaluating the 
relationship between need states and perceived importance by 
drawing some logical conclusions from information provided by 
need theorists. Lawler suggests that, since the perceived 
importance of each need should be influenced by need fulfill­
ment in the lower levels of the need hierarchy and by the 
degree to which the need itself is fulfilled, the more the 
individual reports lower-level need satisfaction, the higher 
should be his perceptions of importance of the higher-order 
needs. The more satisfied the lower-level needs, the less 
important they should become. Likewise, Smith, Kendall and 
Hulin (1969) in an earlier evaluation of the need-importance 
relationship, suggested that there should be a tendency for 
importance of work aspects to be assessed in terms of defi­
ciencies or inadequacies. Pay, for example, should be per­
ceived as important because the employee is dissatisfied with 
his pay. Once an acceptable level of satisfaction is reached, 
it should lose its importance. However, Smith, Kendall and 
Hulin (1969) found that the empirical evidence did not consis­
tently support this expectation. In their study, dissatisfac­
tion with promotion was extremely high, yet the importance of 
promotion was very low.
Alderfer (1966, 1969) and Porter (1964) had both found 
that higher-level needs become more important as they are
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better satisifed. In these studies, as was expected from need 
theory predictions, lower-order needs were perceived of as 
less important as satisfaction increased. However, in a 
longitudinal study of managers by Hall and Nougaim (1967), it 
was reported that as lower-order needs became satisfied they 
did not decrease in importance. Lawler and Suttle (1972) 
found that pay needs did not decrease in importance as satis­
faction with pay increased, thus supporting the findings of 
Hall and Hougaim.
Importance as need-strength related to satisfaction.
Not all researchers have assumed that importance is a function 
of satisfaction or reflects need fulfillment. Schaffer (1953) 
measured and seems to have employed a definition of importance 
perceptions in terms of need strengths. He suggested that 
satisfaction was a function of importance. The stronger the 
need (greater importance), the more satisfaction was thought 
to depend upon its fulfillment. In other words, if pay was 
perceived as very important to an individual, then he should 
be more likely to have stronger feelings of dissatisfaction if 
his pay was seen as inadequate. Blood (1969) supports this 
view, reasoning that importance perceptions precede and influ­
ence satisfaction rather than the other way around. Schaffer 
(1953), however, failed to find significant rank-order cor­
relations between need strength (importance) and relative need 
satisfaction, casting some doubt on this proposed relationship
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Friedlander (1965) attempted to further clarify the 
question of importance being essentially an assessment assign­
ed to those aspects which are most dissatisfying, and 
concluded that importance is associated both with highly 
dissatisfying and highly satisfying environmental factors. In 
the Friedlander study, a scatter plot of importance ratings 
and level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction supports the idea 
that highly satisfying and highly dissatisfying experiences 
are related to high importance ratings. The question of 
interest in this discussion, however, is the causality of that 
relationship. For, if high satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
causes the individual to rate something as important, we may 
suspect that either importance is an assessment of current 
satisfaction states, or that both satisfaction and importance 
are related to some underlying causal factor. If, on the 
other hand, the perceived importance determines the level of 
the satisfaction/dissatisfaction response, then we know little 
more about the nature of importance. The Friedlander analyses, 
however, do not tell us whether strong affective response is a 
function of importance or the other way around, or whether a 
third variable may be responsible for both satisfaction and 
importance perceptions. In addition, a further caution should 
be added to interpretation of the Friedlander study. That is, 
importance was specifically limited to "how important each of 
these things is to your feeling of satisfaction or dissatis-
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faction". It is entirely possible that anchoring responses to 
a specified context such as "your satisfaction" may produce 
quite different results from unattached judgments.
If satisfaction or need states are primary components 
of importance evaluations, rather than the other way around, 
those factors which are assigned extreme ratings on a positive- 
negative affect continuum should be consistently evaluated as 
highly important, and a shift from either extreme toward the 
middle of the affect continuum should result in a decrease in 
importance. I have already noted a violation of the first 
requirement in the Smith, Kendall and Hulin studies (1969) 
where subjects were extremely dissatisfied with promotions and 
yet rated the importance of promotion as relatively low. A 
comparison of the Porter (1962, 1963) need deficiency and need 
importance studies sheds further doubt on the need deficiency 
importance definition. In two of three areas where need 
deficiencies were quite high (high dissatisfaction with auton­
omy and self-actualization) and were then quite significantly 
improved. Porter's results indicate that importance appears to 
have decreased significantly. But in the third area, even 
though dissatisfaction was quite high and subsequently 
reduced, importance actually increased. This third area 
(self-esteem) may have been different in some ways from the 
other two (autonomy and self-actualization). However, the 
failure to support the expectations of the importance-affect 
concept suggests a more complex interpretation than that which
Porter suggests with his model.
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Factor importance as inferred from predictions of 
general satisfaction. If importance cannot be observed or 
defined in terms of needs or satisfaction, perhaps one can 
infer it from its relationship to some other variable. For 
example, a number of studies have explored the possibility 
that what is important to the individual is defined by the 
predictive ability of one or more sub-factor's satisfaction to 
account for the variance in overall or general satisfaction. 
This approach abandons the attempt to determine what people 
mean when they say something is important and employs instead 
an inferential definition of importance as the size of the 
correlation between the sub-factor and the criterion measure. 
In this approach, the more variance accounted for in general 
satisfaction by satisfaction with a sub-factor, the greater 
the inferred importance of the sub-factor (Blood, 1971; Ewen, 
1967 etc.; Kraut and Ronen, 1975). This conceptualization of 
importance as predictive power arose primarily from the fail­
ure of importance weightings to improve predictions of overall 
satisfaction over unweighted factor satisfaction. If impor­
tance was, in effect, a ranking of factors in the order of 
their potential effects on overall satisfaction, then it 
seemed quite reasonable to assume that weighting factor satis­
faction by importance would improve the ability to determine 
which factors were crucial in overall job satisfaction. 
However, a number of attempts to apply this reasoning failed
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to produce any substantial improvements in predictive power of 
satisfaction models (Blood, 1971; Decker, 1955; Ewen, 1967; 
Mikes and Hulin, 1968; Porter, 1962; Schaffer, 1953; Wanous 
and Lawler, 1972). Neither have importance weights improved 
predictions of turnover (Mikes and Hulin, 1968), performance 
(Pelz and Andrews, 1966) or leadership behavior (Beer, 1966).
A number of possible explanations have been offered for 
findings indicating no apparent difference in predictiveness 
when satisfaction is weighted by importance. Several of these 
are of interest to this study. First, it is possible that em­
ployees may not be aware of the factors which are important to 
them. Second, as has been suggested earlier, what is impor­
tant may not be entirely the same thing as that which accounts 
for variance in the particular criterion being predicted (e.g., 
overall job satisfaction). An employee may report that pay 
amount is very important to him and yet the researcher may 
find that his satisfaction with his job is not highly related 
to differences in amount of pay. A third possible explanation 
is that employee reports of importance may be influenced by 
social desirability and thus not accurately reflect actual 
evaluative perceptions. An employee may indicate that rela­
tionships with co-workers are extremely important because he 
thinks that such a response is expected of him, that to think 
differently would somehow be contrary to the values commonly 
held by his society, while, in fact, this factor is of little 
importance to him. Another possible explanation for the
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failure of importance weighted satisfaction models to yield 
significantly greater predictiveness than unweighted models is 
that the restricted range in importance ratings due to the 
tendency of researchers to select factors which are all quite 
important may, in effect, result in equal weighting for all 
factors (Blood, 1971; Evans, 1969). Finally, it has been 
suggested by Locke (1969) that self-reports of satisfaction 
along some dimensions may already reflect importance evalua­
tions. That is, satisfaction and importance, while concep­
tually different, may be perceptually highly interdependent 
(see results discussed above from studies by Porter and Smith, 
et al.). Importance evaluations may be primarily cognitive 
rationalizations for a prior affective response to a factor 
(Zajonc, 1980) or satisfaction evaluations may be essentially 
the same thing as degree of importance.
The equivalence of satisfaction with a factor and 
importance of the factor seems unlikely both because of the 
research findings reviewed earlier which addressed the rela­
tionship between satisfaction and importance and because of 
largely unsuccessful attempts to correlate importance with 
various measures of satisfaction (e.g.. Kraut and Ronen,
1975). At the same time, it does not seem likely that self- 
reports of importance of factors are entirely invalidated by 
social desirablility since weighting satisfaction with impor­
tance, while not significantly improving predictiveness over 
unweighted models,does not at all reduce the predictiveness of
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those models (Ewen, 1967; Mikes and Hulin, 1968; Kraut and 
Ronen, 1975).
Kraut and Ronen (1975) present two conclusions from 
their study of the various attempts to relate importance and 
affect which may further explain the inconclusive findings of 
the literature reviewed thus far. First, their results indi­
cate that "importance" of various job factors may vary depend­
ing on how importance is measured (i.e., self ratings; identi­
fying predictors of general satisfaction from a list of work 
factors using regression analyses, etc.). In addition, with 
respect to the results of the regression analyses, they con­
clude that the order of importance of job factors may differ 
with the criterion being predicted in the regression models. 
Thus, for example, where pay importance is measured by its 
power to predict overall job satisfaction, it may receive an 
entirely different evaluation than if subjects were simply 
asked to indicate how important pay is without restricting it 
to job satisfaction. Likewise, if one measures importance by 
ability to predict overall satisfaction one may get different 
results from those obtained by ability to predict intent to 
stay on the job or turnover (Mikes and Hulin, 1968) or perfor­
mance (Pelz and Andrews, 1966). It appears that one needs to 
specify importance-for-what.
Need-importance factor structures. Another method for 
examining the adequacy of the need-state importance concep­
tualization is to compare the factor structures of item
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importance and reported need states. If importance is the 
same as need state, or if needs are the primary component of 
importance perceptions, then the factor structures of each 
should compare. Research directed toward investigating the 
factor structure of work desires do not entirely support the 
needs-iraportance concept (Dowell, 1975). For example, Robert, 
et al. (1971) examined the factor structures of employees' 
ratings of the importance of work factors and simultaneously 
gathered need deficiency scores using in both cases scales 
developed by Porter (1961). They found no similarity between 
the factor structures of need states and importance ratings 
for the same subjects. Herman and Hulin (1973) and Payne 
(1971) report similar findings.
Summary of the need-based approaches. The selected 
literature review above leads to two conclusions concerning 
the need-based conceptualizations of importance as currently 
used. First, there are no clear conceptualizations of impor­
tance perception in the literature which adequately formulate 
a theoretical relationship between importance and need states. 
Second, empirical evidence fails to support the need-state 
importance relationship and casts considerable doubt on the 
sufficiency of need-based approaches to explain what people 
mean when they say something is important to them. It is 
clear that a cursory reference to needs and/or the state of 
fulfillment or deficiency of needs will not suffice as a con­
ceptual framework for the importance construct. Furthermore,
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the related need-affect conceptualizations of importance also 
appear to be inadequate explanations for importance percep­
tions. The review does not, however, eliminate needs or 
affect entirely from the possibility of helping to clarify the 
nature of importance. There are some who would suggest that 
the addition of one or more complementary constructs to the 
need- importance interpretation would result in a satisfactory 
conceptual framework. Hulin (1963) suggests that people tend 
to perceive and rank as important those things which they both 
lack and value (italics mine). As is evident in Table 3, a 
considerable proportion of the studies reviewed which employ 
the importance construct conceptualize importance in terms of 
values.
Value(s)-based Approaches 
Importance perceptions are frequently equated or 
strongly associated with values. However, as with needs, it 
is not always clear what is meant by "values". Kluckholn 
(1962) bemoans the diffuse, vague, often contradictory concep­
tualizations of values in the literature. Values concepts, 
says Kluckholn, include attitudes, motivations, objects, 
measurable and unmeasurable quantities, and customs or tradi­
tions, to name a few. Connor and Becker (1975) illustrates 
the pervasiveness of this theoretical serendipity by referring 
to a single study which variously discusses values as being 
synonymous with emotional reactions (affect), valuation (i.e..
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X is more valuable than Y), goals, interests, needs and out­
comes. Since we are interested in understanding how values 
are useful in explaining importance perceptions, this lack of 
precision in the definition of the construct presents a 
considerable problem.
Exacerbating this difficulty in defining "value(s)" are 
the need theorists who often appear to use the terms "needs" 
and "values" interchangeably. Locke (1976) points out this 
conceptual gerrymandering and then distinguishes between needs 
and values. Needs are objective requirements of an individu­
al's survival and well-being which exist whether or not the 
individual consciously desires the conditions or actions re­
quired to attain or maintain them. A value is what one con­
sciously or subconsciously desires, wants, or demands. While 
needs are innate, values are acquired. All men have the same 
basic needs but may differ according to values. While needs 
may confront the individual with the demand for some action 
related to ensuring survival or well-being, they do not help 
the individual to know or choose specifically how to go about 
meeting that demand. Any given need may be seen by the indi­
vidual as being satisfied by any of a multitude of actions or 
objects, and nearly any object can be associated with any 
number of "needs". If we accept the nature of persons as 
having preferences and standards for actions, however deter­
mined and whatever they may be, then the question of how to 
satisfy one's needs requires that one have developed cognitive
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categories to aid in identifying and choosing personally 
acceptable forms of voluntary action. Values, according to 
Locke, are these standards within the individual which largely 
determine those choices. If we accept this reasoning, needs, 
as the generators of demand, will be necessarily observed 
through the personally acceptable forms of behavior consistent 
with one ' s values. We may proceed to treating values as per­
sonally acceptable surrogates which reflect underlying needs.
But values, though understood as standards for action 
and reflections of need-states, require further definition.
As we have seen, Locke (1976) apparently equates values with 
wants or desires. He contends that values have two specific 
attributes: content, or what is wanted (italics mine), and
intensity or strength, how much it is wanted (italics mine). 
Others disagree with Locke's apparent interchangeable use of 
values and demand, arguing that what one wants or desires may 
be entirely different from what one sees as desirable (Connor 
and Becker, 1975). While there is certainly not complete 
unanimity in the conceptualization of values, there does 
appear to be some consensus regarding the nature of values as 
being quite apart from wants, desires or demands.
Scott (1956) and Kluckholn, et al. (1962) define values 
as the conception of the desirable as opposed to that which is 
desired. Rokeach (1968) defines values as "abstract ideals, 
positive or negative, not tied to any specific object or 
situation, representing a person's beliefs about modes of
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conduct and ideal terminal modes ..." (p. 389). Values are 
often seen as global beliefs which guide both actions and 
judgments concerning specific objects and situations. While 
there is considerable agreement among values theorists concern­
ing the conceptual distinctiveness of values from needs and 
desires, there is far less agreement as to how abstract or 
global a belief must be before it qualifies as a "value". 
England (1971) points out that values concepts may be thought 
of as located somewhere on a continuum which runs from 
very condition-specific to global and highly abstract. 
Value(s)-based conceptualizations of importance perceptions, 
then, may be classified according to those which treat value as 
an assessment of worth which may be applied to specific 
objects, conditions or ideas (often with reference to specific 
goal attainment), and those which treat values as normative, 
ethical ideals. A number of the studies listed in Table 3 
employ the importance construct apparently having construed 
importance to be the perceived worth of such concrete and 
specific factors as pay, promotion, travel, working conditons 
and supervisory competence (Friedlander, 1963, 1965; Hinrichs, 
1969; Ondrack, 1973; Saleh and Greiger, 1969). Others concern 
themselves with more abstract ideals such as the "moral impor­
tance" of work (Cherrington, et al., 1979; Lied and Pritchard, 
1976); the protestant ethic (Aldag and Brief, 1975; Blood,
1969; Wollack, et al., 1971); or honor, truth, loyalty, equal­
ity and religion (England, 1971; Whitely and England, 1977).
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other studies range between these in level of specificity and 
abstraction. A careful examination of the reasoning behind 
these various approaches to values as explanatory of perceived 
importance indicates that there is very little conceptual 
difference in the interpretations of importance as one moves 
from the specific to the abstract.
The following review and evaluation of the value(s)- 
importance literature reveals that the use of values to 
explain the nature and development of importance perceptions, 
while making some worthwhile contributions, is presently 
unsatisfactory primarily due to the failure to define the 
values construct itself. Values, as used in the work factor 
importance literature, ultimately leaves one asking, "Is a 
work factor important because of a value, or is it valued 
because it is important?"
Among those who seem to advocate defining importance in 
terms of the perceived value or worth of some specific object 
or condition are those who suggest that value, as a complement 
to needs, might help to strengthen the need-based conceptuali- 
zaton of importance. If need states do not define importance, 
then perhaps the "value" of some factor, as it relates to need 
fulfillment, is the proper framework for understanding impor­
tance perceptions. In this view, a factor will be seen as 
important when it is useful in fulfilling a specific goal - 
the elimination of a need deficiency. The further from 
attainment the individual is from the goal (need strength) and
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the greater the strength of the association between the goal 
and the factor in question, the greater the perceived impor­
tance of that factor. Inherent in this approach to importance 
is the idea that need deficiencies give rise to action demand 
while "value" determines the choice of action alternatives. 
Hulin (1963) may have had this in mind when he suggested that 
people see as important those things which they both lack and 
value. As we have already seen, however, need deficiencies do 
not seem to play much of a role, if any, in determining
importance perceptions, at least as they are currently
conceptualized.
Other researchers have abandoned any reliance on need 
deficiencies to explain importance and have focused instead 
upon value alone. Extending the idea of the strength of the
association between a factor and some goal, importance is con­
ceptualized as a product of 1) the value attached to some goal 
(this approach totally rejects need theories as explanations 
for these goals) and, 2) the strength of the role of the fac­
tor in attaining that goal. In other words, something is
important to the degree that it is seen as contributing to 
some valued outcome (Vroom, 1964; Vroom and Pahl, 1971; 
Reinharth and Wahba, 1975). In so far as the outcomes referr­
ed to are relatively specific, this approach may be located on 
the concrete end of the value(s) construct continuum suggested 
by England. While certain parts of this conceptualization of
importance perceptions may prove to be helpful for developing
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the nature and dynamics of importance, there is a circularity 
to this model which requires examination and considerable 
refinement before we may successfully employ those parts.
The values conceptualization of importance just des­
cribed has two essential parts. The first is what Vroom calls 
perceived "instrumentality". The second is the "outcome 
value". Since this model has become, rightly or wrongly, the 
dominant motivational theory in organizational psychology 
(Campbell and Pritchard, 1976; Lawler, 1973), I will examine 
briefly these two basic components and their implications for 
developing a conceptual framework for importance perceptions.
The instrumentality concept may prove to be helpful in 
developing a theoretical framework for importance. Instrumen­
tality refers to the perceived contingency that a particular 
factor has for a specified outcome. That is, given any 
factor, the model implies we should ask questions about the 
extent to which possessing that factor is instrumental for 
obtaining other outcomes. Instrumentality may be viewed as a 
correlation coefficient varying from +1.0 through 0 to -1.0. 
That is, the possession of a factor could mean avoidance of 
certain outcomes as well as their attainment. Accordingly, we 
may reason that if two factors are associated with the same 
outcome, that factor which is seen to be more instrumental in 
the attainment (or avoidance) of the outcome will be perceived 
as more important. If the two factors are seen as equally 
instrumental in the attainment of the goal, then the individual
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will perceive them as equally important (and where selection
between the two factors is required, some other criterion such
as aesthetic preference or cost effectiveness may be employed
to make the discrimination). In a similar way, if two factors
are independent of one another and are each associated with
different outcomes which are of equal value, that factor which
is seen as more instrumental in the attainment of its outcome
will be perceived as more important. Using this approach and
confining our thinking for the moment to instrumentality, we
may suggest several possible synonyms for importance which may
be useful. A factor will be perceived as important if, to the






in the attainment or avoidance of specific outcomes of given 
value. While this view of importance may be helpful and 
intuitively appealing, there are difficulties.
One problem with the currently conceived instrumen­
tality approach to importance perceptions is that it seems to 
assume, perhaps too simplisticly, that each factor is associ­
ated with only one outcome. As demonstrated by England 
(1971), it is entirely possible that a factor may be associat­
ed with a variety of outcomes with varying degrees of positive 
or negative value. In such a case, a factor may have strong 
positive instrumentality coefficients for some outcomes and
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negative coefficients for others. Furthermore, in evaluating 
the relative importance of two factors, the factors may be 
associated with a variety of different outcomes such that even 
net instrumentality coefficients (whether thought of as the 
sum or average of individual coefficients) may not be compar­
able. Little research has been done to determine to what 
extent the inclusion of multiple outcomes affects models of 
importance.
An evaluation of the "outcome value" component of the 
values-based approach, reveals a further problem with this 
concept - the unfortunate circularity of the reasoning behind 
it.
Valence is the term frequently used to refer to the 
perceived positive or negative value ascribed by the indivi­
dual to the possible outcomes of a given action. For the sake
of clarity, I shall simply use the term "outcome value".
While instrumentality may determine the importance of factors 
associated with the same outcome or outcomes of equal value, 
inherent in this model is the idea that the outcomes them­
selves may vary in value. Accordingly, if two independent 
factors are of equal instrumentality toward the attainment of 
outcomes of unequal value, that factor associated with the 
more highly valued of the outcomes should be more important. 
Ultimately, then, in order for one to know the importance of a
particular factor one must have some idea of the value of the
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outcome with which it is associated. Those advocating this 
model insist that there is no need to depend upon untenable 
need theories to determine the value of a given outcome. The 
problem of determining the value of an outcome with which a 
factor is associated is handled by specifying the theoretical 
existence of both first and second-level outcomes. First- 
level outcomes are related to second-level outcomes in that 
they are contributors toward (i.e., instrumental for) the 
attainment of second-level outcomes. This is very analogous 
to the decision tree models used in decision theory (indeed, 
with the addition of the third component of the VIE model, 
expectancies, or perceived probabilities, they are Identical) 
and as such presents the following conceptual problem. While 
it is clear that a factor's importance is dependent upon its 
instrumentality in achieving an outcome of some value, it is 
nowhere specified how one is to determine that value other 
than the suggestion that the value of the outcome is, in turn, 
dependent upon the value of some associated second-level out­
come. Either one "knows" the identity and value of the second 
level outcome or one presumably looks for some associated 
third-level outcome, and so on (Parker and Dyer, 1975). The 
value-instrumentality concepts specify the theoretical exis­
tence of first and second-level outcomes. First-level out­
comes are related to second-level outcomes in that they con­
tribute toward the attainment of second-level outcomes in the 
same way that factors contribute to the first-level outcomes.
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While VIE theorists seem satisfied with two levels of out­
comes, it is possible to presume the existence of third, 
fourth, fifth, etc. level outcomes applying the same structur­
al relationships at each level. If the importance of each 
successive level is determined by its instrumentality in 
attaining the next higher level outcome, then the higher level 
outcomes take on greater and greater significance. It is not 
entirely unreasonable to think of each successively higher 
level as approaching closer to some "ultimate" level of 
values. This final level of outcomes, which will largely 
determine the importance of all other outcomes, may be thought 
of as representing the core values of the individual. Since 
each successively higher level must become more inclusive, it 
is also reasonable to conclude that the progression from lower 
to higher levels of values is also a progression from specific 
to global and abstract as described by England (1971).
While some may object to labeling as "values" the 
beliefs all along the described continuum (Kluckholn, et al., 
1962 and Connors, 1975, for example would insist that "values" 
occupy the abstract end of the continuum while "attitudes" 
occupy the specific end) , other than in degree of specificity 
and inclusiveness, there appears to be no conceptual 
differences. Kluckholn, et al. (1962) contend that all lower 
level values ("attitudes") result from the application of more 
general values to concrete objects or situations. This 
entirely supports the idea that, since the importance of an
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object, condition or idea at any one level depends upon the 
value of the next higher outcome(s) with which it is associat­
ed, the importance of all objects, conditions and ideas at 
all levels ultimately depends upon the hierarchy of values at 
the highest, most global and abstract level. Nowhere in the 
values-importance literature does there appear a satisfactory 
theoretical explanation for the hierarchy of this final level 
of values.
This conceptual inadequacy is not entirely dissimilar 
to that which was earlier attributed to the need-based 
approaches to importance. Both seem to suggest that there 
must be some ultimate or basic set of criteria (needs or 
values) the hierarchy of which determines the importance of 
each succeeding level below. Need-based theories rely upon 
some form of theoretical hierarchy for the most basic 
categories of needs and value-based approaches employ something 
similar in terms of a "basic value system". In the case of 
need-based theories some attempt is made to explain variations 
in importance within each basic need category as being due to 
need discrepancies or lacks. Value-based approaches on the 
other hand, suggest something becomes important not when that 
which is valued is lacking but rather because of its degree of 
association with a valued second level outcome. There is no 
indication that the degree to which the value is fulfilled or 
unfulfilled affects the importance of the factor. The factor 
is important by virtue of its relationship to the valued
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outcome. As long as the outcome remains highly valued and the 
instrumentality of the factor is maintained, it will remain 
important. In contrast to need-based approaches, pay (for 
example) may be seen as highly important regardless of the pay 
level because the individual, in assessing importance, is 
evaluating the contribution or instrumentality of pay to the 
attainment of some valued outcome. In this view, pay is 
important by virtue of its relationship to the outcome, not 
just the lack or abundance of pay. This may help to explain 
findings which indicate that employees may evaluate a factor 
as unimportant even when measures of satisfaction or dissatis­
faction suggest that they do not have what they feel they 
should have of that particular factor. If, for example, pro­
motions are not seen as making any significant contribution to 
valued outcomes, then even where a great deal of dissatisfac­
tion with promotions is expressed it may remain a relatively 
unimportant factor (Smith, Kendall, and Hulin, 1969).
Apart from failure to consider the possible consequences 
of multiple factor-outcome associations, the instrumentality 
construct may make a significant contribution to providing a 
conceptual framework for importance perceptions by turning 
some attention to the cognitive (vs. affective) explanations 
for importance evaluations. However, it remains that value- 
based approaches to importance do not provide a satisfactory 
means of conceptualizing a crucial component required of such 
a model - the relative value of given outcomes. If we define
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importance as an assessment given to a factor which reflects 
its relative contribution to some valued outcome, we still 
require some way to conceptualize the potency of outcomes 
without resorting to their relationships to other undefined 
outcomes.
Summary of the Importance Literature
Throughout the literature surveyed above, human 
behavior and attitude as expressed in preferences or choices 
between alternative objects, actions or ideas are viewed as 
highly dependent upon the importance of the alternatives as 
perceived by the individual. Unfortunately, while importance 
is widely used and heavily relied upon in application of 
numerous theoretical constructs, it takes on a variety of 
imprecise, frequently conflicting definitions and connota­
tions. The purpose of the above literature review has been to 
organize and then analyze the presentations of these concepts 
from the current behavioral research literature. Three quite 
distinct categories of importance approaches were identified, 
each with the potential for making contributions and each 
exhibiting inadequacies which limit those contributions.
Demand-based conceptualizations of importance essen­
tially describe the behavioral consequences of differences in 
importance perceptions. Importance is defined as the degree, 
strength, or intensity of demand, want or desire for a factor 
which is manifested in preference choices. This approach has 
two major weaknesses which limit its contribution to our
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understanding of the nature of importance. First, it fails to 
account for differences in amount and quality of alternative 
factors which could potentially alter any choice preferences 
between factors. This makes it quite impossible to conclude 
that one factor is more important than another in any general 
sense. Second, demand, desire and want are as imprecisely 
conceptualized as importance.
Need-based conceptualizations of importance attempt to 
deal with the problem of identifying the sources of demand by 
suggesting that there are basic requirements for survival and 
well-being which are common to all mankind. Since these needs 
must be satisfied, any unfulfilled or unsatisfied need gives 
rise to increased perceived importance of factors which satis­
fy those needs. The strength of need, determined by its pre­
potency and level of deficiency, define importance. However, 
a review of the research findings indicates that those needs 
which are most deficient are often not perceived of as impor­
tant, and many needs fully satisfied are seen as very impor­
tant. Furthermore, comparison of satisfaction and importance 
perceptions as well as factor analyses of needs and importance 
do not support the contention that importance perceptions are 
definitively linked to need states.
Value(s)-based conceptualizations of perceived impor­
tance abandon the need-state explanation of the construct and 
rely rather upon the perceived value of associated outcomes. 
Values are seen as quite distinct from needs and wants. While
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needs are objective and innate, values are seen as subjective 
and acquired. The strength of the value of a particular 
factor (its importance to the individual) is determined by the 
perceived value of the second level outcome with which it is 
associated, and the degree of that association (instrumental­
ity). While, instrumentality may have some utility for 
improving our understanding of importance perceptions, 
value(s)-based conceptualizations of importance tend to side­
step the importance question by attributing the value of the 
first level outcome to the second level, which must depend 
upon the third, etc. In essence, the value(s)-based approach 
tells us that something is important when it is seen as 
instrumental in the attaining of an important outcome.
While each of these three major approaches to defining 
importance perceptions makes some contribution, an adequate 
conceptualization of the nature and development of importance 
remains very elusive. Without exception in the importance 
literature surveyed for this study, clear conceptual presenta­
tions of the meaning of importance are either totally absent 
or connotative in nature. The following section draws from 
the findings in the above review and from theories of social 
psychology in an attempt to formulate a more precise and use­
ful conceptual framework for the importance construct.
The Nature of Importance Perceptions
Throughout the research literature employing demand- 
based, need-based and value(s)-based approaches to perceived
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importance, the focus has been primarily upon identifying the 
general nature of the outcomes (demand, need or value satis­
faction) with which a particular factor is associated. The 
relative "importance" of any factor, according to each of 
these approaches, is essentially a function of the "strength" 
or "power" of the specified outcome to attract or mold behav­
iors and attitudes related to a particular factor. In this 
sense it is the outcome itself in which the strength or power 
is seen to reside and thus theoretical efforts have concen­
trated on uncovering the source of the "strength of demand", 
"strength of need" or "strength of value". While the nature 
of the factor itself and the relationship between factor and 
demand, need or value receive passing acknowledgment, the 
emphasis is clearly upon the outcomes. It would seem that a 
more careful examination of the entire factor-outcome rela­
tionship might prove to be more productive for developing a 
conceptualization of importance perceptions.
In Chapter III we will attempt to build a more thorough 
conceptualization of importance perceptions by acknowledging 
that there are, in fact, numerous possible outcome states with 
which different objects, conditions or ideas are associated. 
These outcomes may be any of a number of needs, wants, desires 
or values. Focusing our attention systematically on each of 
the components of the factor-outcome relationship will 
ultimately lead to the formulation of a conceptual model which 
will encompass not only the outcomes but also the factors
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themselves and the ties between factors and outcomes. We 
begin by recognizing that factors and outcomes, regardless of 
whether we call them demands, needs, or values, are essential­
ly subjective perceptions, i.e. individual cognitions. We 
then make use of the general and mainstream theories of social 
psychology as expressed in theories of the individual organi­
zation or structure of personal perceptions and cognitions to 




A COGNITIVE STRUCTURE APPROACH
Beliefs, attitudes, values, virtually all concepts used 
in reference to evaluative perceptions, are thought to be com­
posed of two distinct attributes - affect and cognition 
(Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, 1965; Proshansky and Seidenberg, 
1966; Rosenberg, 1956; Secord and Hackman, 1964, etc.). The 
first of these attributes, affect, is the positive or negative 
feeling one gets from the object being evaluated. As we have 
seen from the literature review above, importance perceptions 
do not seem to be fully defined in terms of various measures 
of affect, such as satisfaction. Further, it would appear 
that, while there is some possibility that importance may be 
linked to the range of feelings toward a factor, importance 
evaluations and feelings (affect) are quite distinct concepts.
An individual may have almost any feeling toward an object 
regardless of its level of perceived importance. It would 
appear, then, that affect is a less useful construct in 
helping to account for perceived importance.
The second component of evaluative perceptions - cog­
nitions - are elements in human thought which enter into rela­
tionships with one another and may be described as items of
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information (Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Lawrence and Festinger, 
1962) and as such define what the individual knows about a 
factor rather than how he feels about it. Cognitions are 
organized wholes of interdependent parts. The human mind 
organizes or structures cognitions into patterns of relation­
ships which have attitudinal and behavioral consequences.
Scott (1962) understood cognitive structure to mean the com­
plete cognitive world of the individual which is the final 
product of the individual's interaction with his environment, 
"the individual's phenomenological representation of himself 
and the world - the set of ideas maintained by him and rela­
tively available to conscious awareness" (p. 87). Importance 
perceptions may be usefully conceived of in terms of the 
organization or structure of what the individual knows or 
believes about an object, condition or idea.
Both need and value(s)-based interpretations of 
importance perceptions rely to some degree on cognitive 
structure to explain importance. Need-based approaches employ 
need states and the association of the factor in question with 
need states. If an object is seen as contributing to the 
satisfaction of a need deficiency, then it will be important. 
In the same way, value(s)-based approaches define importance 
in terms of the linkage of the factor with some valued 
outcome. In addition, values concepts specify that the first- 
level outcomes are related to the outcomes at subsequent
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levels. In simplified form, need and value(s)-based approaches 







Figure 1. The two foci of importance perceptions as 
implied by the need and values approaches
In each case there is a factor under consideration for which 
we desire to know the individual's importance perception. As 
an illustration, we may be interested in knowing the impor­
tance of the factor "snow". There is also some outcome (e.g., 
a need state or value) to which the factor is presumed to be 
related. In our illustration, snow may be related to recrea­
tion or physical comfort. Finally, there is the relationship 
itself, the linkage of the factor with the outcome, which may 
have its own components. A thorough examination of importance 
perceptions needs to carefully consider issues relating to 1) 
the nature of the factor, 2) the nature of the factor context.
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i.e., the outcome(s) and the relationship between the factor 
and outcome(s).
Factor Content 
A factor may be defined as a generalized cognitive com­
ponent which includes one or more unique, specific elements. 
For example, if "snow" is the factor under consideration, it 
may be thought of in terms of one or more elements such as 
"cold" or "wet". Thus an individual's cognition of the factor 
"snow" will tend to be characterized by relatively well- 
defined boundaries representative of the individual's interac­
tion with snow (Scott, 1962). While it is common to refer to 
the importance of a particular factor as if it were a single­
element object, condition or idea, it should be recognized 
that factors may vary as to their degree of inclusiveness 
(Newcomb, et al., 1965). Factor definitions are subjective 
and there are likely to be differences between individuals 
both in the number and kind of elements included within the 
cognitions of that factor. For some people with limited or 
specific experiences with snow, that factor may contain only 
one or two elements such as "cold" or "wet". On the other 
hand, for the eskimo or cross-country skier, snow may include 
not only the broad elements such as "cold" and "wet" but also 
more specific elements such as color, powder, depth, beauty, 
etc. Differences in the number and kinds of elements included 
in individual cognitions of a particular factor may require 
caution on the part of the researcher who wishes to interpret
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reports of importance. That is, a term or phrase which we 
intend to have one meaning for evaluative purposes may, in the 
cognitions of different people, have quite different meanings 
and may thus be associated with a different number and/or 
kinds of outcomes.
A second way of looking at factor content is in terms 
of how elements are organized within the boundaries of the 
factor. For different people factors may have many or few 
dimensions. Dimensionality may be thought of as the number of 
sub-factor categories into which the factor elements are 
organized. This is illustrated in the evolution of job satis­
faction questionnaire items concerning the concepts of "pay" 
and "supervisor". In many early studies pay was presented as 
a single-dimension factor and subjects were asked to indicate 
how important "pay" was to them (e.g., Berdie, 1943; Chant, 
1932; Wyatt and Langdon, 1937 etc.). More recently it has 
been recognized that "pay" may have more than one dimension 
and that subjects may attach different importance to each.
Thus "pay" importance items frequently include "pay amount", 
"pay comparison" and/or "pay practices". The same may be said 
of questions involving the concept of "supervisor". Super­
visor items frequently include such dimensions as "supervisor 
competence" and "supervisor human relations".
Since factors may have subjectively different compo­
nents and internal organization, it would seem reasonable to 
expect that the individual might have different evaluative
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reactions to each of.the several elements or dimensions repre­
sented by a complex factor. It is fair to ask whether we are 
correct at all in speakng of "one" importance perception of a 
factor. In our illustration, one element or dimension of 
"snow" may be seen as very important while another element is 
relatively unimportant. Which of these evaluations does the 
individual report when we ask him to indicate the importance 
of "snow"? Where different elements or dimensions are evalu­
ated equivalently the individual may form a generalized evalu­
ative response to the factor as a whole, just as in the case 
where a factor had only one element. However, a subject may 
hold very different views of different components of a factor. 
He would have difficulty considering such a diverse factor as 
though it were a unified whole and would likely feel obligated 
to respond differently to the various component parts. It is 
possible, for example, that the coldness of snow is quite un­
important to the nature photographer while the color and tex­
ture is extremely important. Some care would have to be used 
when interpreting the importance evaluations of individuals 
who have quite different content perceptions of snow. Both 
the cross-country skier and the nature photographer may 
indicate that snow is of high importance to them and yet we 
might find the skier quite dissatisfied with snow that "would 
delight the photographer. For interpretation of importance 
reports and certainly for program implementation in the work
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organization, some effort should be made to determine what it 
is about a factor that is important.
Factor Context
A second focus of importance perceptions is that of a 
factor context. By factor context we mean the outcome(s) with 
which the factor is associated and the relationship(s) between 
the factor and those outcome(s). Just as factor content may 
be multi-dimensional and differ in its inclusiveness across 
individuals, so may the factor context be multi-dimensional 
and vary across individuals.
Several factors may be related to one outcome (e.g., 
snow and sunshine may both be seen as relating to recreation) 
and a given factor may be seen as relating to more than one 
outcome (e.g., snow may relate both to recreation and trans­
portation difficulties). We have already seen that a factor 
may be related to two quite different, even conflicting 
outcomes - a "need" and a conflicting "value" (Herzberg, et 
al., 1957). The possibility of multiple contexts for a given 
factor and the likelihood that perceived contexts differ 
across individuals raises problems for the frequently employed 
uni-dimensional approaches to importance which have been dis­
cussed earlier. The fact that factors and outcomes entering 
into interaction tend to be multi-dimensional suggests that in 
different interactions, different sets of factors become 
relevant (Zajonc, 1968). If a relevant context is specified 
or assumed, a given factor may be seen as important. If an
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irrelevant context is specified or assumed, the same factor 
may be seen as unimportant. This suggests that in any reason­
able interpretation of importance evaluations, the context in 
which the individual is asked to evaluate a factor must be 
clearly identified or defined. If, for example, we ask 
employees "How important is your supervisor's competence to 
your job?", we may receive different responses than if we ask 
"How important is your supervisor's competence to your life?", 
or "to your job satisfaction?" "How important is X to you?" 
may be quite different from "how important is X to society?" 
(Hofstede, 1976). Figure 2 illustrates the potential multi­
dimensionality of factor-context.
The tendency for the literature to employ different 
contexts and then attempt to compare the results is an unfor­
tunate one. For example, Jurgensen (1947) specifically states 
the context of his importance questions as being "how impor­
tant is X to your job satisfaction?" without noting that many 
of the earlier studies to which he compares his results made 
no such specification. Those who would compare importance 
evaluations obtained from direct reports (e.g., "how important 
is X?") to those inferred from a regression analysis of 
"general satisfaction" on various work factor satisfactions 
would also do well to note that the results obtained from the 
regression analyses may be "important" to the researcher in 
that they indicate which specific work factor satisfactions 
account for variance in overall satisfaction and yet not
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reflect accurately that which is most important (perceptually) 
to the employees. This is possible because the employee may 
not use the restricted domain of "overall job satisfaction" as 
the appropriate context in which he makes his evaluations.
For example, it may be that the importance of promotion is 
evaluated in a much broader, "all things considered - includ­
ing family and other aspects of life" context and not just 
with respect to satisfaction on the job. Only to the degree 
that the job plays a highly critical role in the broader con­
text will the importance evaluations obtained from these two 
contexts be equivalent. In addition, where one context is 
specified (e.g., job satlsfation), to the degree that the 
subject is able to limit his evaluations to that restricted 
context, other possible contexts are not considered. If these 
other contexts were considered, it is possible that the impor­
tance evaluations would be altered. To illustrate, suppose 
that we ask an individual the importance of snow to recrea­
tion. The outdoor photographer may indicate that snow is 
relatively unimportant if he does not participate in winter 
outdoor recreation. On the other hand, if we ask only "how 
important is snow?" and allow him to consider recreation, 
transportation and his photography, we may receive a much 
higher importance rating. Little has been done to investigate 
the potential differences in importance perceptions which may 
occur as contexts are specified or unlimited (Jury, 1977). It 
may be that evaluations of importance in unspecified contexts
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tend to generalize to the restricted case so that if a factor 
is important in association with any outcome, it will be 
reported as important in every other situation as well. 
Definite answers to questions relating to the effects of mul­
tiple factor-outcome associations would have implications for 
interpretation of importance responses. A number of recent 
studies, for example, seem to indicate that the job does not 
play as significant a role in general satisfaction with life 
as has been previously thought (Michaelson, Weitzel, and 
Jones, 1979; Near, et al., 1978). Do these findings imply 
that job-related factors will tend to have less overall impor­
tance for those for whom the job is not the primary factor in 
life satisfaction? At the present time an adequate answer to 
this question is not available.
There is further support for the need to give attention 
to the problem of context differences. In the empirical work 
of England (e.g., 1971) and the earlier work of Dennis (1957) 
it has been demonstrated that subjects may indicate identical 
perceptions of the importance of some factor but for entirely 
different reasons. For example, Dennis (1957) found that 
American and Middle-Eastern children both saw gold as some­
thing important. However, the American children's evaluation 
was based upon the perceived economic value of gold while the 
Middle-Eastern children saw gold as important because it was 
decorative or ornamental. In the same way, American children 
thought dogs were important for playing with while Middle-
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Eastern children saw them as important for guarding. England 
(1971) demonstrates that managers may see a factor as impor­
tant for at least three different reasons: because it is
linked with "success" outcomes, because it is related to 
"ethical-moral" outcomes or because it is related to "per­
sonal pleasure" outcomes. It is also evident from the work of 
England that different individuals may see a factor as impor­
tant for more than one reason, i.e., because it is associated 
with more than one outcome.
In sum, the possibility of more than one associated 
outcome for any factor gives rise to the potential for an 
individual to view a factor as important for one outcome and 
relatively unimportant for another. Unless we are aware of 
the context in which the individual makes his evaluation, we 
may only conclude that the factor is important or unimportant 
for some reason. We cannot infer for what reason and, there­
fore, cannot determine that any action taken in response to a 
particular expression of importance will result in a given 
behavior or attitude. Further research is needed to determine 
the effects of context specification or non-specification on 
importance evaluations.
Critical instrumentality. Another context issue which 
must be considered in developing a model for importance per­
ceptions is the perceived instrumentality of a factor toward a 
given outcome. In Figures 1 and 2 the relationship between 
factor and outcome is indicated by a directional arrow
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suggesting that the factor is viewed as having some impact on 
the outcome state. The degree to which the factor influences 
the outcome defines the level of "instrumentality". In other 
words, when the outcome is the specified context, the individ­
ual considers the amount of the contribution of the factor 
toward that outcome and this is reflected in evaluations of 
factor importance.
Where other factors are also viewed as influencing the 
outcome, we must know something more than the level of instru­
mentality as defined above in order to know the relative 
importance of each factor. For it is possible that a number 
of factors may each contribute more or less equally to the 
attainment of the specified outcome and still vary in impor­
tance. We must know how critical each is perceived as being 
toward the attainment or maintenance of the outcome (Emerson, 
1962; Thompson, 1967).
By "critical" here is meant the degree to which the 
contribution made by the factor specifically determines the 
outcome, that is, the degree to which its contribution is 
unique and cannot be readily substituted for by some other 
equally available factor. Zajonc (1968) refers to this 
characteristic of factor-outcome relationship as "prominence", 
the ability of the factor by itself to represent or determine 
the outcome. If, for example, both pay and promotion are per­
ceived as being relevant contributors to an outcome called 
"physical well-being", to the degree that the individual is
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not aware of substitutes for the contribution of one of the 
factors, that factor will be seen as more important. Pay may 
take on greater importance simply because there are no readily 
available substitutes for its contribution. If, on the other 
hand, there are any number of potential substitutes for the 
factor's contribution, it will be seen as less critical and 
less important. The more essential or unavoidable the factor's 
contribution toward the attainment or maintenance of an out­
come, the more important the factor (Zajonc, 1968). Therefore, 
even though a factor may be seen as making a significant con­
tribution to a specified outcome, it may be that the perceived 
criticalness of that contribution will also determine its 
importance. The individual is aware that there are many 
potential substitutes for spinach, for example. Thus, even 
though spinach may make a very significant contribution by 
providing certain required vitamins and minerals, the fact 
that there are other sources reduces its criticalness and 
importance. Thus, importance perceptions may be conceptualiz­
ed as being, in part, a function of the degree to which the 
factor is critically instrumental in the attainment of the 
specified or assumed outcome.
In sum, it would appear that not only must we have some 
idea as to the content of the cognitions about the factor(s) 
in question, but we must theoretically and operationally give 
some consideration to the context in which a factor is evalu­
ated (Zajonc, 1955, 1960). This involves an identification or
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specification of associated outcomes and an evaluation of the 
degree of dependence and perceived criticalness of the factor 
toward the outcome.
Contextual considerations require that we look beyond 
the factor-outcome(s) relationship to gain an understanding of 
the nature of importance as reflected through cognitive struc­
ture. For not only does the factor have a context which must 
be considered, but the outcome itself is embedded in a lattice­
work of cognitions. Recognizing this may help us to gain some 
insight as to how to conceptualize the differential effects of 
outcomes in determining factor importance without having to 
rely on the circularity of the second-third-fourth level 
values approach.
Factor and outcome cognitive centrality and salience.
A construct which may prove helpful in conceptualizing impor­
tance perceptions in terms of cognitive structure is the 
psychological centrality of the factor and its associated out- 
come(s). Some factors stay persistently in the forefront of 
the individual's consciousness while others are psychological­
ly remote, and would be said to have low centrality (Newcomb, 
et al., 1965). Figure 3 extends the concept of factor context 
and illustrates this graphically.
The factors and outcomes located in the middle of the 
individuals’cognitive space (e.g., X in Figure 3) with mul­
tiple ties to other factors, are far more central than those 
located more toward the periphery (e.g., Y in Figure 3).
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Centrality, then, may be thought of as closely related to the 
frequency with which an outcome and related factors occur to a 
person. The extreme case, that is factors totally outside the 
cognitive space, represents factors the person does not know 
exist. These factors would show no incidence at all in the 
person's conscious thought and would have no importance. While 
it would be difficult to predict in advance, we might expect 
that among factors and outcomes lying at the core of the cen­
trality dimension would be those closely associated with the 
"self" (Newcomb, et al., 1965). Conceptually, there would be 
at least one, and perhaps several highly central outcomes 
around which all other cognitions would be organized (Lindzey 
and Aronson, 1968). One would expect these to follow the 
pattern suggested by England (1971), in that the more central 
outcomes would be the more global while those located on the 
extremes would tend to be more specific and less inclusive.
In sum, the overall importance of a factor may be a function 
of the centrality of the specified or assumed outcome in the 
entire cognitive space of the individual. A factor which is 
in itself central will tend to be more important as will those 
factors which are critically instrumental in the attainment of 
central outcomes.
Asch (1952) pointed out (and seems to have shown experi­
mentally) that the centrality of a factor does not depend on 
its intrinsic quality but on its relationship to its neighbors 
in the entire cognitive space. Cognitions are central to the
77
cognitive structure, then, to the degree that they recur in 
the consciousness. This recurrence reflects the degree to 
which cognitions tend to organize around themselves large 
numbers of other cognitions. Money, family or religion, 
for example, may be highly central if they tend to be ass­
ociated with many other elements in the cognitive space.
It may be further suggested that factors which are associat­
ed with central outcomes as a means toward their achieve­
ment take on added centrality as well. If self integrity 
is about as central as any outcome is likely to be, for 
example, then factors closely associated with achieving and 
preserving the integrity of the self may have increased 
centrality by virtue of that fact ( Newcomb, et al., 1965).
It is important to distinguish centrality from salience.
A factor or outcome is salient if the immediate situation is 
such as to sensitize the individual to it, while centrality 
refers to a durable and generalized prominence. A factor of 
generally low cognitive prominence may become temporarily 
salient when the immediate circumstances draw one's attention 
to it forcefully and explicitly. In a case where an employee's 
parking privileges have been violated, for example, "parking 
space" might become temporarily salient and in that sense 
"important". We would not expect, however, that "parking 
space" would be necessarily prominent in the individual's more 
enduring cognitive structure. Rather, even though it is not 
central, it has become temporarily highlighted by an immediate
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situation. Stouffer (1955) demonstrated that cognitions which 
were of low centrality may be brought temporarily into a state 
of salience but are not likely to have dominant influence on 
the on-going attitudes and behavior of individuals.
Few, if any, studies have attempted to examine the 
effects of temporary salience on perceived importance of 
specific factors. The cognitive structure approach suggests 
that general perceptions of importance which influence every­
day behavior and attitudes may be temporarily disturbed by 
transient situations which raise particular factors or out­






Figure 4. Factor Salience.
In sum, it is suggested that cognitive centrality 
(i.e., the d e g r e e  to which other cognitions are related 
to and organized around the factor in question and/or the 
degree to which a factor is seen as contributing to outcomes 
thus described) may also help determine the perceived impor­
tance of the factor to the individual and may be reflected in
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self-reports of importance. In addition, use of the central­
ity construct may help in defining the relative power of dif­
ferent outcomes to determine the importance of an associated 
factor without the necessity of resorting to the second, 
third, etc. levels of outcomes as suggested by the value(s) 
approach to importance perceptions.
We may summarize this discussion of the cognitive 
structure approach to the nature of importance perceptions by 
reiterating the primary determinants of importance evaluations 
as developed above. First, the meaning of any reported impor­
tance evaluation must be interpreted in the light of knowledge 
concerning the understood content of the factor and the con­
textes) in which it is evaluated. The possibility of multiple- 
dimension factor contents and contexts may substantially 
affect the interpretation and prediction of importance evalua­
tions. Second, both the degree of influence of a factor on 
its associated outcome(s) and the perceived criticalness of 
that influence may, in part, determine the importance of the 
factor under consideration. Third, the cognitive centrality 
of the factor and its associated outcome(s) as well as tempor­
ary salience of factor and outcome(s) are seen as making 
potentially significant contributions to the development of 
importance perceptions. Such an approach to importance may 
help not only in improving our understanding of the cognitive 
nature of importance perceptions, but may also prove helpful 




A question of considerable theoretical and practical 
import which was raised at the outset of this paper is "Under 
what conditions might we expect importance perceptions to 
change?" An application of the cognitive structure conceptual­
ization of importance should help to provide some potential 
answers.
Evidence is offered by Rosenberg, et al., (1960) and 
Rosenberg and Gardner (1958) which suggests that perception 
changes are reflections of cognitive reorganization and 
restructuring. They attribute this in part to the striving 
toward cognitive consistency or balance (Festinger, 1957; 
Heider, 1946; Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955 etc.). According to 
this view, an individual can attain or maintain cognitive 
balance by altering relations between cognitions or by refin­
ing (differentiating) or isolating elements. If we consider 
the factor-context relationship in either its simple (Figure 
1) or complex (Figures 2 and 3) forms, we may identify several 
possible conditions under which we might expect changes in 
importance perceptions of a given factor.
First, we might expect the perceived overall importance 
of factor A to change if the centrality of the outcome with 
which it is associated were to somehow be altered. This could 
occur when the number and degree of the relationships between 
the outcome and other cognitions change. For example, if a 
previous relationship between X and Z in Figure 2 were to
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break down, factor C. would become less important due to the 
decreased centrality of its associated outcome.
Second, where the overall cognitive structure is rela­
tively stable, changes in the critical instrumentality of fac­
tor C with respect to specified outcome Z should alter the 
perceived importance of factor C. If all other elements in 
the cognitive space remain stable, such a change would affect 
both the importance of C with respect to ^ and the relative 
overall importance of factor C vis-a-vis other factors which 
have not undergone such a change.
Third, where the overall cognitive structure is rela­
tively stable, changes in the number of outcome associations 
for a given factor should alter its importance. For example, 
if factor B (Figure 2) was instrumental only in the attainment 
of outcome Y, but then cognitive links were established 
between B and W, and/or B and X, the importance of factor B 
should increase. Likewise, for person 1 for whom there were 
links between B and several outcomes as compared to person 2 
for whom B was linked only with Y, if Y is the same for person 
1 and 2, factor B should be seen as more important to person 1
Having indicated the conceptual rational behind 
potential changes in importance perceptions, we may now give 
thought to those occurrences in the individual's existence 
which may bring about these changes.
Essentially, there are two ways in which the critical 
instrumentality and/or centrality of a factor or outcome may
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be altered. The first is the addition or subtraction of cog­
nitions which are related to the factor or outcome(s) in ques­
tion (Adler and Kounin, 1939). Sheer numbers and repetitions 
of cognitive experiences may lead the person to acquire larger 
numbers of psychological cognitions and to form new factor- 
outcome linkages (Barker, Dembo and Lewin, 1941; Zajonc, 1968). 
One of the primary differences between a child and an adult 
may be the increased cognitive complexity which comes as a re­
sult of added experiences. Generally speaking, we may expect 
an adult to have a far more complicated lattice-work of cogni­
tions. Each additional cognitive experience increases the 
potential for larger numbers of relationships between factors 
and outcomes (Deutsch, 1968). The importance of a particular 
factor may be reduced or increased as a result of the addition 
or subtraction of cognitions which contribute to the same out- 
come(s). This, in effect, may reduce or increase the critical 
instrumentality of the particular factor with respect to the 
specified outcome, and may result in changes in importance 
evaluations (Festinger, 1957; Zajonc, 1968). This may be illus­
trated by the employee approaching retirement who sees the 
potential for income reduced from present salary and wages or 
other gainful employment to sole reliance on pension income. 
The removal of other contributing factors may increase his per­
ceptions of the importance of pension. Smith, et al., (1976) 
evaluated the level of satisfaction of older workers with
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various work factors and concluded that the "lack of alterna­
tives" may tend to increase their satisfaction with various 
factors. This may reflect an underlying cognitive restructur­
ing which allows the maintenance of balance - a given factor 
becomes more important by virtue of its increased critical 
instrumentality toward some outcome. At the same time the 
elimination of other alternatives forces an adjustment in what 
is "satisfactory" since an unsatisfactory evaluation would 
demand an impossible behavior (looking elsewhere).
A second related development might also lead to changes 
in the perceived importance of a factor. That is, an initial 
importance perception may be strengthened or eroded by objec­
tive experiences (Cherrington, et al., 1979). For example, if 
the young factory worker sees pay as the crucial contributor 
to his satisfaction with his job, and subsequently finds that 
increases in pay do not, in fact, make his job more satisfy­
ing, one would expect that the critical instrumentality of the 
initial perception would be decreased and perceived importance 
would decline.
On the basis of the above reasoning using a cognitive 
structure conceptualization of importance perceptions, one 
would expect such experience-enhancing correlates as increased 
knowledge, education, age, work experience and objective 
relationships between factor and outcome to alter importance 
perceptions (Cherrington, et al., 1979). Individuals' impor­
tance perceptions would be alike, initially, to the degree
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that processes influencing the elements and relationships in 
the cognitive organization did not differ. Certainly one would 
expect cultural differences (England, 1971; Whitely and 
England, 1977 etc.), differences in socialization processes 
such as differences between generations (Ondrack, 1973; Smith, 
et al., 1977; Taylor and Thompson, 1976), and possibly sex 
(Jurgensen, 1947) to affect importance perceptions. While the 
initial differences in organization of cognitions are inevit­
able and to some degree less predictable, the processes which 
result in changes in importance perceptions should be the 
same. Finally, one would expect that those factors which are 
characterized by extreme centrality (for example the "self") 
or which are seen as highly related to such factors, would be 
much less susceptible to changes simply by virtue of the vast 
numbers of relationships which would have to be altered in 
order to effect such changes (Rokeach, 1960; Zajonc and 
Morrissette, 1960).
In addition to these relatively enduring changes in 
importance perceptions which occur due to the more or less 
permanent rearranging of cognitive structures, there are like­
ly to be temporary changes in importance perceptions which are 
due to what has been described above as "salience".
While we have raised questions concerning the dynamics 
of importance perceptions and suggested possible sources for 
changes in importance, answers to the question "Do importance 
perceptions actually change in a predictable manner?", must
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await the formulation of a clear conceptual definition of 
importance. This study, therefore, defers questions of impor­
tance dynamics to future research and focuses primarily upon 
the nature of the importance construct.
Summary of the Cognitive Structure Approach
Employing a cognitive structure approach to the concep­
tualization of importance perceptions yields a model which takes 
into account a number of crucial issues for the most part 
ignored or inadequately developed by demand-based, need-based, 
and value(s)-based approaches. Those issues include 1) the 
need to acknowledge the potential impacts of differences in 
factor content between subjects on importance evaluation 
interpretations, 2) the need to identify, or specify, factor 
context, including 3) the need to consider the criticalness of 
the dependent relationship between factor and outcome and 4) 
the necessity of determining outcome centrality and taking 
into account temporary salience effects. The failure of 
currently employed conceptualizations of importance to deal 
with these issues has left us with an inadequate conceptual 
base for the importance construct so frequently used to 
explain employee performance and attitudes.
The cognitive structure approach to importance leads to 
the following conceptual model which may be useful for 
examining the cognitive nature of importance perceptions;
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1. Factor content.
2. Factor context including:
A. Critical instrumen­
tality of the factor's 
contribution to
Perceived importance = f associated outcome(s).
of a factor B. Cognitive centrality of
the factor and/or asso­
ciated outcome(s)
C. Temporary salience of 
the factor and/or asso­
ciated outcomes.
That is, the perceived importance of any factor with respect 
to a particular outcome is said to be a function of the cog­
nitive centrality of the factor and the perceived critical 
instrumentality of that factor in the attainment or mainten­
ance of the specified outcome(s). The overall importance of a 
particular factor (its importance in the entire cognitive 
space) is said to be a function of 1) the cognitive centrality 
of the factor and associated outcome(s), 2) the perceived 
instrumentality of the contribution of the factor to the asso­
ciated outcome, including both the perceived degree of depend­
ence of the outcome on the factor and the perceived critical­
ness of the factor contribution and 3) the temporary salience 
of the factor and its associated outcome(s). It is expected 
that differences in self-reports of factor importance between 
and within individuals will be largely explained by differ­
ences in these variables.
To the degree that these expectations are supported by 
the study, numerous theoretical and practical implications may 
follow.
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The following implications for attitude theory and 
research may result from this study;
1. A clearer understanding of the cognitive components 
of importance perceptions - providing a foundation 
for a re-examination of the role of the importance 
construct in performance, motivation and attitude 
formation.
2. Insights into the stability of importance responses 
given the effects of temporary salience of factors 
and outcomes - providing guidelines for' measurement 
and interpretation of importance evaluations.
3. The effects of context specification and non-speci­
fication on importance evaluations (restricted 
importance) - providing cautions and guidelines for 
comparing research using different approaches.
This study investigates the propositions advanced from 
the cognitive structure conceptualization of importance 
perceptions presented above by examining the effects of factor 
content, cognitive centrality, critical instrumentality and 
salience on perceived importance, and then discusses implica­
tions of the findings for theory and practice. The variables 
to be used in this study are defined as follows:
Factor: A generalized cognitive component which includes one
or more unique, specific elements. Factor boundaries 
and inclusiveness are subjectively determined by each 
person.
Factor content: Because factors may differ across individuals
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as to their inclusive elements and dimensions, the sub­
jective perceptions of primary elements (defined next) 
included in each factor must be determined. The pri­
mary elements included in the cognitive set bounded by 
the factor describe the factor content.
Elements : Specific factor components which are indivisible
and yet possess meaning of their own. In this study we 
shall be concerned with those elements which account 
for the greatest proportion of the factor content. 
Primary elements are those components of a factor which 
are most readily perceived as defining the factor's 
meaning to an individual.
Factor context: One or more outcomes which may be associated
with a particular factor in a dependent relationship.
Centrality : That characteristic of a given cognition which
indicates the number and strength of the relationships 
between it and other factors and outcomes in the cog­
nitive space. Factors and outcomes which are in the 
forefront of the individual's consciousness and which 
therefore generally occur frequently in the individual's 
thoughts, are said to be central.
Salience: A factor or outcome which takes on prominence in
the individual's consciousness because of an immediate 
and temporary situation is said to be salient. If the 
same outcome would not occur frequently in the indivi­
dual's consciousness under general, normal conditions, 
it is not said to be central.
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Critical instrumentality: The degree to which a specified
outcome is dependent upon the unique contribution of a 
given factor. Thus, both the strength of the dependent 
relationship and the degree to which the individual is 
aware of equally available factor substitutes deter­
mines critical instrumentality.
Overall importance: An individual evaluation of the overall
consequence of a particular factor, that is, consider­
ing the entire cognitive space. Overall importance 
reflects factor context, centrality and the critical 
instrumentality of long-term dependent relationships 
between cognitive components. Overall importance per­
ceptions may also reflect short-term dependencies 
(salience) brought about by transient cognitive 
linkages.
Restricted importance: An individual evaluation of the con­
sequence of a particular factor relative to a restrict­
ed, specified outcome, without consideration of the 
relative centrality of that outcome nor other possible 
factor-outcome relationships.
Study Objectives 
The variables identified above can be combined to form 
a general model of importance perceptions. In the present
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study, each of the variables is operationalized and then all 
are combined to test the utility of the model in accounting 
for differences in importance evaluations on a wide range of 
factors. In particular we are interested in knowing whether 
or not and the degree to which differences in importance per­
ceptions for a particular factor within and between indivi­
duals can be explained by 1) differences in the cognitive 
centrality of the factor and its principal associated out­
comes, 2) differences in the perceived critical instrumentality 
of the factor-outcome relationships and/or 3) differences in 
the temporary salience of the factor and its associated out­
comes .
A second purpose of the study is to investigate the 
differences in the ability of the above model to predict 
importance perceptions when the predictor variables are limit­
ed to a single context vis-a-vis a multiple context. That is, 
does the inclusion of secondary associated outcomes improve 
the ability of the model to explain importance evaluations 
over a model which considers only the outcome with which the 
factor is most associated? In addition, the study will 
examine differences obtained in importance evaluations for 
factors evaluated in a specified context versus evaluations 
obtained for the same factors when the context is unspecified. 
Finally, we shall seek to determine whether the cognitive 
model of importance perceptions is differentially effective in
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In order to examine the key question presented in this 
study relating to the possible effects of factor content, 
critical instrumentality, centrality and salience on impor­
tance perceptions, it was necessary to examine importance per­
ceptions for a wide variety of factors for a large number of 
subjects who were likely to vary considerably with regard to 
each of the variables of interest as related to the factors 
selected. Furthermore, it was desired to employ a sample 
which included the employed (full and part-time) and unemploy­
ed (e.g., retirees, students and housewives) and those enter­
ing or considering entrance into the job market.
In order to increase the likelihood of considerable 
differences between the subjects on the model variables for 
the work and non-work factors chosen for the study, subjects 
were selected from the university community and from a 
moderately conservative religious group. Students were 
selected primarily from among those having at least some work 
experience, nearing graduation or pursuing graduate degrees. 
The religious group subjects were all members of a large,
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moderately conservative, protestant denomination, whose 
membership also represented a variety of socio-economic 
classes. It was felt that the differences in ages, experience 
and peer norms among the subjects would provide for consider­
able differences in the cognitive structures for many of the 
factors selected for the study (Alderfer and Guzzo, 1979;
Smith, Roberts, and Hulin, 1977; Taylor and Thompson, 1976), 
and thus would provide a reasonable test of the model. The 
demographic characteristics of each group are given in Table 4. 
All subjects were volunteers. The sample size for the study 
was 275.
Operational Definition of the Variables 
Factor importance. The perceived importance of each 
factor (considered the criterion variables) was measured on a 
fifteen point scale from "of no importance" through "somewhat 
important" to "extremely important" (see Appendix A, p. 215). 
Degrees of unimportance were not used since they were believed 
to be meaningless. A rating/ranking scale was selected over 
simple rating or ranking. This has the advantage of allowing 
subjects to give identical evaluations to more than one factor 
and avoid the problem of unrepresentativeness of forced rank­
ing techniques. Subjects were asked to rate each factor 
according to its importance alternating between the most 
important and least important and were required to write each 
factor next to the appropriate number on the fifteen point
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scale. This caused the subjects to consider the relative 
importance of each factor vis-à-vis the other factors without 
requiring them to rate, unequally, factors which they perceiv­
ed to be of equal importance. It is believed that this method 
provides a better approximation for importance perceptions 
than either rating or ranking performed separately. At the 
same time, the rating/ranking method helped to avoid the lack 
of variability which so often occurs in importance measurement. 
The possibility of employing both rating and ranking for com­
parison purposes was rejected since it was felt that subjects 
would not be able to accomplish these independently.
Factors and Outcomes 
Importance evaluations were sought across fourteen 
factors taken from items commonly used in both work and non­
work importance, satisfaction or values studies. In addition, 
several factors were selected to maximize the potential 
variance on the centrality and salience dimensions. The study 
also employed forty-five factors similarly selected which 
were used as distractors and to provide a means for measuring 
outcome centrality (see questionnaire, p.210). Fourteen 
factors were employed because it was felt subjects would have
t
difficulty ranking and rating more (see p. 214). A wide variety 
of factors were adapted from earlier studies by England (1967, 
1971), Michaelson et al (1979), Porter (1961), Friedlander 
(1965), and Wollack et al (1971) in order to provide a test for 
the model over factors which seemed likely to vary in import­
ance for different subjects. Outcomes were adapted from the 
theoretical work of Maslow (1954) and Vroom (1964).
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While outcomes were selected primarily to conform with 
prevalent theory, factors had to be selected in such a way 
as to provide for differences in temporary salience, crit­
icalness, and centrality as well as importance.
Factors Outcomes
1. Income compared to others. 1. Financial goals.
2. College Education. 2. Personal pleasure/
3. Religion. happiness.
4, Conserving natural resources. 3. Right and wrong.
5. Inflation. 4. Personal growth and
6. Job security. development.
7. Afghanistan. 5. Health and safety.
8. Equal opportunity. 6. Self image.






For selected factors, importance was measured via the 
fifteen point rating scale both for evaluations considered 
without regard to a specified context and with respect to 
specific selected outcomes. Subjects first rated factors in 
an unspecified context and later with respect to either "job 
satisfaction" or "general life satisfaction".
Factor content. In order to meet the requirement of 
specifying or identifying the understood factor content, sub­
jects were asked to indicate the primary elements contained in 
their personal conceptualizations of each factor. Questions
were worded, "As I commonly think of it, _____  includes". A
list of common meanings derived from interviews and dictionary 
definitions was provided from which the subject was instructed 
to select the two which best represented elements which he/she 
most commonly included in thoughts about that particular
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factor. Since it was possible that the list of elements provided 
did not include those which were relevant for the subject, blank 
spaces were provided in which the subject could write alternative 
choices. It was felt that two choices prevented the alternatives 
from being too restrictive while the blank space provided the 
opportunity for a greater range of responses.
Factor context. For the purposes of evaluating differences 
in restricted and unrestricted importance perceptions and for com­
paring importance perceptions across instrumentality and central­
ity differences, it was necessary to identify the outcomes with 
respect to which the subjects evaluated the importance of the fac­
tor. Subjects were asked to select from a list two outcomes with 
which he/she most associated the particular factor. Questions 
were worded: "This item contributes most to ..." and subjects
selected the first and second outcomes to which the factor made 
its greatest contribution. A list of commonly associated outcomes 
was provided along with a blank space in which the subject could 
indicate an alternative choice. The outcome choices provided were
1) my pleasure and happiness, 2) financial goals, 3) national 
security, 4) my image of myself, 5) right and wrong, 6) health and 
safety, and 7) personal growth and development. These outcomes 
represented adaptations of outcomes commonly used as motivational 
bases for behavior in VIE theory and research which contributed 
some of the aspects of instrumentality construct used in the 
cognitive structure conceptualization of importance perceptions 
developed above (see especially Vroom, 1964, chapter 3). In 
addition, similarities to need categories hypothesized by
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Murray and Maslow were sought with the expectation that opera­
tional compatability with these theories might prove helpful 
in the interpretation of the results of this study in the 
light of need-based approaches reviewed earlier (see Table 3).
Critical instrumentality. As described in Chapter II, 
critical instrumentality is composed of two dimensions - the 
degree of dependence plus substitutability of the factor. The 
degree of dependence on a given factor of each of the two pre­
viously selected outcomes associated with that factor was 
measured by asking subjects to indicate the degree to which 
the factor influenced the respective outcomes. Questions were 
worded "How much does the item influence the first and second 
outcome choices?" and subjects were to rate the degree of 
influence on a five point scale from "very little influence" 
through "some influence" to "very strong influence".
The criticalness of a factor with regard to its contri­
bution to each of the two associated outcomes was measured by 
asking the subjects to indicate the degree to which there were 
readily available substitutes for the factor's contribution to 
the outcome in question. Subjects rated criticalness on a 
five point scale from "YES, there is one or more possible sub­
stitutes and they are very readily available to me" to "NO, 
there are no readily available substitutes. The item is 
essential or unavoidable".
Cognitive centrality. The centrality of the two 
selected associated outcomes was measured in two ways. The
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first measure (method no. 1) was based on the number of link­
ages in the cognitive space between the outcome and other cog­
nitive elements. That is, centrality was a measure of the 
degree to which cognitions tend to be organized around the 
outcome in question. In order to get some indication of cen­
trality as represented this way, the subject was given a list 
of items (among which were factors used elsewhere in the 
study) and the seven outcomes discussed previously (see Factor 
context) . For each of the forty-five items the subject was 
asked to select two of the seven meanings (outcomes) or "none 
of the above" according to which best represented descriptions 
of what that item meant to them. The total number of times 
that the individual selected a given outcome (as either a 
first or second choice) was taken as a measure of the relative 
centrality of that outcome for that individual (vis-à-vis 
other individuals). This approach is consistent with that 
used by England to study managerial values (e.g., 1971).
Outcome and factor centrality were also measured 
(method no. 2) by operationalizing the concept of incidence of 
conscious thought (Newcomb, et al., 1965). Subjects were 
asked to indicate how frequently they thought about the factor 
or outcome generally (defined as over the last year or two). 
Questions were worded, "generally I tend to think about this 
..." and subjects indicated their answer on a five point scale 
from "not at all" through "occasionally" to "very often".
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Salience. The temporary salience of factors and their 
associated outcomes was measured by asking subjects to indi­
cate how frequently they thought about the item recently 
(defined as the last three to four weeks) as compared to 
generally in the past (over the last year or two). Ratings 
were on a five point scale from "much less" through "about the 
same" to "much more".
Instrument
Pre-administration interviews were conducted during the 
development of the instrument to determine the ability of the 
questions to generate responses which were consistent with 
those sought for the purposes of the study. Numerous adjust­
ments were made in the wording of the instructions, examples 
and the questions themselves until interviews indicated that 
subjects were able to comprehend and respond to the intent of 
each section of the survey instrument. The survey included 
eighteen pages including general instructions and required 
approximately forty minutes to complete. The criterion vari­
able (factor importance rating/ranking) was positioned at the 
beginning of the survey to avoid the possibility that re­
sponses to other sections would influence responses to factor 
importance questions. Post administration interviews were 
conducted to determine whether subjects' answers to any one 
section were influenced by their answers to previous sections. 
Such influence was virtually non-existent. A subsample of 50 
subjects was re-administered the survey three to four weeks
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after the original administration to determine the stability 
of the measures on each variable.
Procedure
Questionnaires were administered to all the subjects 
over the same two-week time span. Verbal instructions were 
given to groups of subjects explaining that the questionnaire 
was part of a doctoral dissertation research project, the pur­
pose of which was to examine the beliefs of different groups 
of people concerning a list of topics relating to many every­
day concerns and interests. Subjects were told that the ques­
tionnaire was composed of several sections and that it was 
very important that they fill in each section completely and 
in sequential order. They were encouraged to read the instruc­
tions carefully, including the examples for each section. 
Subjects were instructed not to include their name anywhere on 
the questionnaire, that the information they provided was 
entirely anonymous. They were asked to fill out the question­
naire in one sitting, individually, and to respond only with 
their personal beliefs, regardless of whether or not they felt 
their response was consistent with what others might believe.
In 100 cases, subjects received verbal instructions and 
immediately completed the questionnaire in the presence of the 
researcher. In 250 cases, verbal instructions were given, 
subjects later completed the questionnaire and returned them 
to the researcher. Self-addressed envelopes were provided and 
subjects were asked to seal their completed questionnaire in
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the envelope before returning it to the researcher. Of the 
250 subjects who did not complete the questionnaire in the 
presence of the researcher, 200 were returned completed within 
five days after administration. From the 350 original sub­
jects, 275 returned surveys sufficiently completed to be 
used in this study.
Analytical Procedures 
Importance Differences 
Analysis of variance was employed to determine whether 
significant differences in importance ratings of factors were 
attributable to age, sex, work experience, education, or 
religious practice.
Test of the Model 
In order to examine the ability of the cognitive struc­
ture model to explain differences in importance perceptions 
between individuals, a series of multiple regression analyses 
were performed, to test the ability of the model components to 
explain importance evaluations for fourteen different factors. 
The first series of multiple regression analyses examined the 
ability of the full model to explain importance rating/rank­
ings for each of the fourteen factors. Predictor variables 
thus included:
1. Primary associated outcome centrality measured by 
method no. 1 (the total number of times the forty- 
five original items were associated with the out­
come - Appendix A, p. 210).
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2. Secondary associated outcome centrality measured by 
method no. 1.
3. Primary associated outcome centrality measured by 
method no. 2 (frequency of thought, generally, from 
"not at all" to "very often" - Appendix A, p.225)*
4. Secondary associated outcome centrality measured by 
method no. 2.
5. Degree of dependence of the primary outcome on the
factor (from "no influence" to "very strong influ­
ence" - Appendix A, p . 220).
6. Degree of dependence of the secondary outcome on 
the factor (the same as variable no. 5).
7. Criticalness of factor contribution to primary 
outcome (from "no readily available substitutes" to 
"many readily available substitutes" - Appendix A, 
p. 222).
8. Criticalness of factor contribution to secondary 
outcome (the same as variable no. 7).
9. Factor centrality (method no. 1: frequency of
thought, generally, from "not at all" to "very 
often" - Appendix A, p. 225 ).
10. Factor salience (frequency of thought, recently as 
compared to generally in the past, from "much less" 
to "much more" - Appendix A, p. 225).
11. Salience of primary outcome (same as variable no. 10).
12. Salience of secondary outcome (same as variable no. 10)
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In order to examine the possibility of reducing the number of 
predictors in the model without reduction in explanatory 
power, a forward stepwise multiple regression was used, repli­
cated by developing the model for each of the fourteen factors.
A second series of multiple regression analyses was 
conducted to determine the relative effectiveness of a multi- 
ple-outcome model (Importance = f(dependence - outcome 1, 
dependence - outcome 2, criticalness - outcome 1, criticalness 
- outcome 2, centrality - outcome 1, centrality - outcome 2, 
salience - outcome 1, salience - outcome 2) vis-a-vis a model 
including the same components only limited to a single out­
come. Differences in variance accounted for in the restricted 
(single outcome) model versus the full model were tested using 
a restricted/unrestricted regressions F-test for significance.
Outcomes As Latent Factors 
A factor analysis of the importance rating/rankings of 
the fourteen major factors was conducted to determine whether 
there was support for the notion that factors tend to be cog­
nitively organized around the outcomes with which the factors 
are most associated. A common factor analysis was conducted 
using a Scree test (Cattell, 1966) as the criterion for 
retaining factors and a varimax rotation.
Model Effectiveness for Sub-groups 
Additional regression analyses were performed in order 
to determine whether there were significant differences in the
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model's ability to explain importance evaluations for subsets 
of the sample. Regressions were conducted for sex 
differences, education and age. In addition, those with work 
experience were compared to those without work experience to 
determine whether the importance of job-related factors tended 
to be better explained by the model for those who have had 
some direct experience with the factors. A similar analysis 
was conducted to determine whether the importance of religious 
beliefs is better explained by the model for those who attend 
church regularly.
The Effects of Context Specification 
Twenty of the original forty-five items were given 
importance ratings both in an unspecified context format and 
in a specified context (ten of the items were rated on 
importance with respect to "Job Satisfaction" and ten were 
rated with respect to "Life Satisfaction"). Zero-order 
correlations were performed between specified and unspecified 
ratings for each of the twenty items and t-tests were used to 
examine differences in mean ratings given each item under the 
two conditions. Unspecified context yielded what will be 
referred to as "unrestricted" importance ratings while 
specified contexts yielded "restricted" ratings.
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE INVESTIGATION 
Introduction
This chapter presents the results of analyses of the 
data generated by this study. First, the results of the test- 
retest stabiity measures, and the specific characteristics of 
the sample are reported. Mean importance ratings are also 
reported for the major sample subgroups (sex, education, job 
experience, age and religious practice) on selected factors. 
In addition, this section will report the frequency distribu­
tions for factor content and context selections.
Next, the results of the multiple regression analyses 
of the model on each of the fourteen factors are reported. 
Included are the overall ability of the full model and a simi­
lar model which includes only components related to a single 
outcome to account for importance evaluations.
Next, the relative usefulness of the full model to 
account for importance evaluations for various subgroups of 
the sample is presented. Included are comparisons of the 
model's effectiveness between sexes, education levels, ages, 
work experience levels and religious practices.
The statistical calculations were performed by the 
Statistical Analysis System package programs (Helwig and
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Council, 1979). An IBM-370 computer at The University of 
Oklahoma Computer Center was used.
The following chapter (Chapter V) is given to a discus­
sion of interpretations and implications of the results of 
study and a discussion of the limitations of the study as well 
as suggestions for future research.
The Reliability of the Measures 
The length of the instrument (subjects required an 
average of forty minutes to complete the survey) and the 
nature of the measurements dictated a test-retest procedure 
for examining the stability of the measures employed in this 
study. Since many of the scales were developed specifically 
for this investigation, the reliability of the measures over 
time is of particular interest.
Fifty of the original 350 surveys administered were 
coded in such a way as to allow identification for retest pur­
poses without jeopardizing the anonymity of the respondents. 
All fifty of the thus identified subjects were asked to take 
part in the retest and agreed to do so. Retest surveys were 
distributed to these subjects from three to four weeks after 
the original administration. This was judged to be sufficient 
time elapsed to prevent bias due to memorization. Difficul­
ties were encountered, however, in getting the respondents to 
return the retest surveys and only twenty-five were eventually 
returned. Of these twenty-five, two were incomplete and were 
not used in the reliability analyses.
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Importance rating/ranking. The dependent variable in 
the model was tested for stability using the twenty-three 
test-retest scores obtained over the three week elapsed time. 
It will be recalled that in the Importance rating/ranking 
procedure the subjects rated the fourteen major factors for 
importance on a scale of 0-15 and in each case wrote the 
abbreviated form of the factor on a line corresponding to the 
rating given. This encouraged the subjects to consider the 
relative ratings each item was given without requiring that 
each factor be given a unique rating or rank. Test-retest 
correlations for the fourteen factor importance ratings using 
this method ranged from a low of .79 to a high of .85.
Reliability tests for the independent variables in the 
model were severely hampered by a reduction in the number of 
comparisons available. On numerous occasions in the retest, 
subjects selected different first and second associated 
outcomes than those they selected originally. While it was 
recognized that the two-outcome model was only a surrogate for 
a multi-context approach, it was not anticipated that in the 
retest subjects might select different outcomes (which may 
have been nearly equal in association with those selected in 
the original administration). Approximately seventy percent 
of the twenty-three usable retests made outcome selections 
identical to those they made originally. Nonetheless, this 
reduced the number of comparison scores for measures of 
outcome dependence, criticalness and outcome centrality to
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fourteen or fifteen. Similar difficulties reduced the number 
of paired comparisons available in the examination of factor 
centrality and outcome centrality as measured by "frequency of 
thought, generally" (method no. 2). Correlations for these 
measures using the very reduced numbers for retest yielded 
values ranging from as low as .30 to .91. This inconclusive­
ness may have been due to the insufficient numbers of compari­
son scores. Correlations obtained for the model components 





Outcome dependence: .67 .75 14
Criticalness : .30 .69 14







research should certainly further examine the
of both importance evaluations and the cognitive model compon­
ents over various time spans. It should be noted here that 
the cognitive theory developed in this study and upon which 
the model is built acknowledges the possibility of continual 
re-structuring of cognitions by the person and therefore one
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would expect some changes in the dependence, criticalness and 
centrality measurements. In addition, the instructions and 
procedures used in this study were relatively difficult for 
most subjects to comprehend upon first reading. Therefore, 
there may be some learning effects influencing the stability 
of the measures. Furthermore, the length of the test (requir­
ing an average of forty minutes to complete) may have led to 
inattention or carelessness in the later stages.
Sample Characteristics 
Table 4 indicates the frequency distributions for the 
sample along several demographic characteristics. It should be 
noted that sex, marital status, employment and job tenure are 
evenly distributed across the sample. However, age and number 
of children tend to reflect the relative youth of the subjects 
taking part in the research, with 65 percent of the sample 
being below thirty years of age and less than 50 percent of 
the married subjects having children at home. The level of 
education of the sample was also quite high with nearly 90 
percent having had at least some college. The high education 
level reflects the college students primarily from upper-divi- 
sion and graduate classes and the middle-class characteristic 
of the religious group. While a large percentage (84%) of the 
sample were church members, only about 50 percent attended 
church regularly and 24 percent rarely or never.
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The Effects of Age, Education. Sex, Employment Status and 
Religious Practice Differences on Importance Ratings
Tables 5-9 show the results of analysis of variance 
tests performed to determine whether differences in major 
demographic characteristics were responsible for significant 
differences in importance ratings. Analyses of variance were 
performed across age, sex and education differences for each 
of the fourteen factors in the study and similar tests were 
performed across religious practice differences for importance 
of religion and across employment status differences for impor­
tance of comparative pay and job security. In each case 
importance was measured using the rating/ranking scale 
described in Chapter III.
As indicated in Table 5, nine out of the fourteen F 
values were statistically significant. However, only for 
leisure, education and home ownership did age difference 
account for five percent or more of the variance in the impor­
tance evaluations when subjects below thirty years of age were 
compared to those over thirty. In addition, small but signif­
icant differences were found for the importance of religion, 
inflation, job security, influence, retirement and taxes. The 
older subjects evaluated religion, inflation, home ownership, 
retirement and taxes as more important and the younger sub­
jects rating education, job security, leisure and the oppor­
tunity to influence others as more important. Rather large
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differences exist in the ratings for taxes with older subjects 
rating taxes much higher.
Table 6 indicates the results for comparisons of impor­
tance ratings between male and female subjects. While there 
were statistically significant differences in the importance 
ratings given religion, the actual difference accounts for 
less than three percent of the variance in the mean ratings.
As with sex differences, Table 7 indicates that there 
were no practically significant differences in the importance 
rating given the fourteen factors between subjects who had 
completed at least an undergraduate degree and those who had 
not. Statistically significant differences were found for the 
importance of job security and home ownership but variance 
accounted for was so small as to make these differences with­
out practical significance.
Analysis of variance of importance of job security and 
comparative pay across differences in employment status (Table 
8) likewise yeilded values which account for less than 
three percent of the variance in importance evaluations indi­
cating that there was effectively no difference in importance 
ratings between these groups of subjects. However, the test 
for significant differences in importance of religion across 
high and low church attenders (Table 9) yielded a very sig­
nificant variance accounted for with the high attenders giving 
a much higher importance evaluation to religion than those who
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attend church less frequently. This, of course, is as would 
be expected if it is the perceived importance of religion 
which leads to church attendance (Blood, 1969).
Since only four of the forty-five comparisons between 
the various demographic comparison groups showed variance 
accounted for of over five percent in the mean importance 
ratings, it appears that these characteristics are accounting 
for nothing but chance variation in the importance ratings 
themselves (the dependent variable in the subsequent 
regression analyses) or, at best, very small proportions of 
any systematic variance.
The Importance Measurement 
As explained in Chapter III, the method of obtaining 
importance evaluations used in this study (the dependent vari­
able in the model) was the simultaneous rating/ranking method, 
The purpose of employing this method was to increase the 
variance in importance across factors and to discourage the 
tendency to rate all factors as of high importance.
Factor Content 
In an attempt to help stabilize and identify the mean­
ings of each factor as they were subsequently considered by 
the subjects throughout the latter portions of the survey, 
respondents were asked to indicate which of several content 
descriptions they normally use in thinking about each factor. 
Table 10 provides the frequency distributions for the major
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content selections. . In eleven of the fourteen cases there was 
general agreement as to the content of the factor with 65 per­
cent or more of the subjects selecting the same content des­
cription. In the remaining three cases (conservation of 
natural resources, retirement and neighborhood) selections 
were more evenly divided among three content descriptions.
Even in these three cases, however, in excess of 50 percent of 
the subjects agreed on the content of the factor.
Factor Context 
For each of the fourteen factors the primary and 
secondary outcomes with which the subject most associated the 
factor was indicated. The frequency distributions for the 
primary outcome selections are reported in Table 11. (i.e.,
the percentage of the subjects who selected each outcome as 
being the one most associated with the particular factor).
None of these findings were unexpected. The primary purpose 
of this context identification was to provide the subject with 
a reference for dependence and criticalness evaluations and to 
allow identification and measurement of the cognitive central­
ity and salience of the associated outcomes for use in subse­
quent regression analyses.
Test of the Full Model 
Multiple linear regression analyses were performed to 
test the ability of the full (multiple outcome) model to
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explain variance in importance rating/rankings between indi­
viduals. thus, the model examined was
Y = Po Pl̂l ^2^2 •••■*■ Pn^n
or more specifically:





Outcome 1 centrality (method no. 1),
Outcome 2 centrality (method no. 1),
Outcome 1 centrality (method no. 2),





Table 12 reports the correlation coefficients between each of 
the predictors in the model and the importance rating/ranking 
for each of the fourteen factors. Consistent and moderate-to- 
strong correlations were found between factor importance and 
the degree of dependence of the associated outcomes (both the 
primary and secondary outcomes) and factor centrality. Fre­
quently, moderate correlations were found between factor impor­
tance and the criticalness of the contribution of the factor
115
toward its associated outcomes and factor salience. In no 
case was the salience of either the first or second outcome 
found to correlate at any practically significant level with 
factor importance, and in only one case did either measure of 
the centrality of either the primary or secondary outcomes 
correlate even moderately with factor importance.
Degree of Independence of Predictor Variables
Correlations between pairs of predictors were also 
examined. Tables 13-26 report the correlation coefficients 
for the relationships between predictors in the full (multiple 
outcome) models for each of the fourteen factors. Only corre­
lations of .30 were considered to be practically significant.
In thirteen of the fourteen cases, the dependence of the pri­
mary outcome on the factor was moderately correlated (a modal 
correlation of around .45 was found) with the dependence of 
the secondary outcome on the factor. This is to be expected 
since the primary and secondary outcomes were very often quite 
similar. For example, the primary outcome selected as associated 
with a college education was "personal growth and development" 
while the secondary outcome was "my image of myself". The 
interdependence of outcomes, therefore, probably explains much 
of the tendency for dependence of outcomes on a factor to 
correlate moderately. The same could be said for the moderate
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correlations between, the criticalness of a factor's contribu­
tion to the primary and secondary outcomes in all fourteen 
cases (again a modal correlation of about .45). However, the 
correlations of criticalness evaluations may also be due to 
subjects evaluating the factor itself without particular 
regard to the specified outcomes so that, if education was 
considered, it may have simply been rated critical in its con­
tribution to both "personal growth and development" and "my 
image of myself" simply because the subject could think of no 
readily available substitutes for education, regardless of the 
outcome. In seven out of fourteen cases the cognitive cen­
trality of the factor itself was moderately (r = .35) corre­
lated with factor salience. That is, there was a slight tend­
ency for those factors which have been thought of quite 
frequently, generally in the past, to also be reported as 
receiving somewhat more attention recently. As expected, this 
was not true in cases where one might expect that current 
events would have dramatically increased the frequency of 
recent thought concerning a factor (e.g., Afghanistan, equal 
opportunity, home ownership, retirement and inflation).
Factor centrality was also moderately correlated with primary 
and secondary outcome dependence upon the factor (eight out of 
fourteen and six out of fourteen cases respectively). This, 
too, is as expected since the cognitive centrality of a factor 
represents both the number of cognitive links with other
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cognitions and the strength of those linkages. To sum, there 
appears to be little practical interdependence between the 
model predictors for each of the factors examined. This 
interpretation is consistent with Lykken (1968) who argues 
that there is often an autocorrelation between two measures 
taken on the same subject regardless of the content of the 
measures.
Multiple Regression Results 
The results of the multiple regression analyses are 
reported in Table 27. In all fourteen cases the full models 
were significant at p <  .0001. Variance in importance rating/ 
rankings accounted for by the full model ranged from a low of 
r 2 = .32 for importance of inflation and kind of neighbor­
hood to = .54 for importance of being able to influence 
others to R^ = .81 for the importance of religion. Table 27 
also reports the standardized beta coefficients for each pre­
dictor variable in each of the fourteen regression analyses. 
Since coefficients are reported only for those predictor vari­
ables for which the contribution to the variance accounted for 
was significant (a significance level of p < .10 was used as 
the criterion), it is possible to gain a feel for the simi­
larities in the regression models by considering how often 
each of the predictors entered into the regression equation.
In fourteen of fourteen cases, the cognitive centrality of the
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factor made a significant contribution. That is, the degree 
to which a factor tends to be consciously associated with 
other cognitions appears to be a consistent predictor of the 
importance of the factor. In twelve of fourteen cases and 
nine of fourteen cases, respectively, the dependence of the 
primary and secondary outcomes on the factor made significant 
contributions to the explanatory power of the model. That is, 
the degree to which a factor is perceived as influencing the 
outcomes with which it is associated quite frequently is a 
significant predictor of factor importance. In nine of four­
teen cases the criticalness of the factor to the primary out­
come or the secondary outcome was a significant predictor.
That is, the degree to which there are readily available sub­
stitutes for the factor frequently influences its importance. 
Likewise, in eight of fourteen cases the salience of the fac­
tor was a significant predictor of the factor importance.
That is, the temporary conscious prominence of a factor may 
significantly influence its importance. The role of the cen­
trality of the primary and secondary outcomes is less clear.
In three of the four cases where the regression analyses indi­
cate a significant contribution of outcome centrality measured 
by the frequency of thought (generally, i.e., method no. 2), 
the standardized betas are negative. While the meaning of 
negative betas is not readily interpretable, the lack of any
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significant numbers.of positively significant coefficients 
tends to support the conclusion that this measure of outcome 
centrality is of little utility in the model. An analysis of 
the overall model indicates that the generally significant 
predictors (as judged by standardized betas) are:
1. Factor centrality
2. Outcome dependence (either primary or secondary 
outcome)
3. Criticalness of the factor contribution to the 
primary outcome
4. Factor salience
5. Outcome centrality as measured by method no. 1.
It would appear that outcome centrality (method no. 2) and 
outcome salience generally fail to contribute significantly to 
the explanatory power of the model. In order to help verify 
these findings, a forward stepwise regression analysis was 
performed for each of the fourteen factors. In none of these 
analyses did the entry of the outcome centrality (method no.
2) of either the primary or secondary outcome add more than 
.01 to the variance accounted for by the model. In the case 
of equal opportunity, the salience of the primary outcome did 
make some significant contribution to the model (adding approxi­
mately .02 to the variance accounted for) as did the salience 
of the secondary outcome to the explanation of importance of 
neighborhood.
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Since we are interested in knowing not only which of 
the predictors make significant contributions to the explana­
tory power of the model but also which among the significant 
predictors should be weighted most heavily in future studies, 
a more careful examination of the standardized beta coeffi­
cients is needed. Listed in table 28 are the number of times a 
predictor was found to have the largest beta coefficient, the 
second largest and the third largest. These findings further 
strengthen the previous conclusions that factor centrality, 
outcome dependence, criticalness, and factor salience are the 
best predictors in the model. The results also suggest, how­
ever, that either factor centrality or dependence may be the 
best predictor (dependence exhibits the largest beta in five 
cases as does factor centrality). For Afghanistan, for 
example, the importance of the factor was explained much more 
by the dependence of the primary outcome (national security) 
on the factor than by the cognitive centrality of the factor 
itself. This is entirely as one would expect since Afghanistan 
is not very likely to be a cognition around which are organiz­
ed large numbers of other cognitions. It would also appear 
that the criticalness of the factor's contribution to the pri­
mary or secondary outcome should also be weighted fairly 
heavily. We may consider criticalness to be a better predic­
tor than factor salience, generally, but should note that for 
factors for which temporary salience is likely to play a role,
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it is equally likely to be a strong one (salience appears as 
the first or second most predictive variable four times).
Comparison of Multiple and Single-Outcome Models 
Having determined the ability of the full cognitive 
model and the relative power of the model components to 
explain importance evaluations on a wide range of factors, we 
turn to an examination of the benefits of employing a multiple- 
outcome model vis-a-vis the more commonly used single-outcome 
models. In this study, the "multiple" outcomes were limited 
to only two. However, some indication of the relative explana­
tory power of a model with several outcomes was expected. A 
comparison of single and two-outcome models was accomplished 
by performing a restricted/unrestricted models F-test for sig­
nificant differences in the ability to predict a given depen­
dent variable and by comparing the variance accounted for by 
each of the models. In other words, we compared the restrict­
ed (single-outcome) model:
Factor Importance = f(Outcome 1 dependence
Outcome 1 criticalness 
Outcome 1 centrality-method no. 1 and 2 
Outcome 1 salience 
Factor centrality 
Factor salience) 
with the two-outcome model specified on page 115. The test 
for significance between restributed and unrestricted regres­
sion models is an F-test where
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F = Sum of squares (error) - Sum of squares (error) 
Restricted Unrestricted
Degrees of Freedom - Degrees of Freedom 
Restricted Unrestricted
Sum of squares (error) / Degrees of Freedom 
Unrestricted Unrestricted
and where the degrees of freedom for the F-test are:
( d f y  -  d f y ) ,  d f ^ .
Table 29 reports the results of the comparisons replicated on
each of the fourteen factors. In twelve of the fourteen cases
the two-outcome model significantly improved the explanatory 
power of the cognitive model and in every case there was a 
positive increase in the variance accounted for. Increases in 
variance accounted for by employing the two-outcome model 
ranged from .02 to .11 with eight of the fourteen cases 
exhibiting increases of .05 or better. More importantly, 
these consistent increases in variance accounted for represent 
improvements of from 4-30 percent over the variance accounted 
for under the single-outcome models.
Latent Factors 
To determine whether the wide variety of factors 
analyzed in this study tended to organize themselves around 
common associated outcomes, a factor analysis of the rating/
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rankings for the fourteen factors was performed. A common 
factor analysis was selected since it was the common variance 
shared between factors which was of interest. An application 
of the Scree Test (Cattell, 1966) to the principal axis solu­
tion led to the retention of six factors. The axes were then 
rotated orthogonally (Varimax procedure). Rotated factor 
loadings for each of the fourteen items are reported in Table 
30. An examination of the factor loadings indicates that 
Factor I tends to load those items which were most closely 
associated with the outcome "Personal Pleasure and Happiness" 
(items loading on this factor include home ownership, retire­
ment, neighborhood and job security, all of which were 
strongly associated with "Personal Pleasure and Happiness"). 
Equal opportunity, conservation of natural resources, and 
Afghanistan all loaded on Factor II and were all associated 
with "Right and Wrong". Taxes, inflation and income loaded 
on Factor III. Each of these was associated with "Financial 
Goals". Only one item, being able to influence others, loaded 
on Factor IV, and this was the only item which was closely 
associated with "My Image of Myself". In no instance did an 
item load with items which were not in some way similar with 
regard to the outcomes with which they were associated. 
Education, religion and leisure, however, did not tend to 
load on any factor. This may be due to the high centrality of 
these issues to the subjects in our sample. That is, educa­
tion, religion and leisure may be so highly cognitively central
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as to make them outcomes themselves, rather than factors which 
influence given outcomes.
Model Effectiveness for Sample Sub-groups
Since it was plausible that a cognitive model such as 
that developed here might explain importance evaluations 
better for one group of subjects than for another, a second 
series of regression analyses was conducted to determine the 
relative effectiveness of the model for men and women, those 
under and over thirty years of age, those with different 
employment status, different education levels and different 
religious practices. Multiple regressions were performed for 
the full (multiple-outcome) model for each of the fourteen 
factors for male and female subjects and for subjects differ­
ing in age and education. Regressions for subjects differing 
in employment status were performed only for importance of job 
security and comparative pay. Regressions for subjects dif­
fering in religious practice were conducted only for the 
importance of religion. Tables 31-35 report the findings of 
these comparisons.
Sex
A comparison of the relative ability of the cognitive 
structure model to explain factor importance for male and 
female subjects (Table 31) indicates that in seven of the 
fourteen cases there are no large differences in the explana­
tory power of the model for male and female subjects. For the
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importance of influencing others, taxes, conservation of 
resources, education and kind of neighborhood, differences in 
variance accounted for are less than .04. In two of the four­
teen cases the model performs slightly better for explaining 
factor importance for female subjects. Differences of .07 
were found in variance accounted for for importance of infla­
tion and Afghanistan. In ten of the fourteen cases, the model 
explains factor importance better for men than women. Vari­
ance accounted for differences exceeded .08 for importance of 
religion, job security, retirement, comparative income, equal 
opportunity and leisure time. Rather large differences were 
found for job security, retirement, equal opportunity and 
leisure.
Education
A similar comparison was performed for the explanatory 
power of the cognitive model as applied to subjects with and 
without college education. Table 32 indicates that in three 
of the fourteen cases the importance ratings of those without 
at least an undergraduate degree were better explained by the 
cognitive model. The importance of neighborhood, leisure and 
education were better explained by margins of increased vari­
ance accounted for of .10, .17 and .23, respectively. In four 
cases (religion, influence, conservation of resources and 
inflation) little difference in the explanatory power of the 
model between subjects of different education levels was 
found. In general (nine of the fourteen cases), the cognitive
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model performed better for subjects who had at least a comp­
leted undergraduate education. Home ownership, taxes, job 
security, retirement, Afghanistan, comparative income, equal 
opportunity all exhibited an increased variance accounted for 
of .09 or greater. The tendency for those without an under­
graduate degree (in this sample) to be somewhat younger on the 
average than those who have completed at least an undergradu­
ate education, may account for the general tendency of the 
model to perform better for the more highly educated since the 
actual number of years of education does not vary much (see 
Table 5).
Age
A comparison of the relative ability of the cognitive 
structure model to explain factor importance for subjects 
above and below thirty years of age reveals that in eleven of 
the fourteen cases the model accounted for more of the vari­
ance in factor importance for the older subjects. In six of 
these cases the difference in variance accounted for exceeded 
twenty percent. In none of the fourteen cases did the model 
perform significantly better for the younger subjects (Table 33)
Religious Practice 
A comparison of the relative ability of the cognitive 
structure model to explain importance of religion for subjects 
who vary with respect to religious practices (Table 34) indi­
cates that for those for whom religion is relatively unimpor­
tant and who are less frequent in such religious practices as 
church attendance, the model is more effective in explaining
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importance evaluations than for those who see religion as very 
important and who are very regular in church attendance, 
though in both cases over 40 percent of the variance was 
explained by the model. A possible explanation for the 
failure of the model to explain as much variance in importance 
of religion for those who are frequent practitioners is that 
there simply is no variance in the importance evaluation of 
this sub-group (see Table 9), while there is considerable 
variation for those who are less regular in church attendance. 
Another potential explanation is that those who see religion 
as important and attend church regularly may associate reli­
gion with outcomes quite different from those offered as 
alternative choices in the survey. Since it was possible for 
subjects to indicate choices other than those offered, a high 
frequency of such "other" outcome selections by those who rate 
religion as very important and attend church regularly would 
explain the inability of the regression model to explain what 
little variance does exist. An examination of the frequency 
of "other" outcome selections by the two groups, however, did 
not reveal any large differences in the frequency with which 
"other" alternative outcomes were selected. A third explana­
tion for these findings may be that high attenders may tend to 
rate religion as more important to them than it actually is 
since it would be socially desirable to do so. Finally, it 
may be that the importance of religion is not a cognitive 
evaluation for those for whom it is extremely important and 
who are high attenders.
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Employment Status 
A comparison of the relative ability of the cognitive 
structure model to explain importance of job security and com­
parative pay for subjects who hold full-time jobs and those 
who are not employed indicates that in both cases the model is 
more effective for the full-time employed (see Table 35). 
Particularly where the importance of job security is evaluated 
the model is much more effective for those with full-time work 
experience, increasing the variance accounted for by 26 per­
cent and accounting for 54 percent of the variance in impor­
tance of job security.
The Effects of Context Specification 
To address the question of the possible effects on 
importance ratings and rankings of using procedures which do 
or do not specify the contexts in which the subjects evaluate 
a factor, a correlation analysis was performed for importance 
ratings for ten factors rated without specification of context 
and ratings where "job satisfaction" was specified as the con­
text. In addition, similar correlations were performed for 
ten factors rated in an unspecified context and rated where 
the context was specified to be "life satisfaction". Each 
rating procedure employed the same fifteen point rating scale. 
The unspecified context ratings were performed early in the 
survey and the factors were included among a large number of 
distractors. Interviews indicated that there was little like­
lihood that the earlier unspecified-context ratings influenced
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the later ratings where job satisfaction and life satisfaction 
were the specified contexts. Table 36 reports the results of 
these analyses. The moderate to high correlations between 
factor importance ratings for unspecified and job satisfaction 
contexts (correlations ranged from .46 to .72) and the some­
what higher correlations between importance ratings for un­
specified and life satisfaction contexts (.54 to .93) provides 
some support for the common practice of comparing importance 
evaluations between studies which have employed different con­
texts. A comparison of the mean importance ratings and the 
rankings of a variety of factors evaluated under unspecified 
and specified contexts (see Table 11) indicates that there is 
virtually no difference in mean ratings or rankings under the 
two methods. However, the clear tendency in Table 36 for the 
Unspecified-Job Satisfaction correlations to be lower than the 
Unspecified-Life Satisfaction correlations advises some 
caution. It may be that the further the specified context 
becomes from "all things considered" the greater will be the 
disparity in the importance ratings. Thus, to the extent that 
"job" is a large part of the individual's view of life, ratings 
will be equivalent. Furthermore, the relatively low correla­
tions between unspecified and specified context importance 
ratings for certain factors suggests that importance ratings 
may tend to vary for certain factors and not for others. In 
addition, it is not known if subjects tend to generalize fac­
tor importance across all outcomes. It may be, for example.
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that if a person sees comparative income as critical to self- 
image that it becomes very difficult for that person to reduce 
that importance evaluation in any other context.
Summary of the Results 
Cognitive Model Effectiveness 
The cognitive model of importance perceptions examined 
in this study demonstrates considerable ability to explain 
differences in importance evaluations for a wide variety of 
factors across a heterogeneous sample. Between 32 and 81 per­
cent of the variance in importance rating/rankings was explain­
ed by the full model. Furthermore, it appears that, for cer­
tain sub-groups of subjects, the cognitive structure approach 
to importance perceptions may account for even larger propor­
tions of the variance in factor importance. The model would 
appear to be most effective for male subjects, over thirty 
years of age, with relatively high levels of education. In 
addition, there is some evidence to suggest that the model 
does a better job of explaining importance evaluations for 
those with greater personal experience with the factor being 
evaluated (e.g., those with full-time work experience appear 
to have developed more cognitively-based evaluations of the 
importance of job-related factors). However, the superior 
effectiveness of the model for explaining importance of reli­
gion for the non-religious (as compared to the church attend­
ers) requires further discussion (see Chapter V).
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Cognitive Model Components 
The findings presented above suggest that the predic­
tors which make the greatest contribution to the explanatory 
power of the model are 1) the centrality of the factor, 2) the 
degree of dependence of the primary and secondary outcomes on 
the factor, 3) the criticalness of the factor's contribution 
to the primary outcome, 4) the salience of the factor and, to 
some extent, 5) the centrality of the primary and secondary 
outcomes as measured by the degree to which the outcomes 
organize around themselves other cognitions. Outcome salience 
and the centrality of outcomes as measured by "frequency of 
thought, generally" appear to make little or no contribution 
to the overall explanatory power of the model.
The results of the comparison between the single-out- 
come and two-outcome model regressions indicate that a 
multiple context approach may significantly increase the 
ability of a cognitive model to explain variance in importance 
evaluations.
Findings obtained through a factor analysis of the 
importance of fourteen diverse factors support the idea that 
factors tend to be cognitively organized around the outcomes 
with which they are associated.
Specification of Context 
No evidence was found to confirm that limiting factor 
importance evaluations to a specific context substantially
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affects either the ratings or rankings of those factors. 
Consistently lower correlations between importance rating for 
factors rated in an unspecified context and with specific 
regard to job satisfaction as compared to similar correlations 
for factors rated in unspecified and life satisfaction con­
texts suggest that the comparability of ratings given under 




DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The Cognitive Nature of Importance 
Perceptions
The primary purpose of this study was to investigate 
the degree to which importance perceptions can be explained in 
terms of cognitive structure. It has been long held that 
evaluative perceptions are in part affective and in part cog­
nitive, yet relatively little has been done to develop a 
comprehensive cognitive approach to importance perceptions. 
Employing a model which is consistent with current demand- 
based, need-based, and value(s)-based approaches to importance 
and which makes use of widely recognized theories of cognitive 
structure, the results of this study have given considerable 
support to the idea that importance perceptions may be under­
stood in terms of the complex interdependencies of cognitions 
in the individual's thinking.
Significant proportions of the variances in importance 
evaluations were explained using the cognitive structure model 
presented herein across a wide variety of factors and across 
subjects quite likely to hold and express different views
134
concerning the importance of those factors. Where importance 
evaluations between subjects varied widely as they did for 
religion, and where the opinions were relatively strong (very 
high or low importance ratings with few subjects rating the 
factor as moderately important), the model accounted for 50 to 
80 percent of the variance in the importance evaluations.
Even for factors for which the importance ratings tended to be 
less polar or for which there was little variance across sub­
jects, the model explained 32 percent of the variance. In 
the fourteen cases the median variance accounted for by the 
model was 37 percent. In addition, there was considerable 
evidence that, with the exception of church-attenders, for 
certain more homogeneous groups of people, the cognitive model 
examined in this study may account for much greater propor­
tions of the variance in importance evaluations. For male 
subjects, for example, in ten of the fourteen cases the model 
accounted for more than 43 percent of the variance in the fac­
tor importance ratings, and in five of those cases explained 
more than 50 percent of the variance. Likewise, for those 
subjects most highly educated, the model explained in excess 
of 45 percent of the variance in importance ratings in nine of 
the fourteen cases. Furthermore, for those over thirty years 
of age, the model explained more than 40 percent of the vari­
ance in thirteen of fourteen cases and more than 50 percent of 
the variance in eight of the fourteen cases. These findings, 
taken together, provide considerable support for the idea that
importance perceptions are in large part cognitive.
135
For subjects high in religious practice we have seen 
that religion is extremely high in importance and there is 
very little variance in the importance ratings of this sub­
group. While this lack of variance in the dependent variable, 
in and of itself, may account for the apparently reduced 
potency of the model for the highly religious as compared to 
those relatively low in religious practice, this finding may 
have theoretical implications which are worthy of considera­
tion here.
The cognitive structure approach to importance percep­
tions is built around the idea that cognitions are interrelat­
ed and that certain cognitions organize around themselves 
other cognitions. Factors which organize around themselves 
large numbers of other cognitions are said to be highly 
central. Outcomes, as used in this study, are characterized 
by their tendency to organize around themselves many factors 
and are by definition more central than the individual factors 
which to some degree contribute to their attainment or main­
tenance. However, for some people, a factor may become so 
central as to become more appropriately thought of as an out­
come. That is, religion may be situated in the cognitive 
structure in such a way that factors are judged in accordance 
with their impacts on religious beliefs rather than religion 
being evaluated according to its contribution to some desired 
outcome. In such cases we would expect very high importance 
ratings and very little variance in those ratings, and we
would not be surprised to find that a cognitive model which
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is based upon criteria of degree of influence and criticalness 
of contribution to other basic outcomes would not be entirely 
effective in accounting for variance in the importance ratings 
of religion for such a group of subjects.
In other words, religion for this sub-group may not be 
important because it leads to some desired outcome, but rather 
has become the standard itself. This interpretation would 
suggest that certain factors may eventually become so central 
for the individual that they take on the characteristics of 
innate basic "needs" as described by Locke in Chapter II.
These factors become the standards by which other cognitions 
are judged and cannot be themselves evaluated effectively in 
terms of their contribution to anything.
Similar results may be obtained in the application of 
the cognitive structure model to other factors and sub-groups 
of individuals. For example, it is possible that education 
could become an end in itself for certain groups of educators. 
Racial equality may become so central in the cognitive struc­
tures of certain people that all other cognitions are evaluat­
ed with reference to it. This is quite consistent with every­
day observations that some issue has "become a religion" to a 
person or group of persons. We mean by this that the issue 
has become all-consuming, of the utmost centrality. And we 
frequently suspect that such issues are not always evaluated 
in terms of contribution to outcomes which others might use as 
criteria. This may explain the findings concerning the relative
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effectiveness of the. model for the religious practitioners and 
non-practitioners, though this is by no means the only possi­
bility. However, if further research indicates that this 
explanation is a reasonable one, such findings would have 
implications for the eventual use of the model. It may be 
possible for researchers to identify issues which have taken 
on the characteristic of being so central for certain groups 
of subjects as to be judged important in and of themselves. 
Such factors would be relatively unassailable. That is, 
little could be done in the way of presenting new information 
to modify the importance of such factors. The researcher may 
be able to identify such factors for certain groups of indi­
viduals by looking for those factors which are consistently 
rated as extremely important and for which there is very 
little variance across the group. Then an application of some 
form of the cognitive structure model would help to determine 
the degree to which the factor is characterized as described 
above. Modifications of the model by systematically adjusting 
the outcomes used may lead to the identification of the 
reasons for the high importance ratings for such groups.
Given the relative crudeness of the measurement and 
procedures employed in these early stages of the theoretical 
and operational development of the cognitive structure model 
examined in this study, findings indicating significant 
explanatory power of this approach to importance perceptions 
may have a number of implications for research and theory
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treating employee performance, motivation and attitude. If 
the model presented here (or in some refined version) Is sub­
stantiated through replication, our understanding of employee 
behavioral responses to various organizational attempts to 
influence individual choices concerning the level and persis­
tence of effort applied to a given task may be significantly 
improved. Current performance theories suggest that effort 
choices are in part determined by the perceived importance of 
rewards received for performance associated with effort. If 
employing a cognitive approach to importance allows us to 
better understand how importance evaluations are formed and 
develop, we may be able to better select rewards or perhaps 
even influence the perceptions of the importance of certain 
rewards. In addition, if Blood (1969) and Friedlander (1965) 
are correct in their contention that the strength of affective 
responses to job factors is determined by the importance of 
the factor to the individual, through an improved understand­
ing of the nature of importance perceptions, we may be better 
able to predict employee responses to organizational policies 
and practices which affect those factors. The results of this 
study indicate, for example, that a particular factor may be 
considered important not because it has a strong influence on 
a valued outcome (dependence) but because the employee is 
aware of no available substitutes for the factor. Where this 
is the case, and can be identified, the organization may be 
able to provide a more cost-effective substitute for the
139
factor. As things currently stand, we would know only that 
the factor is important and have the definite potential of 
initiating actions based upon that inadequate understanding 
which could be useless or worse as far as effects on attitude 
and performance are concerned.
Components of a Cognitive Approach
Knowing that importance perceptions are in part cogni­
tive is of little practical use apart from some insight into 
what it is about the relationships between cognitions that 
affect these perceptions. Previous attempts to test the use­
fulness of cognitive models have been, on the whole, inconclu­
sive. The approach presented and tested in this study is 
built on a theoretical foundation consistent with current 
theories of cognitive structure. Rather than relying solely 
upon the instrumentality of a factor in the attaining or main­
tenance of a single outcome, the cognitive structure approach 
introduces multiple contexts, the concept of criticalness, and 
the possible influence of temporary factor and outcome 
salience. In an attempt to avoid the circularity of current 
value(s)-based approaches which fail to adequately concep­
tualize the differential "value" of outcomes for which factors 
are instrumental, we have employed the concept of the cogni­
tive centrality of factor and outcome(s).
The study results point to the consistently si.gni''i cant 
contributions of factor centrality, primary and secondary
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outcome dependence, criticalness of contribution, factor 
salience, and, somewhat less frequently, the centrality of the 
outcome(s). The concept of dependence of an outcome upon the 
factor to be evaluated has been employed earlier in instrumen­
tality theory and empirical research. Findings of this study 
corroborate the potential explanatory usefulness of this 
concept and extend the number of components relevant to a 
cognitive explanation of importance.
The results of this study further suggest that factor 
centrality - the number of other cognitions which tend to be 
organized around the factor - may be the best predictor of 
importance evaluations. This concept suggests that greater 
knowledge about and experience with a factor and its associ­
ates is likely to increase the cognitive centrality of the 
factor and thus improve the explanatory power of the model. 
With the exception of religious experience, for subjects 
we would generally expect to have more knowledge about a fac­
tor, the model explains significantly greater proportions of 
the variance than for those we would expect to have less per­
sonal experience with or knowledge of the factor. This is 
interpreted as support for the inclusion of factor centrality 
in the cognitive model. Likewise, the findings support the 
inclusion of factor salience and criticalness . The addition 
of these components to our methods of interpreting importance 
perceptions may have implications for both theory and practice 
of management.
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We may, for example, hypothesize that sub-sets of the 
population who have previously had little knowledge about a 
given factor but who are then exposed to an increased amount 
of information about and experience with that factor, are 
likely to begin to perceive it as more important. This may 
mean that employees who are provided with continuous informa­
tion concerning all of the issues surrounding organizational 
policies and practices may become more cognizant of, and con­
cerned with, the effects of labor action on long-term organiza­
tional viability. It has already been described how an under­
standing of the role of criticalness may improve management's 
ability to respond to expressions of factor importance. In 
the same way, where temporary salience of a factor is the 
primary contributor to its importance and this is recognized, 
organizations may select more temporary alternatives in 
responding to expressions of concern over a given job factor. 
In addition, to the degree that importance of a factor may be 
used to induce increased effort and performance, the under­
standing manager would not attempt to generate sustained 
effort by employing a factor whose importance is primarily due 
to temporary salience. The concept of salience may also prove 
to be useful in helping to explain the effects of need- 
deficiencies on importance. It may be, for example, that 
needs give rise to temporary prominence which, in some cases, 
may result in increased importance evaluations.
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The inconclusive results concerning the usefulness of 
outcome centrality in a cognitive explanation of importance 
perceptions may be largely due to the measures employed and 
the outcome alternatives selected for the study. The second 
method of operationalizing outcome centrality (frequency of 
thought, generally) seems to be virtually useless given the 
outcome alternatives. On a frequency of thought scale of from 
1 to 5, the seven alternative outcomes received mean ratings 
of 4.0, 4.0, 3.97, 3.95, 3.92, 3.4 and 3.3 with relatively 
little variance between subjects. In other words, five of the 
outcomes (those most often associated with the factors 
studied) tended to be rated as very "central" by all the 
subjects. Therefore, it is unlikely that differences in the 
centrality of outcomes measured in this way would account for 
much of the variance in the importance of the factors. The 
first method of measuring outcome centrality (frequency of 
association with forty-five selected items) improved upon this 
somewhat by increasing the variance among subjects slightly.
It may be that selecting outcomes which are likely to vary 
more in centrality across individuals will improve the rela­
tive contribution of this component. As has been suggested, 
the lack of variability in the centrality of religion for this 
sample may explain the relative inability of the model to 
account for importance differences for the high church attend- 
ers. Certainly, of the two methods of operationalizing out­
come centrality, method No. 1 was superior. This may be in
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part because it does.not rely so directly upon the subjects' 
reported frequency of thought, but infers centrality from 
behavioral responses. Or, it may simply reflect the degree of 
reliability of the measures.
The Use of Multiple Outcomes
The study provided support for the use of multiple out­
comes in a cognitive model of importance perceptions. In 
twelve of the fourteen replications of the model regressions, 
the addition of a second associated outcome significantly 
increased the variance accounted for by the model. This, too, 
has implications for the theoretical and practical applica­
tions of the cognitive structure approach to importance.
Generally, work factors derive their importance from 
their relationships with more than one outcome. Theories and 
empirical studies which ignore this fundamental fact are 
likely to be less useful in aiding our understanding of the 
role of importance perceptions in employee performance and 
attitudes. The practitioner who ignores the multiple-outcome 
principle is likely to make serious and costly mistakes as 
he/she attempts to respond constructively to expressions of 
factor importance. To illustrate, suppose that employees 
express strong dissatisfaction with the condition of the 
company cafeteria and indicate that the place is of consider­
able importance to them. Further, suppose the cafeteria is 
important primarily because it relates to self-image and 
secondarily because of health and nutritional considerations.
It would be entirely possible for the unsuspecting manager to
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arrange for a change in the cafeteria that thoroughly met the 
requirements of health and nutrition but ignored the primary 
outcome - self-image, and thereby accomplish very little in 
the way of improved attitudes. Furthermore, one of the out­
comes may be strongly influenced by the factor while the other 
is associated with the factor due to a temporary salience, in 
which case focusing on one or the other outcomes may be more 
effective than focusing on the factor itself.
The Cognitive Structure Approach 
and Affect
The tendency for the explanatory power of the model to 
improve where subjects are likely to have had more information 
about or direct and extended experience with the factor and 
its associates suggests that the organization of cognitions in 
the mind becomes more clearly defined with knowledge and 
exposure over time. For example, the increased effectiveness 
of the cognitive model for explaining importance evaluations 
for both the more highly educated and older subjects in this 
study might be explained in terms of greater experience with 
or knowledge of the various factors and their respective 
associates. It may be possible to explain the greater effec­
tiveness of the model for men vis-a-vis women in the same 
terras. Perhaps women are not given the opportunities for 
knowledge and experience that are afforded men in the areas of 
job security, retirement, comparative income, equal opportun­
ity and leisure.
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HoW; then, do. those with less knowledge of or experi­
ence with a factor make evaluations concerning its importance? 
We have seen that, for most of the factors considered in this 
study, there were few significant differences in importance 
ratings when men and women, young and older and employed and 
unemployed were compared. We must conclude that some method 
of deriving an importance evaluation is being employed since 
it is apparent that ratings of zero (0) are not being reported 
by any of the sub-groups. That is, it would appear that lack 
of experience or knowledge concerning a factor does not pre­
vent the individual from evaluating its importance.
It is not unreasonable to presume that, since percep­
tions are cognitive and affective, those who lack information 
or experience and yet are required to make importance evalua­
tions must do so primarily on the basis of affect. There is a 
temptation to equate "cognitive" with rational and "affective" 
with emotional or irrational and thus to conclude that the 
aged, educated and male tend to be more rational than the 
young, less educated and female. There is, however, no con­
clusive evidence in this study which suggests that the cogni­
tive evaluation is actually based upon rational considerations 
It is possible, for example, that cognitions are consciously 
or sub-consciously organized and structured to be consistent 
with or rationalize prior emotional reactions (Zajonc, 1980). 
In that case, we would perhaps conclude that the educated, 
aged and male work harder and longer at rationalizing
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their emotions. This issue is raised here to point out that 
we do not yet know, nor does this study adequately answer, 
whether affective responses to factors are primarily determin­
ed by cognitively-formed importance perceptions (as implied by 
Blood, 1969; and Friedlander, 1965) or whether cognitions are 
organized in support of affect. Further research is required 
to answer this question. If importance evaluations are funda­
mentally affective, then they are unlikely to be influenced by 
providing information or experience which alters the cognitive 
centrality of the factor, the dependence of a primary or 
secondary outcome on the factor, the criticalness of the 
factor's contribution to an outcome, or the cognitive central­
ity of the associated outcome(s). If, however, importance 
perceptions are substantially cognitive, as a face-value accep­
tance of the results of this study would indicate, we may be 
able to both predict and influence importance perceptions to 
the degree that we can bring about changes in one or more of 
the relevant model components. Furthermore, if affect is 
largely determined by importance perceptions which are cogni­
tive, we may be better able to understand the dynamics of 
affective responses to work and non-work factors by giving 
closer heed to the components of the cognitive structure 
approach to importance perceptions. Finally, it is possible 
that both affect and cognitive structure are subject to the 
influence of some underlying third variable. For example, 
needs may be the motive force behind both the affective and
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cognitive components of importance. It is not necessary that 
a third, underlying factor such as needs influence affect and 
cognitions in exactly the same way. Thus, the previously 
referenced incongruities in the research seeking to link 
importance and affect may be due to the fundamental differ­
ences in affect and cognitive structure and the different ways 
they relate to needs. Approaching importance perceptions from 
a cognitive structure point of view provides the potential for 
examining the influence of varying degrees of need deficiencies 
on each of the model components to determine the specific 
relationships between needs and importance. Such research may 
lead to a better conceptualization of the need concept as 
well, for there is certainly reason to speculate that needs 
aie also perceptions which may be understood as being composed 
of affect and cognition.
The Limitations of the Study and Suggestions 
For Further Research 
As indicated by the analyses of the effects of demo­
graphic characteristics of the sample sub-groups, sex, age, 
education, work experience and religious values may affect 
both the importance evaluations of subjects and the degree to 
which the cognitive structure approach to importance can 
account for differences in importance evaluations. In this 
study a sample was sought whose members would be likely to 
hold divergent views on a wide variety of issues and, to some 
degree, this was achieved. It would be useful, however, to
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examine importance perceptions for additional sub-groups of 
the general population to determine whether the model consis­
tently accounts for significant proportions of the variance in 
these divergent views. For example, people who hold strong 
political views might be examined using factors which are more 
political in nature, or managers' importance perceptions could 
be examined using sub-samples of managers who differ in 
management style. Perhaps one of the more interesting studies 
suggested by this initial research would be the examination of 
importance perceptions of managers, union leadership, union 
rank and file, and stockholders, not only to determine what is 
important and why, but also the extent to which the percep­
tions of different groups of subjects are cognitively based.
The student sample employed in this study was taken 
primarily from business majors. Since it was demonstrated 
that the level of education of subjects may affect the degree 
to which the model accounts for differences in importance 
evaluations, it is plausible that the very nature of the 
educational background of the subjects would also affect the 
findings. Therefore, it may be helpful to examine the useful­
ness of the model for those with liberal arts, fine arts, 
engineering or "hard sciences" backgrounds. In addition, the 
model should be tested on subjects with a broader range of 
educational backgrounds, comparing, for example, those with 
high school or less to those with increasing levels of 
education.
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There were strong indications in this study that the 
age of the subjects affects the explanatory power of the 
model. Yet, in this study the distribution of ages was quite 
narrow. The same was true of job experience and tenure. It 
would be helpful to examine the explanatory power of the model 
for a wider variety of subjects with respect to age and work 
experience.
It was suggested in Chapter II that differences in the 
inclusiveness and/or dimensionability of content and context 
perceptions between individuals may affect importance evalua­
tions and their interpretation. Though an attempt was made to 
examine differences in importance perceptions which were due 
to differences in content and context, the sample was too 
small and the content and context perceptions too similar to 
allow such an analysis. It remains, therefore, for the ques­
tions concerning the differential effects of content and con­
text perceptions to be examined. It may be, for example, that 
the differences in the model effectiveness encountered in this 
study between the education levels and age levels are due in 
large part to systematic differences in subject cognitive com­
plexity in some way related to these characteristics. Thus, 
an examination of the model on subjects of known,but differing, 
cognitive complexities may prove helpful.
The study has also raised the possibility that knowl­
edge of and experience with a factor may tend to increase the 
extent to which importance evaluations are cognitive rather 
than affective. This study provides no controlled examination
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of the proposition, however. Future research may be designed 
to select subjects in such a way as to control for levels of 
knowledge and experience with the factors studied.
A further limitation of this study is its inability to 
shed light on the extent to which cognitively-based importance 
perceptions influence affective responses to factors, or con­
versely, the degree to which affect determines the cognitive 
nature of importance. Most probably a longitudinal research 
design will be required to answer this fundamental question.
In order to test the relative effectiveness of a multi­
ple outcome model vis-à-vis a single context approach, two 
outcomes were used. While the results of this study lend 
support to the multi-context approach to the cognitive nature 
of importance perceptions, they do not tell us what would 
happen if several associated outcomes were identified and 
included in the model. Perhaps if very few factors were exam­
ined, additional outcomes would not make the data-gathering 
task so unwieldy as to be impossible.
Related to the number of outcomes is the selection of 
the outcome alternatives to be used. In this study seven out­
comes were selected based upon current theory and the inter­
view process. However, the outcomes used in this study were 
quite general. As has been suggested, the nature of the out­
come alternatives (their uniformly high cognitive centrality) 
may have been responsible for the failure to find conclusive 
support for the usefulness of outcome centrality in explaining
151
importance evaluations. It may be that where subjects are 
more homogeneous careful interviewing will yield outcome 
alternatives that are more specific and relevant to the parti­
cular sample. Outcome alternatives may be identified in some 
fashion other than providing alternatives from which the sub­
jects are required to select. It may be that interviewing 
each subject will provide identification of associated out­
comes that are more individually specific and which in turn 
may improve the explanatory power of the model. This -approach, 
however, would be extremely burdensome if large numbers of 
subjects were to be included in the sample.
Conclusions
There were four major findings in this research; (1) 
the subjects' evaluations of the importance of a wide range of 
work and non-work factors was in large part explained by the 
cognitive structure approach to importance presented in the 
study, (2) the addition of a second factor context signifi­
cantly improved the explanatory power of the cognitive model 
for twelve of the fourteen factors examined and in all cases 
increased the variance in importance ratings accounted for by 
the model, (3) four cognitive constructs, in addition to the 
previously identified instrumentality, were found to make con­
sistently significant contribuitons to the explanatory power 
of the model. These include the cognitive centrality of the 
factor, the criticalness of the contribution of the factor to 
the primary outcome, the temporary salience of the factor and,
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somewhat less consistently, the centrality of the primary and 
secondary outcomes as measured by the relative frequency with 
which diverse items from a large list of common work and non­
work factors were associated with the outcome; (4) for certain 
sub-groups of the sample, the cognitive structure approach 
exhibited a strong general tendency to account for signifi­
cantly greater proportions of the variance in importance 
evaluations than for other groups. In particular, males, the 
highly educated and those over thirty years of age seemed to 
fit the model very well.
The question of the relationship between affect and the 
cognitive component of importance perceptions remains unre­
solved. However, to the degree that the findings of this 
study are confirmed through further research, it is suggested 
that the resultant broadened understanding of the cognitive 
nature of importance perceptions, and in particular the iden­
tification of those components upon which such cognitive per­
ceptions are based, may prove useful in helping to explain the 
development of job attitudes, the dynamics of those attitudes 
and may ultimately improve our ability to predict and influ­
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TAÜLÜ 1
Early Studios of Job Factor Importance
oi
STUDY Chant (1932) Wyatt Ü Langdon (1937)
Berdie (1943) Blum 8t Russ (1942)
IMPORTANCE
CONCEPT
Preference Preference None Preference
OPERATIONAL­ Paired Pai red Rank Order PairedIZATION Comparisons Comparisons Comparisons
FACTOR RANK ORDER OF JOB FACTORS BY IMPORTANCE
Ad vanceme n t 1 5 2 1
Job Security 2 1 1 2
Creativi ty 3 7 4 -
Training 4 8 7 -
Job Significance 5 - 8 -
Supervisor 6 4 9 4
Pay 7 6 3 3
Co-workers 8 3 5 -
Work Conditions 9 2 11 -
Hours 11 9 6 5
TABLl!] 2
Prevalent Connotations of Importance Perceptions
BTUDY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IMPORTANCE











^  *Alderfer 8t Guzzo 
(1979)
Mobley & Locke 
(1970)




Strength of desires 
Strength of preference
Age, sex, educ., job 
level, tenure, external 
conditions
Age, educ., external 
conditions
Age, job level, sex, 
educ.
Herzberg et al(1957) Need intensity, hier
archy
Morse (1953) Strength of need
Qcq
CO
^  Ross & Zander (1957) Strength of need
I
M  Schaffer (1953)wz:
Strength of need
Froehlich & Wolins Need strength 
(1960)











Age, sex, educ., job 














STUDY CONCEPTUALIZATION OF IMPORTANCE
Frledlander (1SJ65) Need strength




Porter (1961, 1962 Prepotency of need
1963) Porter & Henry
(1964)
Alderfer & Guzzo 
(1979)
Need rank
Kraut & Honen (1975) Predictive validity
for general 
satisfaction
















Need deficiency + value 
Value of outcomes
Vroom & Pahl (1971) Value Perceptions of self 
as compared to peers








Relnhartli & Wahba 
(1975)




Intrinsic valences and 
expectancies, attrac­
tion value of rewards
Work values systems 
preferences, desire
OPERATIONALIZATION VARIABLES AFFECTING 
IMPORTANCE PERCEPTIONS






















Ranking aspects from 
Herzberg (1959) and 
Friedlander (1964)
Age, educ., sex
Age, educ., tenure 
job level
Promotion rate
Protestant ethic scale Age, educ., tenure
Scale of Work Values 




Sex, age, tenure, 
educ.















Saleh & Grygier 
(1969)
Wollack et al. 
(1971)
CO N Cl!] PT U AL IZ ATI ON 
OP IMPORTANCE







Rank order of factors
'D ♦Occasionally study references appear in more than one concept category. This is because 
the authors employ more than one conceptualization of importance without clear indication 
that they prefer one over the other.
TABLE 3
Conceptual Clustering of the Needs Proposed by 
Murray, Maslow and Alderfer
MURRAY MASLOW ALDERFER































Demographic Characteristics of the Sample 
Frequencies and Percents

















































































Less than 1 yr 1-2 yr 
52 41
19% 15%


















A n a l y s i s  o f  V arian ce  R e s u l t s  f o r  F a c to r  Im portance
D i f f e r e n c e s  Between S u b je c t s  Under T h ir t y  Y ears o f
Age and Over T h ir t y









Education 12.79 .0004 .05 12.2 2.2 11.0 3.4
Religion 4.44 .04 .02 11.5 4.4 12.6 4.1
Income (compare) .00 .96 .000 9.0 3.6 9.0 3.7
Inflation 4.73 .03 .02 9.3 3.0 10.2 3 .2
Conserve Resources .02 .90 .000 8.9 3.1 9.0 3.3
Job Security 4.62 .03 .02 10.4 3.0 9 .5 3.7
Afghanistan 1.80 .18 .007 6.7 3.8 7 .4 4.1
Equal Opportunity .14 .71 .001 9.0 3.6 8.8 3.8
Home Ownership 21.98 .0001 .08 8.2 3.4 10.1 3 .0
Leisure 15.11 .0001 .05 9.8 2.8 8.3 2.9
Influence Others 7.08 .008 .03 8.9 3.5 7.6 4.2
Retirement 8.25 .004 .03 5.6 3.3 6.9 3.5
Neighborhood .07 .79 .000 7.7 3.2 7.8 3.1
Taxes 7.96 .005 .03 6.9 3.2 8.1 3.5
**r 2 greater than .05 are underlined.
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TABLE 6
A n a l y s i s  o f  V a r ia n c e  R e s u l t s  f o r  F a c to r  Im p ortan ce
D i f f e r e n c e s  Between S u b j e c t s  w ith  L e ss  Than C o l le g e
D eg ree  and Those w ith  U n d ergrad u ate  D egree or  More
2 NON-GRADS GRADS
Factor F p* R
X STD X STD
Education .67 .41 .0025 11.7 2.9 12.0 2.4
Religion 3.70 .06 .014 12.3 3.8 11.3 4.9
Income (compare) .04 .84 .000 8.9 3.7 9.0 3.6
Inflation 1.51 .22 .006 9.4 3.0 9.9 3.2
Conserve Resources .84 .36 .003 8.9 3 .2 9.2 3.1
Job Security 4.45 .04 .017 10.4 3.2 9.6 3.3
Afghanistan .07 .80 .000 7.0 3.7 6.9 4.2
Equal Opportunity 2.44 .12 .009 9.2 3.5 8.5 3.9
Home Ownership 4.32 .04 .016 8.5 3.4 9.4 3.3
Leisure .04 .84 .000 9.2 3.0 9.3 2.7
Influence Others .12 .73 .000 8.3 3.9 8.5 3.7
Retirement 1.76 .19 .007 6.3 3.5 5.7 3.3
Neighborhood .30 .59 .001 7.7 3.3 7.9 3.0
Taxes .12 .73 .000 7.3 3.3 7.4 3.4
^Probabilities less! than .05 are underlined.
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TABLE 7
A n a ly s i s  o f  V a r ia n ce  R e s u l t s  f o r  F a c to r  Importance
D i f f e r e n c e s  Between M ales and Fem ales
p MALES FEMALES
Factor F p* R
X STD X STD
Education .80 .37 .003 11.9 2.4 11.7 3.0
Religion 5.74 .02 .021 11.2 4.6 12.5 3.9
Income (compare) .50 .48 .002 9.2 3.7 8.8 3.6
Inflation .25 .62 .001 9.7 3.1 9.5 3.1
Conserve Resources 3.17 .08 .012 8.6 3.0 9.3 3.3
Job Security .21 .64 .001 9.9 3.3 10.1 3 .3
Afghanistan 1 .12 .29 .004 7.2 4.1 6.7 3.7
Equal Opportunity 3.70 .06 .014 8.5 3.7 9.3 3.5
Home Ownership 2.97 .09 .001 8.5 3.4 9.2 3.3
Leisure .71 .40 .003 9.4 2.9 9.1 2.9
Influence Others .44 .51 .002 8.6 3.7 8.3 3.9
Retirement .97 .32 .004 6.3 3.4 5.8 3.5
Neighborhood .54 .46 .002 7.6 3.0 7.9 3.3
Taxes .00 .98 .000 7.3 3.4 7.3 3.3
^Probabilities less than .05 are underlined.
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TABLE 8
A n a ly s i s  o f  V a r ia n ce  R e s u l t s  f o r  F a c to r  Importance
Of Job S e c u r i t y  and Com parative Pay A cro ss  Unemployment,
P a r t - t i m e ,  and F u l l - t i m e  Workers
NO JOB PART-TIME FULL-TIME
Factor F P R*- X STD X STD X STD
Job Security 2.11 .12 .016 10.6 3.0 9.9 3.6 9.6 3.3
Comparative Pay 2.64 .07 .020 8.9 3.6 9.8 3.5 8.5 3.7
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Variance Results for Factor Importance 
Of Religion Between Practitioners and 
Non-practitioners
HIGH ATTEND. LOW ATTEND.
Factor F p *
X STD X STD
Religion 95.5 .0001 .69 14.3 1.4 8.6 4.7
*Probabilities less than .05 are underlined
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TABLE 10

























Job Security Demand for Skill Permanent Employment
82% 71%"








Home Ownership A Permanent Place to Live The Right House
62% 50%
















Neighborhood Size of Homes Schools Status of Resident
50% 47% 31%
Taxes Income Tax 1RS Social Security
82% 59% 36%
^Figures represent the percent of total sample which selected 
the content items as either of two content selections.
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TABLE 11
Percent of Responses for Factor Context 
Selections
Factor Context Selections Percentsa
Personal GROWTH and development 
HEALTH and safety
RIGHT and wrong -----




Equal opportunity for all r a c e s .......... 02
Owning my own home....................... .49
Leisure time.............................  .79
Being able to influence others.............08
Retirement....................................39
The kind of neighborhood I live in. . . .46
Taxes  ..................................
My income compared to others............... 11
A college education........................ 07
Religion....................    .20
Conserving natural resources............... 07
Inflation................................... 01


































.03 .01 .02 
.01 .05 .06 
.22
Percentages occasionally do not total to 100% because some subjects 
selected a "none of the above" context and percentages are rounded to 




Correlations^ Between Factor Importance and Model Components
Lor Fourteen Factors

















College Ed. .41 .38 .50
Religion .76 .74 .52 .50 .82 .43
Afghanistan .46 .32 .31
Income (comp) .43 .35 .31 .43 .30
Equal Opport. .35 .31 .47
Own Home .52 .36 .32 .45
Leisure .45 .35 .37 .38
Influence .45 .46 .31 .66 .47
Retirement .39 .33 .31 .33 .44 .30
Neighborhood .31 .33 .36
Taxes .36 .37 .39 .39
Conserve R e s . .41 .51 .44
Inflation .45 .42 .37 .34
Job Security .42 .41 .49 .38 .37
Ou tcome
^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  .3 0 +  and s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p <  .0 5  a r e  g i v e n .
TA15I.I': 13
''■Corrélation M a t r i x  for M o d e l  Cotnponents for I m p o r t a n c e  of C o l l e g e  IklucatIon




F a c t o r  





























aO nly c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  .3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p . 0 1 .
*A = Method #1 
+B = Method #2
TABLE 14
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a tr ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  I m p o r ta n c e  o f  R e l i g i o n
po 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 































^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^  . 0 1 .
TABLE 15
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o r ta n ce  o f  A f g h a n i s t a n
PP po 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 

























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^  . 0 1 .
TABLK 16
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o r ta n c e  o f  C o m p a r a t iv e  Income
PS 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd























Second Outcome .31 .35
Salience
^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^ . 0 1 .
TA I) LI': 17
a.C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o rta n ce  o f  Equal O p p o r t u n i t y
1 . . 0 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 

























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^ . 0 1 .
TABLE 18
aC o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r i x  f o r  Model Components  f o r  I m p o rta n ce  o f  Home Ownership


































Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p < ^ . 0 1 .
TAiiLi-: I y
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  I m p o r ta n ce  o f  L e i s u r e
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd







Second Outcome .30 .50
Dependence
















^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h er e




^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o rta n ce  o f  I n f l u e n c i n g  O t h e r s
P , 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd
































^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p < . 0 1 .
CO '
TABLU: 21
^Correlation Matrix for Model Components for Importance of Retirement
pr Fs 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 

























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p 4 . 0 1 .
TABI.li 22
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o rta n ce  o f  N e igh b orh ood
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd 

























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p . 0 1 .
TABLE 23
to
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a tr ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o r ta n c e  o f  T a x es





























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p . 0 1 .
CO
TABLIC 24
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r i x  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o r ta n c e  o f  C o n se rv e  R e s o u r c e s





























Only  c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^  . 0 1 .
TABLH 25
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a tr ix  f o r  Model Components  Cor Im p o r ta n ce  o f  I n f l a t i o n
p. . 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd

























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e .
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p C . 0 1 .
TAIJLIC 26
^ C o r r e l a t i o n  M a t r ix  f o r  Model Components  f o r  Im p o r ta n ce  o f  Job  S e c u r i t y
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 1st 2nd 2nd 1st 2nd
Dep Dep Crit Crit Cnt A Cnt B Cnt A Cnt B Sal Sal
.57




























^Only c o r r e l a t i o n s  o f  . 3 0  o r  g r e a t e r  a r e  r e p o r t e d  h e r e
A l l  c o r r e l a t i o n s  a r e  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  p ^ . 0 1 .
TA13LK 27
Multiple Regression Rtisults for Full Model
tocn
Dependent










(Gen. Thought) (Linkages) 
of Outcome of Outcome 







Cen t . R* r 2
Religion 1.65 .56 .60 .27 .26 .38 1.44 .90 .81
Influence .65 .35 .80 1.60 .73 .54
Own Home 1.32 .35 -.53 .90 .66 .43
Taxes .36 .60 .46 .51 .60 .52 .64 .41
Job Security .44 .51 .87 .54 -.36 .46 .63 .40
Conserve
Resources .39 .89 .92 .61 .37
Retirement .35 .64 .39 .34 .54 .83 .61 .37
Afghanistan 1.32 .71 .79 .55 .60 .36
Income
(compare) .59 .40 .50 .56 .40 .42 .72 .60 .36
Equal
Opportunity .99 .70 .63 1.21 .60 .36
Leisure .69 .41 .72 -.45 .56 .41 .60 .36
Education .68 .33 1 .00 .58 .34
Inflation .47 .84 .65 .50 .56 .32
Neighborhood .44 .59 -.36 .37 .34 -.41 .36 .68 .58 .56 .32
*A11 regressions significant at p .0001.
TABLE 28
Frequency with Which Predictor Beta 
Coefficients Appear as Largest, Second Largest 
And Third Largest Among Significant Predictors 
In Fourteen Multiple Regression Analyses
Predictor Beta Coefficient Frequencies
Largest Second Third Totals
Primary Outcome 
Dependence
4 2 1 7
Second Outcome 
Dependence
1 3 3 7
Dependence Total 5 5 4 14
Factor Centrality 5 4 2 11
Criticalness to 
Primary Outcome
1 0 4 5
Criticalness to 
Secondary Outcome
1 1 1 3
Criticalness Total 2 1 5 8





of the Relative Ability of the Multiple Outcome Model vs. a 














SSE df F R^ SSE df F R^ F P*
Religion 860 206 103 .78 661 190 65 .81 .03 3.5 .01
Influence 1453 199 31 .52 1342 185 18 .54 .02 1 .1 NS
Own Home 1507 209 19 .39 1364 197 13 .43 .04 1.7 .10
Taxes 1612 206 13 .30 963 138 8 .41 .11 1 .4 .025
Job Security 1514 212 16 .35 1336 201 11 .40 .05 2.4 .01
Conserve Resources 1427 201 13 .31 1155 178 9 .37 .06 1 .8 .01
Retirement 1640 204 14 .33 1427 191 9 .37 .04 2.2 .01
Afghanistan 2095 203 14 .33 1667 169 8 .36 .05 1 .3 .10
Income (compare) 1726 206 15 .34 1569 194 9 .36 .02 1.6 .10
Equal Opportunity 1784 195 12 .30 1224 146 7 .36 .06 1.4 .05
Leisure 1226 213 13 .30 1051 197 9 .36 .06 2.1 .01
Education 998 212 13 .30 845 202 9 .34 .04 3.65 .01
Inflation 1419 201 10 .27 1258 181 7 .32 .06 1.2 NS
Neighborhood 1622 212 9 .24 1417 200 8 .32 .08 2.4 .01
F-test for significance of differences in predictive power of 
restricted/unrestricted regression models:
F = SSEy - SSE^ / dff- dfy
SSE / dfu u
SSE sum of squared error.
p indicates the level of significance 
for the difference in the ability of 
the two models to account for variance 
in the dependent variable.
TABLE 30
Rotated Factor Loadings for Item Importance 
Rating/Rankings
Item Factors
I II III IV V
Equal Opportunity -.07 .66 — . 08 -.04 .00
Home Ownership .49* -.05 .18 -.05 — . 13
Leisure .35 — .02 -.01 .26 .33
Influence Others -.10 -.03 -.05 .47 .01
Retirement .47 .06 .10 -.09 .02
Neighborhood .44 .01 .10 .35 .00
Taxes .12 .16 .66 -.05 .00
Income .18 -.23 .40 .03 .22
Education -.05 .06 .06 .02 .36
Religion .05 .19 -.37 -.07 -.30
Conserve Resources .10 .53 .16 -.14 .15
Inflation .14 .33 .66 -.11 .05
Job Security .51 — .03 .04 -.05 .04
Afghanistan .00 .53 .20 .14 -.10
Factors are defined as:
I. Personal Pleasure and Happiness,
II. Right and Wrong,
III. Financial Goals,
IV. Self Image.
♦Factor loadings greater than .40 are underlined.
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TABL1-] 31
Comparison o f  the  R e l a t i v e  A b i l i t y  o f  a C o g n i t i v e  Model t o  E x p l a i n











MSE df F MSE df F "2
Religion 3.5 87 39.8 .85 3.5 90 25 .77 -.08
Influence 7.4 85 8.8 . 55 7.6 87 9.0 .55 .00
Own Home 7.1 95 6.4 .45 6.9 89 6.8 .48 + .03
Taxes 7.0 56 3.9 .46 7.6 69 4.2 .42 -.04
Job Security 6 .6 96 7.2 .47 7.1 92 4.3 .36 -.11
Conserve Resources 5.0 80 5.0 .43 7.6 85 5.1 .42 -.01
Retirement 6.3 95 8.0 .50 8.6 83 3.3 .32 -.18
Afghanistan 11 .4 79 3.6 .36 9.0 77 4.8 .43 + .07
Income (compare) 8.1 . 88 5.6 .43 8.2 93 4.0 .34 -.09
Equal Opportunity 8.5 61 5.4 .52 8.2 72 1.9 .24 -.28
Leisure 4.5 90 7.5 .50 6.3 94 3.1 .28 -.22
Education 3.5 92 4.9 .39 4.6 97 5.6 .41 + .02
Inflation 7.5 80 3 .2 .33 6.6 88 4.9 .40 + .07
Neighborhood 6.1 92 4.4 .37 8.1 95 4.3 .35 -.02
TABLE 32
A Com parison  o f  th e  R e l a t i v e  A b i l i t y  o f  a C o g n i t i v e  Model






Less Than College (
Full Model 
Regression Results 
For Grad or More
MSE df F MSE df F «2
Religion 2.8 107 38 .82 4.4 70 27 .82 00
Influence 7.4 100 10 .56 6.9 72 8.8 .59 + .03
Own Home 7.8 110 6.5 .41 4.6 74 10 .62 + .21
Taxes 7.6 69 4.5 .44 5.9 56 5.2 .53 + .09
Job Security 6 .2 108 5 .4 .37 7.4 80 5.9 .47 + .10
Conserve Resources 6.4 103 6.3 .42 6.9 62 3.2 .38 -.04
Retirement 8.0 103 5 .3 .38 6.1 75 6.5 .51 + .13
Afghanistan 9.2 95 4.1 .34 10 61 5.6 .52 + .18
Income (compare) 8.1 106 4.7 .35 8.1 75 5.1 .45 + .10
Equal Opportunity 7.8 78 3.4 .34 9.4 55 4.0 .46 + .12
Leisure 5.3 105 7.6 .47 5.4 79 2.8 .30 -.17
Education 3.8 110 8.1 .47 4.9 79 2.1 .24 -.23
Inflation 7 .1 96 4.2 .34 7.2 72 3.4 .36 + .02
Neighborhood 6.9 108 6.6 .42 6.8 79 3.0 .32 -.10
O
TABLK 33
A Comparison  o f  t h e  R e l a t i v e  A b i l i t y  o f  a C o g n i t i v e  Model t o  E x p l a i n
E a c t o r  Im p o r ta n ce  For S u b j e c t s  o f  V a r y in g  Age
Full Model Full Model
Dependent Variable Regression Results Regression Results
MSE df F MSE df F
Religion 3.8 124 39 .79 3.0 53 26 .85 + .06
Influence 7.6 123 8.3 .44 6.8 49 9.5 .70 + .26
Own Rome 7 .0 131 9.6 .47 6.2 53 3.2 .42 -.05
Taxes 7.2 93 5.1 .40 5.8 32 4.7 .64 + .24
Job Security 5.7 133 8.8 .44 7.9 55 4.0 .47 + .03
Conserve Resources 6.4 119 6.4 .39 7.3 46 2.6 .41 + .02
Retirement 7.8 124 5.3 .34 5.4 54 7.5 .62 + .28
Afghanistan 9.7 111 4.4 .32 8.8 45 5 .8 .61 + .29
Income (compare) 8.3 130 5.6 .34 7.8 51 4.3 .50 + .16
Equal Opportunity 7.8 93 5.4 .41 10.2 40 2.2 .40 -.01
Leisure 5.1 133 6.6 .37 6.0 51 2.4 .36 -.01
Education 3.3 135 5 .6 .33 6.7 54 3.0 .40 + .07
Inflation 7.5 116 3.2 .25 5.3 52 6.1 .58 + .28
Neighborhood 7.6 134 5.1 .31 4.4 53 6.8 .61 + .30
TABLE 34
A Comparison of the Relative Ability of a 
Cognitive Model to Explain Importance of 













MSE df F MSE df F %2 r |-r 2
Religion 5.4 87 22 .75 1.5 90 5.0 .40 -.35
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TABLE 35
A Comparison of the Relative Ability of the 
Cognitive Model to Explain Factor Importance for 









Importance of MSE df F MSE df F 4
Comparative
Income
6.9 66 3.3 .37 9.2 59 4.1 .45 .08
Job Security 6.1 69 2.3 .28 6.6 65 6.3 .54 .26
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TABLE 36
Correlations Between Unrestricted and Restricted 
Rating of Factor Importance for Selected Job-related 





Factor r* Factor T*
Job Security .67 Neighborhood .60
Retirement .64 Religion .93
Fair Treatment .46 Home Ownership .73
Recognition and .64 Money .72
Appreciation
Community Health .69















Fif^ure 2. Context Multidimen.sional i ty .
Factors A ,  B and C are relevant to one 
or more outcomes (IV, X, Y, Z). II 
context is specified as outcome X, 
then Factors A and B are seen as 
relevant, while Factor C is not.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
AND INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you f o r  your p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in t h i s  research  s tu dy .  This q u e s t io n n a ir e  
i s  part  of  a d o c t o r a l  d i s s e r t a t i o n  research  p r o j e c t  designed to f in d  out  how 
d i f f e r e n t  groups o f  people look at  c e r t a i n  common, everyday t o p i c s  in  our 
s o c i e t y .  In tlie ques t ionn a ire  you w i l l  be asked to express  your persona l  
b e l i e f s  about a wide v a r i e t y  of  s u b j e c t s .  The q ues t ionn a ire  i s  com p le te ly  
anonymous -  p l e a s e  do not  put your name anywhere on the q u e s t io n n a ir e .
You are encouraged to be carefu l  to  express  on ly  your own personal  v i e w s ,  
r e g a r d le s s  of  whether or not your views are  c o n s i s t e n t  with the v iew s  o f  
o t h e r s .
The q u e s t ion s  you are  asked in t h i s  survey o f t e n  require  some thought.  You 
should answer each ques t ion  t h o u g h t fu l l y , but do not spend too much time on 
any one q u e s t io n .  We recognize  that  some o f  th e se  q u e s t ion s  w i l l  be more 
d i f f i c u l t  than o thers  for you. We have done e ve ry th ing  p o s s ib l e  to make the  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  and examples very c l e a r  but r e a l i z e  that  you may s t i l l  have some 
qu e s t io n s .  PLEASE, PEEL COMPLETELY FREE TO CALL THE RESEARCH NUMBER GIVEN 
BELOW IF YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND ANY PART OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE. WE WILL VERY 
MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR CALL.
The q u e s t io n n a ir e  c o n s i s t s  of  s e v e r a l  s e c t i o n s .  I t  i s  very important that  
you complete  each s e c t i o n  before going on to the next  s e c t i o n .  You should  
complete the e n t i r e  ques t ionn a ire  at  one s i t t i n g .  P l e a se  do not complete  one 
s e c t i o n  and then return l a t e r  to complete  the next  s e c t i o n .  READ THE INSTRUCT­
IONS CAREFULLY.
THIS IS NOT A TEST. There are no r ig h t  or wrong answers.  It  i s  very  important  
that  you t e l l  us how your r e a l l y  f e e l .  Tlie u s e f u l n e s s  o f  t h i s  study w i l l  
depend upon the frankness  with which you answer the q u e s t io n s .  REMEMBER,
Ml AT YOU SAY IN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Your i d e n t i t y  
i s  not required and w i l l  not  be known to anyone.
When you have completed the e n t ir e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e ,  p l e a s e  seal  i t  in the 
envelope  provided and return  i t  immediate ly .
TIL\NK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.





D ir e c t io n s :  I n d ic a te  your response to the q u e s t io n s  below EXAMPLE :
by p u t t 'a y an "F" in the space to the l e f t  o f  the most
c o rrec t  response,  ur by w r i t i n g  you answer in the blocks 1. Your present  .ni;e.
provided.  Please  use a p e n c i l .  Erase c l e a n l y  any answers  








Present  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  in school .
  Part-t ime s tudent
C o l la te  Freshman 
i . o l l i ' c u  S o n i ' . o m o r e
  Collvze Junior
Col lece  Senior  
Jraciuare Student  
Mu longer in sc h oo l
hov; much education have you had? 
(Mark only r.iiu ii i yhes t  Iuvc-1')
(iradc school  or l e s s
 Some Hie’n School
Hiy!i S.i'iool Cr.'iduate 
_  Some Co!lego
  Vocational  or Trade School
  Col leee  Graduate ( i  year)
Some Graduate School  or 
Advanced Deyree
Marital S ta tu s .
Sine! <-•
Married
  Divorced or Separated
ed
Do vou have ch. ildren v;!ion vou
8. Are you present ly  a member of  any
church or other r e l i g i o u s  or gan iza t ion?
Yes
9. how o f t e n  do you at tend re] ir.ions  
s e r v i c e s ?
 More titan once a week
  About once a week
About twice a m.onth
 A i ' o u t  un c i '  a m.unti i
   Less than once a month
  Very rarely
Meve r
10. Are you presently  employed?
Yes Ful l - t im e  Pa. r t - t  ime
11. Your occunation:
12. How long have you been on your present, 
iob?
Less than one year 
1 - 2  years  
3 - 5  years  
More than 5 years
THIS COMPLETES SECTION I 
PLEASE GO ON 10 THE NEXT SECTION
es How m.anv?
.\0
C i t i z e n s h ip .
 .Vmerican
  Other ( s p e c i f y )
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SECTION II  
General Importance Items
D i r e c t io n s  : In t h i s  s e c t i o n  you are  asked to  in d ic a t e  how important  each item i s  to  
you by r a t i n g  i t  from 0 to 15. A zero ( 0 ) means the i tem i s  not a t  a l l  
important to you and a 15 means that  the item i s  extremely important to you.
A f t e r  r a t in g  the item, you are asked to s e l e c t  the f i r s t  and second most accurate  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  what the item means to you.
The importance sc a le  i s  given on the r i g h t .  The meaning d e s c r i p t i o n s  are d i r e c t l y  
below the importance s c a l e .  I n d i c a t  your answer by w r i t in g  the number of  the 
importance r a t in g  and the l e t t e r s  of  the meanings you s e l e c t  in the spaces provided.
ITEM Importance 1s t  2nd 
Rating_______Meaning Meaning
1. Honestv
2. The kind of  neighbor­
hood I l i v e  i n ................
3. Job s e c u r i t y
i .  Friends ..........
5. P r e s t i g e ..........
6. Overtime work
7. Ambition..........
8. R ecogni t ion  and 
a p p r e c i a t i o n . . . .
9. R e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s  . . .
10. Fair  treatment ...........
11. Doing my b es t  in 
whatever 1 do . . .
12. Marriage ............................
13. Retirement .......................
11. S erv ice  to  others . . . .
15. My pay as compared to 
o t h e r s  ................................
E.'GMIPLE :
Footba l l  ................ • ^ _ H _
Legal  J u s t i c e  . . • J 3
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OF SOME IMPORTANCE 6
-■ 5
-4
OF LITTLE IMPORTANCE 3
2
1
OF NO IMPORTANCE -0
I I .  MEANING DESCRIPTIONS
A. F inanc ia l  g o a l s .
B. My P leasu re /happ iness .
C. Right and '.’rong.
D. Personal  growth and
development.
E. Health and s a f e t y .
F. My image of m yse l f •
G. Nationa l  s e c u r i t y .
H. NONE OF THE ABOVE
Importance 1st 2nd
Rating Meaning Meaning
16. The chance to do work that  i s  c h a l l e n g i n g . .  ____  ____  ____
17. Promotion (on the job)  ............................................. ......... .........  ......
IS. Owning ray own home ......................................................  .........  .........  ........
19. The chance to try  new t h in g s  ..............................  .......... .........  .........
20. Others looking to  me f o r  d i r e c t i o n .............................  .........  .........
21. Money ....................................................................................  .........  .........  .........
22. Equal opportuni ty for  a l l  races  .......................  .........  .........  ..........
23. Knowing important peop le  .......................................  .........  .........  ..........
21. Community hea l th  care  q u a l i t y  ............................  .........  .........  .........
25. Taxes .................................................................................... ............  .........  .........
26. Afghanistan ......................................................................  .........  .........  .........
27. Education ...........................................................................  .........  .........  .........
28. Being able  to i n f l u e n c e  o t h e r s  ............................................................      _____
29. T e l e v i s io n  .....................................................................................  .........  .........
30. Contribut ing  to s o c i e t y  ..........................................  .........  .........  .........
31. Var ie ty  in the work I do ........................................ __ _
32. Personal  m ora l i ty  ........................................................ ............  .........  .........
33. Le isure  time .................................................................... ............  .........
34. The opportuni ty to  use  my a b i l i t i e s  .............. ............  .........  .........
35. The amount o f  ray pay .................................................  .......... .........  .........
36. Church ..................................................................................  .......... .........  ..........
37. Tlie approval and accep tan c e  o f  my peers . . .  ____  ____  _____
38. Company l o y a l t y  ............................................................. ............  .........  .........
39. I n f l a t i o n  ........................................................................... ............  .........  ..... ....
40. Conservation of  n a t u r a l  re sou rc e s  ................... .........  .........  ..........
41. Recreation  .........................................................................  .........  .........  .........
42. The q u a l i ty  o f  work I do ........................................ .........  .........  ..........
43. Federal  government ...................................................... ............  .........  ..........
44. P a t r i o t i s m .........................................................................  .........  .......... ..........
45. P o l i t i c a l  h o s t a g e s  ..................................................
T T T
SECTION' III
Uliat does i t  i nc lude?
Dj.j]ectJxM]_s. In t l ; is  s e c t io n  you are asked to cons ider  tlie primary e lements  yon 
include  .-.hen \ou t ii ink of  each i tem. Here we are not concerned v.'itli t i i in cs  von 
think are a f f e cted bv 
the i tem.
r the item, but th in gs  which you th ink o f  as  a c t u a l l y  m.'king up
Err each item you w i l l  be given a l i s t  o f  e lements  commonly included in what people  
think of when they cons ider  that i tem. You arc to s e l e c t  the two elements  which
are most r e p r es e n ta t iv e  of  what you tliink o f  wiien you I'onsider the item.vou til 1 ;
V('u should i n d i c a t e  yanir ciu' ices  by put t in g  
of eacii your s e i e c t i m i s .
cnee in tile space to tlie left
It mac be that  none o f  tin.' items 1 i s t e d  represi-nts  the elc'ments vou would includi,'. 
Space.- are provided for you to w r i te  in UNE WORD s u b s t i t u t e s  for those provided.
1: you choose to w r i te  in one or more c h o i c e s ,  use ONE WORD ONLY. Remember, DO NOT 
u-e t i l ings wnich are a i fee t e d by tne i tem. L se  t h ings i-.Tiich are a c t u a l l y  e lements  
of tlie i tem.
EXAMPLE: ITEM
Pets
ELEMENTS INCLUDED IN THE ITEM
Ca t s 
Docs
Horses
National  s e c u r i t '   The economy
 yX The m i l i t a r y
  Eni ted  Nations
Free dom/ l i b e r t;
1. My income compared to that of  o thers Amount o f  my pay
My neighbors'  pay
Fay of o th e rs  wi th  s i m i l a r  Jobs
Pay of people  my age
2. A col l t -ge  educat ion Diploma
Classes  & study  
Cost s
Facu1 tv
3. Ri'licinn Chu rch
Faith
Cod
Mo ra 1 i t v 
liypocr i sy
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Conserva:iua of  na tura l  resources .
Pol lut  ion
CnV1ronmen ta l i s t s
  O i l ,  gas
Git i z e n s ’n in dutv
11. Being ab le  to inf luence  o t h e r s .
 Fh-ing tlic ivtss
  Power
  Persuas iveness
  Respect
Owning ny own home.
  The r igh t  house
Mortagago
.'^'permanent p la c e  Cc' l i v e
10. Leisure t ime.
  Time alone
  Family time
  Vacation
Recreation
Tile rate  of  i n f l a t i o n .
F.conomics 
P r i c e 5
I n t e r e s t  rate  
Dollar  value
Ret irem ent .
Old age 
Leisure
Pension or s o c ia l  s e c u r i t y
: 0 0  s e c u r i t v
Demand for ny s k i l l s
Firing
Layoffs
!’e rnaneti t ennlovir.en t
.3. The kind o f  neighborhood I l i v e  in.
S i z e  o f  bouse 
Schools
Newness of homes
S o c i a l  s ta tus  of neighbors
A :anan is tan .
U 5 i
Russian aggress ior  
I ran
Taxes .
I n L rna ! Revonuc So rv i c e 
Income tax 
S o c ia l  Security  
Lind fa 11 p r o f i t s
Leua 1 opportunLty for a l l  races .
  Federal  law
Jobs for m i n o r i t i e s  
Seine 1 int'.ngrat ion THIS COMl’I.LTLS SLCi'IDX i l l  
GO OX TO THE NEXT SECTION
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s  t e n  ON IV
Importance Rating and Ranking
D ir e c t io n s :  In tin's .section vou arc asked to both rate  and r.ank s e l e c t e d  items
according to no:; important they are to you. Remember, v.'e are i n t e r e s t e d  only in 
your ov.Ti personal  views.
You should:
1. Look over the l i s t  of items to get  an idea of  what they are.
2. Determine- which of the ite!::s is :!ost impc'rtnnt to you. 'liion I. o the
c a p i t a l i z e d  portion of  that  item on the l i n e  to the r igh t  of the rating  
s c a l e  number which re pr ese nt s  it.s importance to you. Lor e:-:amplc, i f  
you b e l i e v e d  that "SERVING others"  was the most important item of  those
l i s t e d  below,  vou would de c id e  how imnortant i t is  to vou on the sonic
U 1Ô. ihen you wri te  SLRViN'G on the l in e  to the right  ul that
number you s e l e c t  ( see  example below).
Cross the f i r s t  item you s e l e c t e d  o f f  the l i s t .
d. S i - l i l t  tiie 1 cast important item from the l i s t .  Decide how important it 
i s  to  you ar.d wri te  the CAPITALIZED LORD ONLY on tiie l i n e  to the r ight  of 
t'ne number on the importance s c a l e .  I:: the example below,  tlie person thought 
ret irement  -.as tiie l eas t  im:'orta:'.t of the i t..ms and wrote i t  on the l ine  
:'.cxt to t'ne number 2. Cross out that  item.
-t. Now from t'ne remaining l i s t  s e l e c t  the most important item and repeat  the 
p r o c e ss .  Then s e l e c t  tiie l e a s t  important of  the reinaini:ig items and repeat
the process  for that i tem. Do t h i s  u n t i l  ALL OF THE IT EN F ARE v.'RITTEN NEXT
10 ''HE SCALE AND ALL ARE CilECNED 0! F üiE LIST.
NOTE: You m=ay ciioose to w r i t e  more than one item, on a l i ne.  I f  you Judge that
two or mere items are o f  the same importance w r i te  the CAPITALIZED portion  
o: both i tems on the same l i n e .  In the example- below,  the items SERVING and 
NAiL'iLITY were considered of  equal  importance.
















1 ; i:ms :
-  My TXCiM'n compared to that  of  o thers .
-  A eol !e -c -  iMTAI HiX.
- i::r:.A;:A::.
-  (fi;;St.-’".','!!: io;i of o. '.tural RESni'hCES.
- ihhj'hu::.
- My joo ?r.ry:\jxi-
- Aft .MAMi s ; a ; : .
-  ElTAL opportun i t  y  for a l l  r a i e s .
-  O v / n i n t ;  n v  o'.-.-u i lOMh.
- LEISl'Rn cine.
-  Koine nhle ti' I.M.’TMÎM.Ï.'i' oiiier-;.
- KMnRMMMMJ.




OF SOME IMFOMTAMCE .










Job S a t i s f a c t i o n  & L i f e S a t ls_f
D i r e c t io n s  : In t i l l s  s e c t i o n  you nre asked to rate the importance oT s e v e r a l
i tems accord in g  to hov; important you th in k  each would be in determin ing  your 
s a t i s f a c t i o n  witii  your IDEAL job -  the  kind of  ioh vou would most l ik e  to iiave. 
You w i l l  a l s o  be asked to ra te  a number of  i tems according to  liow important you 
ti i ink each i s  in determining o v e r a l l  s a t i s f a c t i o n  witli l i f e .  In each c a s e  you 
rate the i tem from 0 -  15. Write your importance r a t in g  to the l e f t  o f  the 
item in the space provided.
E.\.-V-ITLES :
FOR SATISFACTION ON MY IDEAL JOB, HOW IMPORTANT IS
1. My s u p e r v i s o r ' s  t e c h n ic a l  s k i l l s .
FOR GENER/\L SATISFACTION IN LIFE, HOW IMPORTANT IS
IMPORTANCE SCALE
FOR SATISFACTION ON Mf IDEAL JOB. ExtreriO 1 y T r.ip or tant 15
HOW IMPORTANT IS ............... 15
1 Job s e c u r i t y . r n
2 Ret irement. Very Important
12
3 Fair treatment. r I I
Zt R ecogn i t ion  and a p prec ia t ion . . It:
5 My pay as compared to o t h e r s . Important ■ 9
6 Promotion. ■ 3
7 The chance to do work that  i s  c h a l l e n g in g . - 7
8 The opportuni ty  to use my a b i l i t i e s . Of Some Importance • 6
9 The amount of  ray pay. 5
10 V ar ie ty  in  tlie work I do.
L i t t l e  Importance
- 'i
■ 3
FOR GENERAL SATISFACTION IN LIFE, ■ 2
HOW IMPORTANT IS .............. 1
1 The kind o f  neighborhood I l i v e  in .
Of No Importance 0
___ 2 R e l i g i o u s  b e l i e f s .









Le •'sure Lime. 
T e l e v i s i o n .
1 0 , ; r i e n o s .
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ri!1 51 COMPLETES THE FIRST H AL F OK THE Q U E S T I O N N A I R E
PLEASE 00 ON TO THE NEXT PACE
217
SECTION- VI 
V.jiy_ i s  ~;no r tant
D i r e c t i o n s : In the s e c t i o n  'nec inning on the next  pa£,e you are asked in g ive  your
on in ion as to t'ne outcome or conséquence '.-.•ith v.’itic'n you miust a.ssi it (■ s'_- ! 'cc to '  i tems.
You '..'ill be given an item on the l e f t  and s e v e r a l  c i io icos  on the ri;':;t. .ün-
i n t e r e s t e d  in knowing to v'nich ty.'o of tiie c h o i c e s  on tiie riyiit von tiiink the  
i t ’--::, on tiie i e f :  makes it.s great L-st cnntr i'u:t Lcn. in o ther  •.■.•unN, •••i.ch itein is
pre''umed to m.ike snm.e c o n t r ib u t io n  to one or more o f  the cho ices  en I is- ri -hi. V o u
are to  s e l e c t  th.e ticu c h o ice s  to '.•.•iiicit you f e e l  tiie ite::; -take.s i t_̂  cy e a t e s t  cont r ihu' ioj;
In th.e spaces d i r e c t l y  below the choices  you should wr 11e a nur.ber one ( 1 ) for your 
f i r s t  c i ioice,  and a number two ( -  ) for your second o'noice. As before,  a blank
sipa.ce i s  pruvitied i f  you f e e l  none o f  the ciioice.s i s  the one to wliich the item ma la - n
i t s  g r e a te s t  c o n t r ib u t io n .  You may write  an a l t e r n a t e  c i io ice  in that space .  Be sure  
tc usa s iicrt  n'nrases or one word for your a l t e r n a t i v e  s e l e c t i o n s  .\ND 'ne sure to 
w r i te  ;iie number in the space provided which i n d i c a t e s  whether i t  is your f i r s t  or  
second cho ice .
You w i l l  note that  the i tems on the l e f t  are on a n a i f  s hee t  of th is  q u e s t io n n a ir e
and tiie cho ices  on the r ig h t  are a c tu a l ly  loca ted  on a d i f f e r e n t  page. T!i is  is
as i t  i s  -'ntended. P lease  mark your answers in tiie spaces  provided ..-n the pace- 
whicli contains the c h o i c e s .
i ’c r s n n a j  vT’ O k FH a n d  d o v e  1 o p r . e n  I 
i i B A L l l i  a n d  v a f e t y y
RI Chi' and wnnr..'.  |
My IM\GE of  myse lf  
NATIONAL s e cu r i ty . ,  i
FINANCIAL "oals ' |




2 .  Automobile
O t h e r :
In this examnle, the p e r s o n  feelo that Ar-ltion -a>es its rroatuot 
contribution or h a s  the Greatest influence on h i . . I. roais ( r1 )
and has the second Greatest influence on hv hh.lh of no self ( // 2
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i'he itiT. i'flo',-.- icn t  I-ibut es  r.i'st in 
( I n d ic a te  •••1 mu! -2 ciiolces)
i .  Emm]  o r i K' r t u n  i c V f o r  n i l  r a c e s
2. Ov.-ni:;c r.v ov;n hor
J, Leisure time
Heine ab le  to  i n f lu e n c e  others
1 . Retirement
6. T'ne bind o f  neic'nborliood 1
iive in.
l a x e s
S. Mv income com.narcd to others
b.  A c u l l c c e  e d u c a t i c ’
1C. R e l ig ion
11. Conserving n atura l  resources
12.  I n f l a t i o n
id. Mv ie'l s é c u r i t é
1 .  . \ f  ciia .n i s I an.
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SF'.CTio:; VII 
Decree o f  In f luence
In ch is  <cc: ion you arc 
asked to rate  t ’ne decree to which the 
atta inticnt  or maintenance of a s a t i s ­
factory  l e v e l  o f  the c i io lces  you nade 
0 :1  the ri'ciit are a f f e c t e d  or inf luenced  
hv the i ter,  on the Lef t .
You should ra' 
on a s c a l e  of 
ci veil below.
the decree of in f luence  
1 to 5. The s c a le  i s
You are to in d ica te  how r.uch the iter,  
in f lu e n c e s  -‘.u:ii of  the TV.'i> choices  you 
have narked "I and •■2. That i s ,  your 
f i r s t  and second c h o i c e s  from the 
n r e v ieus s e c t i o n .
SCALE OF INFLUENCE
Very s trong  in f l u e n c e  — 5
St rone indluence  — - A
Some i n f l u e n c e  — -  3
L i t t l e  i n f l u e n c e  — _ 1




Ç  kS 1. .-Xr.b i t  i ton




■ ■ ■  J l ±
• • •  J A.
In the example above,  the person b e l i e v e s  
that for h i n / her Ambition has a VERY 
STRONG in f lu e n c e  on t in anc ia ]  r.nals (•••I 
cho ice )  and SOXE i n f lu e n c e  on p leasure  ( f2 )
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riOV.’ Xm -  tloos thv iter. !-e]ev influence* 
the 1 cho ice  on the rluii t? l i ie ••2 
choice?
rCiu’ice ••1
r C i ' . o i c e
1. r.cuni opportuni ty for n i l  rnces,
2. Ov.'tiinc r.y own hone ............................
i .  Le isure  t in e  ....................................... .
Being ab le  to in f luence  o t h e r s . .
5. Ret irenent  ..............................................
6. The kind of neighborhood I
l i v e  in ................................................... .
7. Taxes ........................................................
S. Xy incone conpnred to o thers  . .
. A ci' l l i -ye educa t ion ...................................
10. R e l ig io n  .................................................
11. Conserving natural  resources
1 ? .  I n f l a t i o n  ..........................................................
iJ. Xv ; e i  s e c u r i t y  .............
1 -4, A Î ‘ ’ 1 ' n ’11 t n • • • * • * • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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SECTION VIII 
Cri c i c a l n e s s
Hi r e ce lon s :  In t h i s  sec t ion  vou are  
asked to i n d ic a t e  the e ”tent  to which 
there are r e a d i l y  a v a i la b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s -  
for each iter, which night  be used to  
e i t i i er  s u b s t i t u t e  tor the c o n tr ib u t io n  
ti’.c i t  en nakes ,  OR inigiit be used to 
avoid or o f f s e t  negat iv e  consequences  
of  tiie i t e n .
You w i l l  r a te  each item on the l e f t  as  
to t!io decree  to which i t  i s  a b s o l u t e l y  
e s s e n t i a l  nr unnvoida'nle KITii RlkSI’ECl' TO 
ITS INFLUENCE ON THE "1 ,VND "2 CHOICES 
ON THE RIGHT.
You should ra te  each i t e n  us ing  the  
numbers on tlie s c a l e  below FOR BOTH 
THE •••1 and 2 CHOICES YOU I-IADE EARLIER.
CRITICALNESS SCALE
, t!:ere are no readily  
:!va i la !) l e  subst i t u t e s . 
The i ter,  i s  e s s e n t i a l  
or unavoidable.
YES, there i s  one or more 
p o s s i b l e  s u b s t i t u t e s  - 
BUT they are n^t 
re a d i ly  a v a i la b l e .
YES, there i s  one or more 
p o s s i b l e  s u b s t i t u t e s  
whicii are somewhat 
a v a i l a b l e  to me.
YES, there i s  one or more
p o s s i b l e  s u b s t i t u t e s  ___
and they are very 
r e a d i l y  a v a i la b le  to  me.
EXAMPLE:
Choice vl  
r Clio i c e  ■‘2
HEALTĤ  
FINANCIAL goa l s
PLEASURE
3_  _.0_ Ambition .........................  Æ  J _
/ _  2. Rocrerat ion
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To what e x te n t  are there  r e a d i l y  a v a i la b l e  




Personal  GROWTH and development-  
HEALTH and s a f e t y —, 
RIGHT and wrong- 
My IMAGE o f  m y s e l f -----
NATIONAL s e c u r i t y —  j
i I
FINANCIAL g o a l s -------, I
My PLEASURE/ happiness—̂ | |
1. Equal opportuni ty  for  a l l  races
Other
2. Owning mv own home
Other
3. Leisure  time
Other
4.  Being ab le  to i n f l u e n c e  others
Other
5 .  Retirement
Other
6. The kind o f  neighborhood 




8.  My Income compared to others
Other
  ___  9. A c o l l e g e  education
  ____  10. R e l ig io n  ........................
Other
Other
11. Conserving natura l  resources.
Other
12. I n f l a t i o n
Other






F cj/ _o f 1 iioii j ĥt
i' i r c L I : Ip. cl i is  s e c t i tm  you o.rt' askoci to cuas i Jor iio'.-; of loi i  you ii.iv._-
t::.'U,;'at a'aout tiic i tems GENER-M.LV ( over tiie pa.-U v^ar , .r two) ,iiiù I! FCFN !T.V 
I, ovi-r ciio y.ist to  ̂ weeks) .
F irs t  you siiould i n d i c a t e  hov; o f te n  you GENER.-\LLV tii ink o f  tlie it-.-ri. Tndivnti  
your cho ice  'o y n i a c i n s  an X in the anprnpr i . ite  space i'elov; the col  umn of 
ansv.-ers labe led  GENERALLY.
Next, you should i n d i c a t e  hov; much more or l e s s  you have thought about the iter 
re ce n t ly  as compared to over the la s t  year or tv;o. You should ind icate  vour 
ciioice by p la c in g  an X in the appropriate  space below tiie culumn of  answers  
labe led  RECENTLY.
EXAXPLES:
GENERALLY 
G eneral ly ,  I tend to 
th ink about th i s  . . .
Vicrv Ort-en.-
Somewha t Often — 
O c c a s i o n a l l y —̂
Very L i t t l e —
It a l l   I
1. .-.oney ..............
c . Church ............  _
3. Iran .................  X
_  __x
RECENTLY
As compared to g e n e r a l l y  in the 
p a s t ,  I have r e c e n t ly  tiiought 
about th is  .............................................
'•‘uc!i l-'or<‘-., 
Son’.cv.'hat .'-lore-- j
About tiie Same— |
Somewhat l e s s — j j '
UCil Less--, ; ; I j





Genera l ly ,  I tend to  
th in k  about t h i s  . . .
Very Often- 
Somevhat Often-. 
O c c a s i o n a l l y ..
Very L i t t l e  
Not at a l l
Equality for a l l  r a c e s . .
O’.wiinc r.y ov.t. h e r e  ......
Leisure  t i r e  ........................
Being able to in f lu e n c e  
o the rs  .....................................
retirèrent
The kind of neighborhood 
I l i v e  in ..............................
laxes
9 _











My Lncoro corpared to 
others  ...................................
c o l l e g e  educat ion . . .
Re I i i o n  ......................................
Conserving natura l  
resources ............................
InI ' lat icn ............................
My Job s e cu r i ty  ..............
; \friianiStan .......................
My personal  growth and 
development ........................
I s s u e s  of ric'nt i  wrong. 
My p le asu re /happ ine ss .  . .
Nat ional  s e c u r i t y  ............
Health and s a f e t y  ............
F inanc ia l  goa ls  .................
Mv irace  of r v s e l f  ..........
As compared to g e n e r a l l y  in  
the pas t ,  I have r e c e n t l y  





Much Less  I
I I




SCORING INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
THE PERSONAL BELIEFS 
QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRODUCTION
The following instructions are meant as a suggested guide for 










Age as reported (e.g. "26") 
Male=l Female=2
Scored 1-7, top to bottom (i.e 
Part-time student=l 
Scored 1-7, top to bottom.








No=0, Yes^Number reported 
American=l, 0ther=0 
Yes=l, No=2
Scored 1-7, top to bottom (i.e. 
Never=7)
No=0, full-time=l, Part-time=2 
This was not used in the study, 
however occupation code may 
be employed here.




P a r t  A: Importance Rat ing  in  U n s p e c i f i e d  C o n tex t .
Each of the forty-five factors is scored according to 
the rating given in the first column to the right of the 
factor (i.e. 0 - 15).
Part B : Outcome Centrality, Method No. 1.
Here the total number of times letter appears in 
either the second or third columns to the right of the factor 
is recorded as the relative cognitive centrality for that 
outcome. In other words, the total number of times a subject 
entered an "A" in either the 1st or 2nd meaning columns (the 
maximum would be 45 since the same letter would not be used 
for both a 1st and 2nd meaning) is recorded. 1 found it 
convenient to record these totals directly to the left of the 
respective letters in the "Meaning Descriptions" box. It is 




Response choices were numbered 1-5 from top to bottom 
for all provided responses. All response choices written in 
blanks by subjects were scored "0". (It may be possible to 
work out a coding for each of the major write-in responses, 
but this was not done in this study.
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SECTION IV 
RATING AND RANKING 
Each factor was given a score from 0-15 which 
corresponded to the position in which it was placed on the 
rating/ranking scale.
SECTION V
SPECIFIED CONTEXT IMPORTANCE RATINGS 
Scores were recorded for each factor listed under Job 
Satisfaction (A) and Life Satisfaction (B) context ratings.
As in previous sections scores could be between 0 and 15.
SECTION VI 
ASSOCIATED OUTCOME IDENTIFICATION 
Each of the seven outcome choices provided at the top 
of page 223 from which the subject made a first (1) and second 
(2) choice was given a value of from 1-7, left to right, i.e. 
Pleasure/happiness was 1 and Growth and development was 7.
Responses were then scored by giving a score of 1-7 
for the first choice for each factor and a 1-7 for the second
; .g. ;
Factor Score
12. Inflation first choice 2 (Financial goals)
Inflation second choice 1 (Pleasure/happiness)
Note that pages 219-222 are half pages and that the right half 
of page 223 should be visible under pages 219 and 221.
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SECTION VII 
DEPENDENCE OF OUTCOMES ON FACTOR 
Scores were given for the dependence of choice No. 1 
and No. 2 on the factor in question. The No. 1 and No. 2 
corresponded to the '1' and '2' choices the subject selected 
in the previous section (VI) and which are visible on page 223 
to the right of page 221.
Scores were given 1-5 for dependence of choice No. 1 
on the factor and 1-5 for dependence of choice No. 2 on the 
factor. e.g.:
I tern Score
12. Inflation dependence of outcome No. 1 4 (Strong influence)
Inflation dependence of outcome No. 2 3 (Some influence)
SECTION VIII 
CRITICALNESS OF FACTOR CONTRIBUTION 
Scored in the same fashion as Section VII, except that 
scores run from 0-3.
SECTION IX
Part A. Factor + Outcome Centrality (Method No. 2).
The answer choices for GENERAL thought (left-hand 
portion of page 225) were given values of 1-5 from left to 
right (i.e., "not at all" was scored 1 while "very often" was 
scored 5).
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Each factor and outcome (item 1-14 are factors, 15-25 
outcomes) received a score of from 1-5.
Part B. Factor and Outcome Salience.
The answer choices for RECENT thought (right-hand 
portion of page 225) were given values of 1-5 from left to 
right (i.e., "much less" was scored 1, while "much more" was 
scored 5) .
Each factor and outcome received a score of from 1-5.
Employing the above scoring methods and using all 80 columns 
on a standard IBM computer card (i.e., no spaces between 
items) approximately five cards were required per subject.
231
